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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation studies how loss-aversion, i.e., people’s behavioral tendency to be more sensitive to 
potential losses than the same amount of potential gains, affects households’ insurance buying decisions 
and savings decisions. The first chapter, "Prospect Theory and Insurance Demand," tries to answer the 
question of why a substantial fraction of households remains uninsured even if classical expected utility 
theory predicts that it is beneficial to own insurance. This chapter posits that prospect theory’s loss-
aversion and reference point dependence can address the under-insurance puzzle and tests the theory. This 
chapter finds empirical evidence consistent with prospect theory using the American Life Panel (ALP) 
data: loss-averse individuals have a low ownership rate of long-term care insurance, supplemental 
disability insurance, and private health insurance; they express a low willingness to pay for health 
insurance; they are unwilling to purchase health insurance in a hypothetical insurance choice experiment. 
These results are consistent with prospect theory, which predicts that loss-aversion may decrease 
insurance demand if individuals’ reference points are ‘the wealth level when they do not engage in 
insurance contracts.’ Under such reference points, individuals may regard insurance as a “risky 
investment” because they may lose premiums if a pre-specified bad event does not occur. Hence, those 
who are more sensitive to potential losses in premiums are unwilling to buy insurance.  
   The second chapter investigates how loss-aversion affects individuals’ decisions about saving using 
the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) data. Specifically, this chapter empirically tests if prospect 
theory’s loss aversion decreases insurance demands and increases savings demands. Loss-averse 
individuals may be unwilling to buy term-life insurance because term-life insurance can be regarded as a 
risky investment. Instead, they may choose a more safe option to prepare for uncertain future events by 
increasing precautionary saving. This chapter tests this prediction and finds empirical evidence consistent 
with it: loss-averse individuals are less likely to own term-life insurance and more likely to own whole-
life insurance, which serves as a partial savings instrument. These individuals also hold a higher level of 
wealth than others, suggesting that they tend to save more (presumably for precautionary motives), all 
other things being equal.  
   The third chapter explores the socially optimal level of insurance given that households are subject to 
behavioral biases, especially narrow framing and loss aversion. The central issue of this normative 
analysis is whether or not a social welfare function (SWF) should take into consideration the behavioral 
components of preferences. One school of thought claims that social planners should not consider 
behavioral components since they are anomalies or mistakes that are often self-destructive. Another 
school of thought argues that social planners should respect behavioral components because these 
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components determine actual choices and may reflect true and stable preferences. After exploring both 
viewpoints, this chapter concludes that narrow framing and loss aversion need to be considered in 
normative analysis at least to some extent because these behavioral biases may partially, if not completely, 
shape authentic and stable preferences. This chapter then shows that the socially optimal level of 
insurance could be lower than full insurance when these behavioral components are reflected in the SWF.  
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CHAPTER 1  
Prospect Theory and Insurance Demand 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Households’ take-up ratio of insurance is substantially lower than what standard economic theory 
suggests it should be. A classical expected utility theory predicts that risk-averse agents (more specifically, 
expected utility maximizers with a concave utility-of-wealth function) should fully insure themselves as 
long as premiums are actuarially fair (Mossin, 1968). However, the take-up ratio of insurance products is 
far below the prediction even after higher-than-fair premiums are taken into account: only 14 percent of 
Americans aged 60 and over hold private long-term care insurance (Brown & Finkelstein, 2011), although 
about half of them will need long-term care, which is extremely costly (this is called “the long-term care 
insurance puzzle”).1 Take-up of disaster insurance is exceptionally low even if it is offered at a 
subsidized price (Michel-Kerjan & Kousky, 2010). Even in the case of the life insurance market, which is 
regarded as a healthy and well-functioning insurance industry, 30 percent of U.S. households do not have 
any policy. 
This paper takes a behavioral economics approach to explain the low demand for insurance. In 
particular, this paper applies prospect theory proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1992). The 
central idea of prospect theory is that individuals evaluate a prospect or a lottery based on a simple gain-
loss value from a reference point rather than the prospect’s effect on final wealth. When individuals assess 
the gain-loss value, loss aversion plays a central role because the degree of loss aversion determines the 
relative disutility of losses against the same amount of gains. For example, the gain-loss value of a 
gamble with a 50-50 chance of winning $100 or losing $50 could be negative to an individual with loss 
aversion of three (1/2*$100 - 3*1/2*$50 = -$25), but positive to an individual with loss aversion of 1.5 
(1/2*$100 – 1.5*1/2*$50 = $12.5). Hence, depending on the degree of loss aversion, an individual may or 
may not accept the gamble. (Other features of prospect theory, such as probability weighting and 
diminishing sensitivity, are not considered in this example for simplicity). Since the gain-loss structure of 
an insurance contract is similar to that of a gamble, a loss-averse individual may reject an insurance offer 
in the same manner as he rejects a gamble. Potential insurance gains are benefits from an insurance 
company (gains are realized if an accident occurs) and potential losses are premiums the individual pays 
                                           
1 A majority of existing studies tried to rationalize the low take-up of insurance. In the case of long-term care insurance, prior 
studies focused on (i) potential substitute forms of insurance (e.g., informal insurance by families, public insurance provided by 
Medicaid, illiquid housing that can be liquidated when needed), (ii) unfair premiums (due to transaction costs and adverse 
selection), (iii) state-dependent utilities (Brown, Goda, & McGarry 2016). Brown and Finkelstein (2009; 2011) provide an 
excellent review on the topic. 
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(losses are realized if an accident doesn’t occur). It is trivial to show that the gain-loss value of insurance 
can be negatively associated with loss aversion. The negative association is true under the two 
assumptions: (i) gains and losses are framed narrowly in the sense that an individual pays less attention to 
the diversification or hedging effect that a prospect will bring to his existing portfolio.
2
 (Note that a 
possible large loss in wealth due to an accident is not taken into account in the gain-loss assessment). (ii) 
The reference point is ‘the wealth level when one does not purchase insurance’ (i.e., no gain or loss 
occurs if one does not take the action of buying insurance).  
This paper tests the predictions of prospect theory by merging various questionnaires on behavioral 
tendencies with those of insurance ownership in the RAND American Life Panel. This paper finds 
empirical evidence supporting prospect theory in a representative sample of low-to-moderate income U.S. 
individuals: loss-averse individuals have a low ownership rate of long-term care insurance (LTCI), 
supplemental disability insurance (SDI), and private health insurance; they express a low willingness to 
pay for health insurance; they are unwilling to buy health insurance in a hypothetical insurance choice 
experiment. The robustness check results show that these results remain robust to alternative estimation 
methods, more controls, and the cohort analysis. This paper also provides empirical evidence that the 
negative effect of loss aversion on LTCI and private health insurance demand is amplified by narrow 
framing and subjective probability.  
   This paper also provides suggestive evidence that the negative relationship between loss-aversion and 
insurance demand does not hold or can be reversed under a different reference point. It shows that, in the 
case of auto insurance markets, where insurance purchase is compulsory and uptake ratio is 
approximately 85% in the U.S., loss-averse individuals have a slightly higher ownership rate than other 
individuals. This result, although it is only marginally statistically significant, is consistent with prospect 
theory: loss aversion may increase insurance demand if the reference point is ‘the wealth level under 
insurance coverage’ (i.e., holding insurance is the reference point). This is because, under such a reference 
point, ‘not purchasing insurance’ is regarded as a risky choice that can cause losses. The potential gain 
and loss of ‘not purchasing or not renewing auto insurance’ are as follows: a potential gain is premiums 
saved (the gain is realized if an accident doesn’t occur) and potential losses are benefits from an insurance 
company that could be paid out to the driver should the driver own auto insurance (the loss is realized if 
                                           
2 Narrow framing (Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993) means that consumers evaluate a lottery in isolation, rather than mixing it with 
their pre-existing risks. Some literature call this “narrow bracketing” (Rabin & Weizsäcker, 2009) or “correlation neglect” 
(Eyster & Weizsäcker, 2010). Narrow framing inhibits consumers from recognizing diversification effects that lotteries will bring 
(Guiso, 2015). For example, in the case of health insurance, consumers with narrow framing neglect that insurance benefits are 
perfectly correlated to potential medical costs. The notion of “mental accounting” (Thaler, 1999) is closely related to narrow 
framing. The gain-loss utility of insurance may be interpreted as the result of mental accounting in which only direct cash flows 
from an insurance contract are counted. 
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an accident occurs). Thus the gain-loss value of ‘not purchasing insurance’ is negatively associated with 
loss aversion. Hence, loss-averse agents do not choose the risky option of not purchasing mandatory 
insurance. 
  Taken together, the empirical results in this paper can be summarized as follows: (1) loss-averse 
individuals are less likely to buy unpopular insurance or risky-looking insurance such as LTCI and SDI, 
possibly because the reference point is ‘the wealth level without LTCI and SDI coverage,’ and hence, 
purchasing these insurance plans is regarded as a risky choice; (2) The negative relationship between loss-
aversion and insurance demand does not hold (a weak positive relationship holds if any) in the case of 
popular and mandatory insurance such as auto insurance, possibly because the reference point is the 
wealth level under insurance coverage (now, living without auto insurance becomes a risky choice). 
  It is worthwhile to stress the findings in the LTCI, SDI, and private health insurance markets: the 
negative association between loss-aversion and insurance uptake. This relationship is remarkable 
considering that loss-aversion captures an attitude toward risk: it suggests that a more conservative 
attitude toward risk may decrease (rather than increases) the demand for insurance. This finding is in stark 
contrast with the rational approach, such as expected utility theory, the prediction of which is that risk-
aversion (which is defined over final wealth) increases the demand for insurance. These contrasting 
predictions are the result of the different assumptions of the two approaches: while the rational approach 
assumes that consumers value an insurance policy based on its hedging effect on existing risks, prospect 
theory assumes that consumers often neglect the diversification effect and instead focus on the insurance 
policy’s own value when evaluated in isolation from existing risks. That is, while the rational approach 
presumes that consumers use insurance to hedge their existing risks, the behavioral approach in this paper 
notes that consumers may regard insurance itself as a risk if the reference point is ‘not taking the action of 
purchasing insurance.’ 
This paper is the first to present real-world empirical evidence that loss aversion and reference points 
are important determinants of insurance take-up. This paper also provides the first suggestive evidence 
that the effect of loss aversion on insurance demand is amplified by a degree of narrow framing and 
subjective probability (probability weighting). Thus far, most studies on prospect theory have been 
conducted in experimental settings.
3
 Relatively little research has been done on the relevance of the 
theory in real-world choices rather than laboratory settings 
 
(for reviews, see Camerer (2004) and 
Barberis (2013)). Prior studies that examined the relevance of prospect theory in real insurance markets 
mainly focused on probability weighting (Sydnor, 2010; Barseghyan et al., 2013). The literature has not 
                                           
3 For experimental evidence on insurance demands, see Johnson et al. (1993). They show that how probability weighting, 
reference point dependence, and framing effects affect consumers’ willingness to pay for insurance. 
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focused on the role of loss-aversion in insurance buying decisions because most studies have assumed 
that individuals make the decisions entirely within the “loss domain” rather than the “gain-loss domain” 
(Sydnor, 2010, p. 195).
4
 
The most relevant empirical study is by Gottlieb and Mitchell (2015). Contemporaneously with this 
paper,
5
 their study finds that narrow framing is negatively associated with LTCI holdings. Compared 
with their study, this paper focuses on the effect of loss aversion. While their study measures narrow 
framing by observing if individuals reverse their decisions within a negative frame, this paper measures 
loss aversion using acceptable losses in small gambles.
6
 While Gottlieb and Mitchell (2015) use the HRS 
survey and focus on LTCI, this paper uses the ALP survey and looks at various types of insurance such as 
SDI, private health insurance, and auto insurance. Another closely related study is by Bhargava, 
Loewenstein, and Sydnor (2015). They find that a majority of workers at a large U.S. firm choose an 
actuarially-dominated health insurance option (rather than the best option). They show that this choice 
behavior is better explained by a heuristics process than a sophisticated utility-maximizing process. 
   This paper is related to the growing body of work that stresses behavioral and psychological effects on 
financial decision-making. In contrast to the assumption of the rational approach, an increasing number of 
papers report that individuals have difficulty evaluating the value of financial products that provide 
insurance opportunities, such as annuities (Brown et al., 2013). Framing effects take a central role in 
valuing insurance products against longevity risk (Brown et al., 2008; Brown et al., 2013; Brown, 2014). 
In valuing stocks, loss aversion (Benartzi & Thaler, 1995; Dimmock & Kouwenberg, 2010) and narrow 
framing (Barberis, Huang, & Santos, 2001; Barberis, Huang, & Thaler, 2006) have an important role. All 
these literatures are in line with this paper, which suggests significant psychological and cognitive impact. 
 This paper is also related to literature that studies insurance uptake decisions in a development context. 
Cole et al. (2013) and Gine et al. (2008) show that risk-averse farmers are less likely, not more likely, to 
buy rainfall insurance in their randomized field experiments. Giesbert et al. (2011) also report that risk-
averse households are less likely to uptake micro life insurance. They raise the possibility that insurance 
itself can be regarded as a risk. In a similar vein, Kunreuther, Pauly, and McMorrow (2013) note that 
individuals often view insurance as a “poor investment.” This paper contributes to this literature by 
providing a formal model showing that a more conservative attitude toward potential losses may depress, 
rather than stimulate, insurance demand.  
                                           
4 Sydnor (2010) explains as follows: “However, there has long been a recognition within the literature that standard formulations 
of prospect theory cannot fully explain insurance purchases over modest stakes. The reason is that since insurance involves 
paying money to reduce losses, the decision is entirely within the “loss domain” and away from the kink in the value function. As 
such, loss aversion does not affect insurance purchases in standard prospect theory.” (p. 195) 
5 This paper and Gottlieb and Mitchell’s paper (2015) were drafted at the same time in March 2015. 
6 This paper uses a set of six gamble questions (lose $2 win $6; lose $3 win $6; lose $4 win $6; lose $5 win $6; lose $7 win $6). 
In all of these scenarios, there is a 50 percent chance to win or lose. The degree of loss aversion is measured by seven degrees, 
depending on the largest acceptable amount of losses. Those who reject even a “lose $2 win $6” gamble are considered to have 
the highest degree of loss aversion. 
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  This chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.2 illustrates prospect theory. This section then derives 
three testable implications from the prospect-theory-based insurance model: (i) loss aversion decreases 
insurance demand if the reference point is ‘the wealth level without insurance coverage’; (ii) the effect of 
loss aversion on insurance demand is amplified by narrow framing and the subjective probability of not 
experiencing an accident; (iii) loss-aversion may increase insurance demand if the reference point is ‘the 
wealth level under insurance coverage.’ Section 1.3 empirically tests the testable implications. Section 1.4 
discusses how the prospect theory model addresses several puzzles in insurance markets in a unified 
setting. It also applies the model to the U.S. LTCI market and calibrates the model. Section 1.5 discusses 
various policy tools to stimulate the uptake of insurance. Section 1.6 concludes this paper. 
 
1.2. Theoretical predictions of prospect theory about insurance demand 
 
1.2.1 Prospect Theory  
Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory, originally created in 1979 and revised in 1992, is a 
descriptive theory about decisions under risk.
7
 The theory’s four features are 1) reference point 
dependence, 2) loss aversion, 3) diminishing sensitivity, and 4) probability weighting (Barberis 2013, p 
175). The theory states that people evaluate a prospect or a lottery based on gains or losses from the 
reference (reference point dependence). When valuing losses and gains, losses loom larger than the same 
amount of gains (loss aversion). The sensitivity to gains and losses exhibits a diminishing trend 
(diminishing sensitivity, see Figure 1.1). Lastly, instead of objective probabilities, subjective decision 
weights are used to calculate final values. In the process, the hedging or diversification effects that a 
prospect will bring are often neglected due to reference point dependence and the closely associated 
notions of “narrow framing” (Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993) and “mental accounting” (Thaler, 1999). That 
is, people evaluate the value of the prospect in isolation from other risks. 
Specifically, the utility from investing in a prospect is given by the expected gain-loss values from a 
reference point, u = ∑w(pi)v(xi), where w(∙) is the decision weight, v(∙) is the value function, xi is the 
potential outcomes of the prospect, and pi is their respective probabilities. Hereafter we call u and w(pi) a 
“gain-loss utility” and a “subjective probability,” respectively. The value function has the following form:  
𝑣(𝑥) =  {
𝑥𝛼                  𝑖𝑓 𝑥 ≥ 0
−𝜆(−𝑥)𝛽   𝑖𝑓  𝑥 < 0
 , where λ is the coefficient of the loss aversion…..……….. (1.1) 
Being loss-averse means that the coefficient of loss aversion (λ) is greater than 1. Kahneman and Tversky 
(1992) reported that the median of both α and β was 0.88 and the median of λ was 2.25. 
                                           
7 The new version of prospect theory (cumulative prospect theory, 1992) differs from the original one (1979) in decision weights. 
Specifically, the revised theory (1992) transforms the entire cumulative distribution function when weighting probability. This 
paper mainly illustrates the original prospect theory.  
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Figure 1.1 Value Function of Prospect Theory 
 
Notes: In absolute terms, values from losses are greater than values from the same amount of gains. This implies loss aversion. 
The coefficient of loss aversion (λ) determines the “overall concavity” of the value function around the reference point (See 
Appendix A.1). Also note that the value function is concave in the gains domain and convex in the losses domain, implying 
different attitudes toward risk in the gain and loss domains.  Source: Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
 
1.2.2 Prospect Theory and Insurance Demand  
  We start with the case where insurance is perfectly narrowly framed, i.e., insurance is evaluated in 
isolation from background risk and wealth, and the reference point is ‘the wealth level without insurance 
coverage.’ In this case, insurance can be viewed as a risky gamble: insurance pays out benefits (prizes) 
when an accident occurs but nothing if an accident does not occur. In the latter case, individuals lose 
premiums (the money for gambling). 
 
[Definition] A ‘prospect theory consumer’ is a consumer who makes the decision of whether to buy a 
prospect based on the gain-loss utility, ∑w(pi)v(xi). 
 
[Proposition 1.1] The utility of purchasing an insurance policy is a decreasing function of loss 
aversion (λ) to a ‘prospect theory consumer’ if the reference point is ‘the wealth level without 
insurance coverage.’ 
 
(Proof) Suppose the probability of an accident is p. The utility from insurance is u = w(p)*v(Benefit-
Premium)+w(1-p)*v(-Premium)= w(p)*(Benefit-Premium)
α
 - w(1-p)*λ*(premium)β . Hence, the utility is a 
decreasing function of λ. 
 
 
The critical assumption of the above proposition is that the reference point is ‘the wealth level when 
one does not engage in an insurance contract.’8 This is not a strong assumption because ‘not taking an 
action (of purchasing insurance),’ which can be interpreted as remaining status-quo, is assumed to be the 
reference point. The status-quo reference point is a conventional assumption of prospect theory verified in 
numerous experiments (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991). Note that if we assume a different 
                                           
8
 The minimum requirement of the reference point such that we observe a negative association between loss aversion and gain-
loss utility is that the reference point quantities of insurance plans (?̅?) is less than the actual quantities of insurance plans (at+1). 
(See the notations in Section 1.3.8 and Table 1.6. If we assume ?̅? < at+1, then loss aversion should be negatively associated with 
insurance demand). For simplicity, we do not discuss this generalized case. 
reference point 
1 
λ 
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reference point, the relationship between the utility from purchasing an insurance policy and loss-aversion 
changes:
9
 for example, (i) if we assume that a reference point is ‘the wealth level under full insurance 
coverage,’ then the gain-loss utility can be an increasing function of loss aversion (Proposition 1.2 states 
this); (ii) if we assume that a reference point is ‘the wealth level when an accident does not occur’ and the 
decision to buy insurance is reviewed only within the loss domain, then loss aversion does not affect the 
insurance decision. Note that many previous studies on prospect theory have considered this case. See 
Sydnor (2010, p 195). 
Also note that perfect narrow framing is implicitly assumed: the ‘prospect theory consumer’ only cares 
about the gain-loss utility, ∑w(pi)v(xi) (i.e., the diversification effect of insurance is neglected). The gain-
loss utility may be interpreted as the result of mental accounting regarding an insurance contract. Mental 
accounting refers to a set of cognitive operations used by individuals to evaluate financial activities 
(Thaler, 1999, p 183). The assumption of perfect narrow framing means that an individual only codes the 
cash flows caused by insurance purchase in the mental accounting process. For experimental evidence of 
narrow framing, see Tversky and Kahneman (1981), Rabin and Weizsäcker (2009), and Eyster and 
Weizsäcker (2010), among others. The perfect narrow framing assumption in Proposition 1.1 can be 
relaxed. Proposition 1.3 states this. 
[Proposition 1.2] If the reference point is ‘the wealth level under full insurance coverage,’ the 
utility from purchasing an insurance policy is an increasing function of loss aversion (λ) to a 
‘prospect theory consumer.’ 
(Proof) Suppose a prospect theory consumer’s initial wealth is W. There is a bad event with a probability 
of p. If the bad event occurs, he suffers damage L. Let’s denote the amount of insurance coverage Ƈ (Ƈ ≤ 
L). Then, the wealth level under full insurance (reference point) is ‘W-pL’ regardless of the state. Let’s 
assume that the person purchases Ƈ amount of insurance (by paying p∙Ƈ). If an accident occurs, his wealth 
becomes W-L+ Ƈ-p∙Ƈ. If an accident doesn’t occur, his wealth becomes W-p∙Ƈ. Hence, as Schmitt 
(2012)
10
 shows, gain or loss from the reference point is as follows: if an accident occurs (with the 
probability of p), losses occur (W–pL – (W-L+ Ƈ–p∙Ƈ)). If an accident doesn’t occur (with the probability 
of 1-p), gains occur (W–pL – (W– p∙Ƈ)). Hence, the gain-loss value is w(1-p)*(W–pL – (W– p∙Ƈ)) α + 
w(p)*λ*((W–pL – (W-L+ Ƈ–p∙Ƈ)) β. Notice that an increase in Ƈ results in a decrease in the amount of 
loss, the effect of which is multiplied by λ. Hence, if other things are equal, a high λ means that insurance 
coverage’s effect of reducing loss is large. Thus, the gain-loss utility is an increasing function of λ. 
 
[Definition] A ‘boundedly rational consumer’ is a consumer whose preference is monotonic with respect 
to ∑w(pi)v(xi). 
 
[Proposition 1.3] A utility from purchasing an insurance policy is a decreasing (increasing) function 
of loss aversion (λ) to a ‘boundedly rational consumer’ if the reference point is the wealth level 
without (under) insurance coverage. 
                                           
9 See Appendix A.1 on the importance of the reference point. 
10 The gain-loss value of insurance when the reference point is the wealth level under full insurance is from Schmitt (2012). 
Schmitt (2012), however, does not focus on the role of loss aversion in insurance uptake decisions. 
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(Proof) Monotonicity implies a consumer’s utility (U) increases (decreases) if ∑w(pi)v(xi) increases. Thus, 
by proposition 1.1 and 1.2, U and λ are negatively (positively) correlated. 
 
   Proposition 1.2 states that a reversal of preferences may occur if we assume a different reference point.  
Proposition 1.3 implies that the relationship between loss aversion and the demand for insurance should 
hold as long as consumers are not perfectly rational in the sense that they have a certain degree of narrow 
framing. 
 
1.2.3 Prospect Theory Model of Insurance Demand 
   This section explores the implications of prospect theory on insurance demand using the prospect-
theory-based asset-pricing model proposed by Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001).
11
 For expositional 
purposes, this section will specify the model when the reference point is ‘the wealth level when one does 
not engage in an insurance contract.’ An insurance demand model when the reference point is the wealth 
level under insurance coverage is provided in Section 1.3.8. The model considers a boundedly rational 
consumer whose preference is monotonic with respect to ∑w(pi)v(xi). In other words, the model assumes 
that consumers get utility not only from final consumption, but also from a gain-loss value, ∑w(pi)v(xi).
12
 
The general form of this type of utility can be written as U = f (V(c) , ∑w(pi)v(xi) ) where V(∙) is a 
standard (Bernoulli) utility function defined over final wealth or consumption. This paper further assumes 
that V(∙) is a CRRA utility function. These assumptions result in the consumer’s problem in equation (1.2).     
    This prospect theory model differs from the rational model in the second term of the equation, 
𝑏𝑖𝑧 ∙ 𝑣(𝑎𝑡+1|𝑟𝑒𝑓), where v(at+1|ref) is Kahneman and Tversky’s value function.
13
 The value is determined 
by the quantities of insurance policies (at+1) and the reference point (ref). We drop the notation “|ref” from 
now on. The novel feature of this model is that it allows “varying degrees of narrow framing” using the 
scaling factor, bi,z. The scaling factor determines the degree that the gain-loss utility affects a person i’s 
insurance buying decision when other parameters and conditions are fixed. A perfectly rational agent 
model is a specific case of this boundedly rational agent model, where the degree of narrow framing (bi z) 
                                           
11 The model is in line with Kőszegi and Rabin’s (2006; 2007) reference point dependent preferences. Gottlieb (2012) has 
proposed prospect-theory-based life insurance model in a more general setting.   
12 The model in this paper describes consumers’ choices by expanding the domain of preferences. In a perfectly rational model, 
the domain of a decision problem is only X, a lifetime consumption vector. A behavioral approach considers a more generalized 
decision problem: the domain of a decision problem is (X, d), where d represents ancillary conditions (e.g., the way alternatives 
are presented, narrow framing, exposure to an anchor). If we restrict the domain of a choice problem to X, then an individual’s 
choice looks inconsistent when C(X, d0) ≠ C(X, d1), where C is a choice correspondence. The difference in choices, however, can 
be explained by the difference in the ancillary conditions (d0 ≠ d1) in the behavioral approach. See Salant and Rubinstein (2008), 
Bernheim and Rangel (2009), and Bernheim (2009) for details. 
13 A model that assumes perfectly rational agents should not include the second term because in this model agents are assumed to 
care only about the final outcome of choices. Hence, when deciding whether to buy an insurance policy, perfectly rational agents 
only care about its effect on their final wealth, which will be translated into consumption. 
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is zero. The degree of narrow framing is individual traits (i, Guiso, 2015). But it is also assumed to be a 
function of z, the degree of prominence of risky framing in insurance policies. It is assumed so in order to 
reflect framing effects reported by recent studies, such as Brown et al. (2008). Brown et al. (2008) show 
that preferences regarding annuities vary significantly depending on whether they are presented within a 
“risky investment frame” or a “consumption frame.” 
A consumer’s problem is as follows: given prices {qt(s
t
, st+1)st+1∈S}
∞
t=0 and ref,  
Maxct(st), 𝑎t+1(st,st+1)  𝐸  ∑ 𝛿
𝑡  [∞𝑡=0  
Ct(s
t)1−γ
1−γ
 + bi,z ∙  𝑣(𝑎𝑡+1(s
t, st+1)|𝑟𝑒𝑓) ] ,  
 
where 𝑣(𝑎𝑡+1(s
t, st+1)|𝑟𝑒𝑓) = {
(δ ∙ 𝑎𝑡+1 − 𝑞𝑡 ∙ 𝑎𝑡+1)
𝛼    𝑖𝑓 𝐽 ∈ 𝑠𝑡+1  𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑠                 
  −𝜆 ∙ (𝑞𝑡 ∙ 𝑎𝑡+1)
𝛽   𝑖𝑓 𝐽 ∈ 𝑠𝑡+1  𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟
,  
  , E is the expectation operator based on a subjective probability, and γ > 0. 
 
subject to:  ct(s
t
) + ∑  𝑞𝑡st+1∈S (s
t
, st+1) 𝑎t+1(s
t
, st+1) ≤ et (s
t
) +at(s
t
)  ∀t, ∀st 
ct(s
t
) ≥ 0, 𝑎t+1(s
t
, st+1) ≥ 0  ∀t, ∀st,∀𝑠𝑡+1  ………………………………..….…….(1.2) 
 
The term, at+1(s
t
, st+1), is the quantities of state-contingent claims or insurance policies in which each 
unit pays off one unit of consumption in the next period if J ∈ st+1 is realized. But it does not pay out 
anything if J ∈ st+1 is not realized. If the pre-specified state (J) is realized, the present value of the buyer’s 
gains from purchasing at+1 units of the claim is ‘ δ ∙ 𝑎𝑡+1 − 𝑞𝑡 ∙ 𝑎𝑡+1’ (i.e., benefits−premium), where qt is 
the unit price of the claim at t. If the pre-specified state is not realized, the buyer loses the premium, 
𝑞𝑡 ∙ 𝑎𝑡+1. The term, et(s
t
), is the endowments in period t. 
Note that there are multiple parameters that measure consumers’ attitudes toward risk. The first one is a 
conventional risk-aversion measure, γ, which captures the concavity of CRRA utility function. The 
second is a loss-aversion measure, λ, which captures the overall concavity of Kahneman and Tversky’s 
value function around the reference point. While γ increases the demand for insurance, λ decreases it. 
Loss aversion decreases insurance demand because λ decreases the value, bi,z ∙  𝑣(𝑎𝑡+1(s
t, st+1)). The 
other two parameters, α and β, also measure attitude toward risk within the gains domain and the losses 
domain, respectively. Although the last two parameters are important in prospect theory, this paper does 
not focus on them because this paper assumes that insurance is evaluated in both the gains and losses 
domains, where α and β play little roles, but λ plays a critical role. 
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Figure 1.2 Various Measures for Attitude Toward Risk in the Prospect Theory Model 
   
Notes: There are four parameters in the prospect theory model of insurance demand. The coefficient of RRA (γ) measures the 
concavity of the Bernoulli utility function defined over final wealth. Loss aversion (λ) measures the concavity of value function 
around the reference points. α (β) measures the concavity of value function within the gains (losses) domain. Since this paper 
assumes the status-quo reference point (i.e., not purchasing insurance is the reference point) and narrow framing, decisions about 
insurance are associated with both the gain and loss domains. Thus, the relative value of the losses compared with that of gains is 
important in the decisions. Hence, instead of α and β, loss aversion (λ) plays a critical role in the model. Note that Kahneman and 
Tversky (1992) estimate that α and β are the same. 
 
The first order condition (FOC) for the interior solution is as follows: 
(FOC) 𝑞𝑡 ∙ V′(ct) – bi,z 𝐸[𝑣
′(at+1 )] = E [δ 𝑉′(ct+1)],  where V(𝑐𝑡) ≡
Ct
1−γ
1−γ
  ……..………….(1.3) 
The FOC provides an explanation of why boundedly rational consumers demand less insurance. The 
first term of the left-hand side of the FOC (𝑞𝑡 ∙ V′(ct)) implies the marginal cost of giving up one unit of 
consumption today. The right-hand side of the equation means the expected discounted marginal utility of 
future consumption. If bi z was zero, the consumer who is assumed to be perfectly rational should equalize 
the two terms to maximize his lifetime utility (i.e., 𝑞𝑡 ∙ V′(ct) = E 𝛿𝑉
′(ct+1)). A boundedly rational 
consumer, however, has another term to consider, bi,z 𝐸[𝑣′(at+1 )]. In most cases, this term is negative due 
to loss aversion. Even if the state-contingent claim is actuarially favorable, if the degree of loss aversion 
is high, then bi,z 𝐸[𝑣′(at+1 )] has a negative value. Hence, the overall value of the left-hand side of a 
boundedly rational consumer becomes larger than that of a perfectly rational consumer. This implies that 
the expected marginal utility of future consumption should be increased to maximize utility. Thus, to 
increase the expected marginal utility, the consumer should decrease the expected level of future 
consumption. The consumer does so by decreasing demands for state-contingent claims.  
The reason that 𝐸[𝑣′(at+1 )] is negative is as follows. 
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    𝑣′(𝑎𝑡+1(𝑠
𝑡, 𝑠𝑡+1)) = {
α(δ ∙ 𝑎𝑡+1 − 𝑞𝑡 ∙ 𝑎𝑡+1)
𝛼−1(𝛿 − 𝑞𝑡)  if J ∈ 𝑠𝑡+1is realized            
     −𝛽𝜆𝑖(𝑞𝑡 ∙ 𝑎𝑡+1)
𝛽−1 𝑞𝑡                    if J ∈ 𝑠𝑡+1is not realized     
…………..…………....(1.4) 
∴ 𝐸[𝑣′(at+1 )] = w(𝑝𝑠𝑡+1)∙ α (δ ∙ 𝑎𝑡+1 − 𝑞𝑡 ∙ 𝑎𝑡+1)
𝛼−1 ∙ (δ − 𝑞𝑡) −w(1−𝑝𝑠𝑡+1)𝛽 𝜆𝑖(𝑞𝑡 ∙ 𝑎𝑡+1)
𝛽−1 𝑞𝑡…………...(1.5) 
Thus, if 𝜆𝑖 is large, 𝐸[𝑣
′(at+1 )] becomes negative. In cases where an actuarially fair insurance is given, 
𝛼 = 𝛽 = 1, and w(p)=p, the term, 𝐸[𝑣′(at+1 )], becomes negative if and only if 𝜆𝑖 is greater than one. This 
is because the actuarially fair price implies δ 𝑝𝑠𝑡+1𝑎𝑡+1= 𝑞𝑡at+1 (i.e., present value of expected benefits = 
premium). If the price and other parameters are plugged into (1.5), then 𝐸[𝑣
′(at+1 )]=𝑞𝑡(1 − 𝑝𝑠𝑡+1)(1 − 𝜆𝑖). 
Thus, 𝐸[𝑣′(at+1 )] becomes negative if and only if λi is greater than one. 
 
1.2.4. Three Testable Implications of The Model 
The prospect theory model and Propositions 1.1-1.3 provide three testable implications: 
 
[1] As long as consumers are not perfectly rational, the more loss-averse a consumer is, the less he or she 
is likely to demand insurance if the reference point is ‘the wealth level without insurance coverage.’14 
This is because λ decreases the expected gain-loss value, E bi,z ∙  𝑣(𝑎𝑡+1(s
t, st+1)).  
 
[2] The effect of loss aversion is amplified by the degree of narrow framing (biz) and the subjective 
probability of not experiencing an accident, w(1-p). This is because loss-aversion (λ) is multiplied by biz 
and w(1-p).  
 
[3] If the reference point is ‘the wealth level under insurance coverage,’ then loss-aversion may increase 
insurance demand.  
  
                                           
14 The empirical test in the next section mainly tests how loss aversion (λ) affects the demand for insurance holding when the 
degree of narrow framing is fixed (bi,z> 0). In contrast, Gottlieb and Mitchell (2015), in a contemporaneous study, test how the 
degree of narrow framing (bi,z) affects demand assuming that consumers have loss aversion (λ>1). While their study measures 
narrow framing by observing if individuals reverse their decisions within a negative frame, this paper measures loss aversion 
using acceptable amount of losses in small gambles. 
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1.3 Empirical Test using the American Life Panel  
  Sections 1.3.4-1.3.7 examine how loss-aversion is associated with LTCI, SDI, and private health 
insurance. Section 1.3.8 studies loss-aversion and auto insurance take-up. 
1.3.1 Loss Aversion Data  
   The coefficient of loss aversion (λ) is defined by λ = 
−𝑣(−𝑥)
𝑣(𝑥)
 (Kahneman and Tversky, 1992). 
Following Kahneman and Tversky (1992),
15
 this paper measures λ using the acceptability of a set of 
mixed prospects. In particular, this paper uses a set of gamble questions in the RAND American Life 
Panel (ALP). The ALP is a nationally representative internet survey of over 5,000 active members aged 
18 or more. While regularly collecting detailed information on individuals’ income and assets, the ALP 
allows researchers to field their own questionnaires. All data, including the fielded questionnaires, are 
available for free to the public after an embargo period. Loss-aversion questions were fielded from 
December 2012 to March 2013 by Carvalho, Meier, and Wang (forthcoming) in order to examine if risk 
attitudes are affected by the liquidity constraint.
16
 The loss-aversion questions ask whether respondents 
are willing to play six risky games or not. The only difference among the six games is the amount of loss. 
The questions used are as follows:  
 
In what follows we will ask you to make choices of whether to play or not a risky game.(Yes / 
No) If you play the game, you receive one amount if a tossed coin comes up heads and a 
different amount if it comes up tails. If you do not play the game, you do not win nor lose any 
money. For example, let’s look at choice (1). If you play the game, you lose $2 if the coin 
comes up heads and you win $6 if it comes up tails. 
         (1) lose $2 win $6          (4) lose $5 win $6 
(2) lose $3 win $6      (5) lose $6 win $6 
(3) lose $4 win $6     (6) lose $7 win $6 
 
 
   Among the selected sample of 1,152 individuals, 1,039 individuals (90.19%) answered all six 
questions. Loss aversion is measured by seven degrees: those who reject all games, including a ‘lose $2 
win $6 game,’ have the highest λ (λ of four is assigned in this case); those who accept a ‘lose $2 win $6 
game’ and reject other games have the λ of three (λ= 
6
2
 ); those who accept a ‘lose $2 win $6 game’ and 
‘lose $3 win $6 game,’ but reject other games, have the λ of two (λ= 
6
3
 );…; those who accept all six 
games, including a ‘lose $7 win $6 game,’ have the lowest λ of 6/7 (see Appendix A.2 for details). Similar 
to the result of Kahneman and Tversky (1992), the median of λ is found to be 2.0. 
                                           
15 Kahneman and Tversky (1992) measure the degree of loss aversion using “the acceptability of a set of mixed prospects (e.g., 
50% chance to lose $100 and 50% chance to win $x) in which x was systematically varied” (p. 306, λ=$x/$100). Their paper 
reports that the median of x is $202, which implies the median of λ is 2.02 (pp. 310-312). 
16 Carvalho, Meier, and Wang (forthcoming) find that risk attitude is not affected by the liquidity constraint, which suggests that 
loss aversion is a stable component of preferences. 
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The loss aversion question, created by Gaechter et al. (2007) and used by Fehr and Goette (2007) and 
Fehr, Goette, and Lienhard (2013), captures how individuals assess gain and loss when they are narrowly 
framed. A line of research (Rabin, 2000; Rabin & Thaler, 2001; Barberis, Huang, & Thaler, 2006; Safra 
& Segal 2008; Aissia, 2014)
17
 has shown that the rejection of a small favorable gamble is evidence of 
narrow framing. This research points out that, since a small favorable gamble brings a diversification 
effect to individuals, the behavior of turning down the gamble can be explained only by introducing 
individuals’ neglect of the diversification effect. Hence, one can conclude that at least those who reject 
‘lose $5 win $6 game’ (at least 60.1 percent of the ALP sample) have narrow framing. Given narrow 
framing,
18
 the measure captures how the decisions vary when the amount of losses decreases significantly. 
Since the “salient difference” of the six gambles is the amount of potential losses, the measure captures 
the degree of loss aversion. To be specific, one can compare a person who accepts a ‘lose $4 win $6’ 
gamble but rejects a ‘lose $5 win $6’ gamble, with one who rejects both gambles. There is little difference 
between the two people in that they both frame gambles narrowly (i.e., both people reject a small, 
favorable gamble). What is different is that the change in losses ($4$5) is meaningful to the first person, 
while it is not to the other person. Hence, it can be concluded that the different decisions are mainly 
caused by differences in loss aversion.  
 
1.3.2 Background: LTCI, SDI, and Private Health Insurance in the U.S. 
 We first consider two types of insurance (LTCI and SDI), where individuals’ reference points can be 
‘living without such insurance.’ We then consider another type of insurance (private health insurance) 
where ‘holding one or two insurance plans’ is typical (e.g., having a generic health insurance plan and a 
dental plan). Among U.S. individuals aged 18 and older, only 9.9 percent own LTCI and only 19.2 percent 
hold SDI (based on 2012/2013 ALP data). Hence, not holding LTCI or SDI could be perceived as normal. 
The average number of private health insurance plans that a U.S. adult owns is 0.7 (based on 2013 ALP 
data). Thus, having more than one or two private health insurance plans can be regarded as unusual. 
LTCI covers the costs of long-term medical and non-medical care. Benefits are triggered when the 
insured no longer performs routine activities of daily living such as transferring, bathing, eating, or 
                                           
17 Rabin (2000) and Rabin and Thaler (2001) show that the rejection of a small favorable gamble implies an implausibly high 
risk-aversion under the utility-of-wealth function. For example, under Expected Utility theory, the rejection of the ‘lose $10 or 
gain $11 with equal chances gamble’ implies that the individual should also reject a ‘lose $100 or gain $∞ gamble.’ (This is 
called Rabin’s “calibration theorem.”) 
18 For those who do not reject ‘lose $5 win $6 game’ (39.9 percent of the ALP sample), two different interpretations are 
possible: (i) They are narrow framers but they have a low degree of loss-aversion; or (ii) They are not narrow framers. This paper 
adopts the first interpretation following Rabin and Weizsäcker’s (2009) study. Rabin and Weizsäcker show that approximately 89 
percent of people have narrow framing using a representative sample of U.S. individuals. 
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toileting. In the U.S., long-term care costs are not generally covered by private health insurance plans.
19
 
Unlike health insurance, LTCI benefits are triggered when the prospect of regaining health or functioning 
is unlikely. Compared to disability insurance, LTCI does not provide income replacement. Brown & 
Finkelstein (2009) report that the financial risk associated with long-term care is substantial: the 
probability that a 65-year-old U.S. citizen will use a nursing home at some point in his or her life is about 
35-50 percent; conditional on entering nursing home, the average stay varies from 2-3 years; and the 
average cost for the nursing home stay is $143 per day for a semi-private room in 2002. However, the 
take-up ratio of private LTCI is only 14 percent among the U.S. elderly. The LTCI market is a useful 
market to study individuals’ insurance decisions for several reasons: (i) the U.S. private LTCI market is 
primarily an individual market rather than an employer- or government-sponsored market (Brown & 
Finkelstein, 2011). Hence, it is a better market for examining individuals’ decisions. (ii) The LTCI market 
is less affected by bequest motives, which makes our analysis simpler. This is because the beneficiary of 
the LTCI is the insured himself or herself, whereas the beneficiary of life insurance is the family of the 
deceased. (iii) LTCI is less affected by the tax exemption benefits, and hence less distorted by tax 
incentives. (iv) The LTCI market is a very important market by itself. At an aggregate level, expenses on 
LTC in 2004 represent 8.5 percent of all health care spending in the US and about 1.2 percent of U.S. 
GDP (CBO, 2004, as cited in Brown & Finkelstein, 2011, p 6). 
The take-up of supplemental disability insurance (SDI) is another focus of this section. SDI protects the 
beneficiary's earned income against disability due to disease or injury. It is “supplemental” to the standard 
employer-provided disability insurance, which typically covers 40-60 percent of pre-disability salary.
20
 
Employees who want more income protection can purchase SDI and increase the reimbursement rate up 
to 80 percent. The premiums of employer-provided disability insurance are paid by employers or unions. 
In such cases, employees do not need to sign up for the group policy because they are automatically 
covered by the group policy if they meet eligibility requirements. In contrast, in the case of SDI, 
employees have to sign up and pay for the premiums. For this reason, the insurance decisions of SDI 
depend on individuals’ willingness to get more protection. Self-employed individuals who need disability 
coverage should buy individual disability plans, not the group policy, such as employer-provided 
disability insurance or SDI. Hence, self-employed individuals are dropped from the sample when the 
dependent variable is SDI. We will reduce possible confounding effects from employer-provided 
disability insurance on SDI take-up by adding occupational dummy variables.  
                                           
19 Medicare, the U.S. public health insurance program for the elderly, does not cover long-term care costs per se. Medicaid, a 
means-tested public health insurance program for low-income families, partially covers the long-term care costs. See Brown and 
Finkelstein (2009) for details.  
20 According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2014), 49 percent of private sector U.S. workers have employer-provided 
disability insurance in 2014. The BLS also reports that most employer-provided disability insurance is offered free to employees.  
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This paper also considers the number of private health insurance plans one owns. Related literature 
(e.g., Brown & Finkelstein, 2008) suggests that the take-up of private health insurance is substantially 
affected by public health insurance programs, such as Medicaid (a federal and state health insurance 
program for low-income families) or Medicare (a federal health insurance program for the elderly). We 
will control for possible crowding-out effects of public insurance on private health insurance by adding 
various control variables (e.g., (i) the number of public health insurance plans one owns, and (ii) income 
and net worth, which affect the eligibility of public insurance programs). The U.S. Census Bureau
21
 
reported that, in 2013, 64.2 percent of U.S. individuals were covered by private health insurance. The 
largest single type of private health insurance was employment-based health insurance, covering 53.9 
percent of the population. In 2013, approximately 34.3 percent of the population was covered by public 
health insurance. The Census Bureau also reported that about 13.4 percent (42.0 million) of the 
population did not own any private or public health insurance for the entire calendar year. Since various 
factors may affect ownership of private health insurance, we will look at how loss-aversion is associated 
with a hypothetical insurance choice experiment as well, after examining loss-aversion’s association with 
a cross-section of health insurance ownership.  
Table A.4 (Appendix A) displays the take-up ratio of LTCI, SDI, and private health insurance in the 
ALP sample. It shows that old, highly-educated, high-income, and married individuals are more likely to 
hold these insurance plans.
22
 
1.3.3 Socio-economic Characteristics of the Merged ALP Sample 
For analysis, this paper merges loss aversion data with the ALP’s various insurance ownership data 
(fielded in 2013 in the case of LTCI, 2012 in the case of SDI) using individual identifiers.  Detailed 
sources for the data set, all of which are publicly available, are provided in Table A.3 (Appendix A). The 
characteristics of the main sample, in which both loss aversion and LTCI ownership information are 
available, are summarized in Table A.5 (Appendix A). Since the sample is based on two randomized 
surveys, targeting all U.S. families (LTCI ownership: N=3,421) and low-to-moderate income U.S. 
families (loss aversion: N=840) respectively, the merged sample (N=606) can be regarded as the 
representative of low-to-moderate income U.S. families. As a result, the average LTCI take-up ratio of the 
merged 606 sample is 5.61%, which is lower than the all ALP samples (9.91%, N=3,421).  Similarly, the 
average SDI take-up ratio of the ‘SDI-loss aversion’ merged data set (N=598) is 10.54%, which is lower 
than the average of all ALP samples (19.2%, N=2,933); the average number of private health insurance 
plans of the ‘private health insurance-loss aversion’ merged data set (N=609) is 0.406, which is lower 
than the average of all ALP samples (0.702, N=3,449). Compared with the 2013 Current Population 
                                           
21 Detailed statistics are available at http://www.census.gov/library/publications/2014/demo/p60-250.html. 
22 In the case of SDI and the number of private health insurance plans, their take-up ratios decline after the retirement age (65). 
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Survey (CPS), the ‘LTCI-loss aversion’ merged sample has a similar education level to the CPS, but is 
three years older, more female, and less married than the CPS. 
 
1.3.4 Loss Aversion and Insurance Ownerships: Descriptive Statistics 
Consistent with the predictions of the prospect theory model, Panel A of Table 1.1 shows that those 
with a high degree of loss aversion have a significantly low ownership rate of LTCI and SDI. For example, 
among those with a low λ (λ<3.0), 6.9 percent own LTCI. In contrast, of those with a high λ (λ≥3.0), only 
2.7 percent own LTCI. Loss-averse individuals also have, on average, a slightly lower number of private 
health insurance plans, although the statistical significance level is low.
23
 Figure 1.3 illustrates the 
differences. There is no measurable difference in demographics between the two groups (high vs. low loss 
aversion group) in terms of age, gender, income, wealth, education, cognitive ability, race, and marital 
status. 
   Panel B of Table 1.1 shows the descriptive statistics when data is sorted by LTCI ownership. 
Consistent with the prospect theory model, those who do not own LTCI show a high degree of loss 
aversion. One cannot find significant differences in the degree of risk aversion between the two groups. 
Although they are not significant, those who insure themselves show a lower degree of risk aversion, the 
opposite of the prediction of the rational approach (last row in Table 1.1).  
 
Figure 1.3 Loss Aversion and Insurance Ownership Rates  
 
Notes: The first figure illustrates the ownership rate of LTCI (the proportion of individuals who own LTCI) among the low loss 
aversion group (λ < 3) and the high loss aversion group (λ ≥ 3). The second figure illustrates the two groups’ ownership rates of 
SDI. The last figure compares the average number of private health insurance plans that individuals own. The error bars indicate 
the standard errors in Table 1.1. 
                                           
23 Table A.6 (Appendix) displays insurance ownership rates when we restrict the samples to those who demonstrate clear 
evidence of narrow framing (i.e., those whose loss aversion is greater than 1.0). The table shows that the difference in ownership 
rate between the high loss aversion and the low loss aversion group is increased in the case of LTCI and the number of private 
health insurance plans. 
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics-Loss Aversion and Insurance Holdings 
  
Notes: All data is from the American Life Panel (See Table A.3 (Appendix A) for details of the sources). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. Own_LTCI and Own_SDI are indicator variables if a respondent owns private long-term care insurance or supplemental 
disability insurance. LossAversion takes the values of 0.86, 1.0, 1.2, 1.5, 2.0, 3.0, or 4.0.  a) Total real assets and financial assets 
of the family.  b) based on the ‘serial 7 subtraction question.’ Five means the highest subtraction ability.  c) based on the 
question, “how do you see yourself regarding financial matters: are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or 
do you try to avoid risks? 0-1-…-10”(0: not at all willing to take risks, 10: very willing to take risks).  d) based on the status-
quo-bias-free income gamble question (Barsky et al., 1997), “Suppose that you are the only income earner in the family. Your 
doctor recommends that you move because of allergies, and you have to choose between two possible jobs. The first would 
guarantee your current total family income for life. The second is possibly better paying, but the income is also less certain. There 
is a 50-50 chance the second job would double your total lifetime income and a 50-50 chance that it would cut it by a third (or cut 
it by 99%, 90%, 75%, 50%, 20%, 10%, 5%, and 1%). Which job would you take the first job or the second job?” (measured by 1-
2-…-10 degrees). 
 
1.3.5 Loss Aversion, LTCI, SDI, and Private Health Insurance Holdings: Regression Results 
Estimating equations are as follows: 
 1(insurance)𝑖    =  𝑐1 + 𝛼1LossAversio𝑛𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖?̇? + 𝜀𝑖 …………… Probit Model 
 Number_of_insu𝑖 = 𝑐2 + 𝛼2LossAversio𝑛𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖?̈? + 𝑒𝑖………….. OLS 
   Where 1(insurance)𝑖 is an indicator variable for whether an individual 𝑖 owns LTCI (or SDI), 
Number_of_insu𝑖 is the number of private health insurance plans that the individual owns, and 𝑋𝑖 is a 
vector of control variables. 
The Probit regression results in Table 1.2 are consistent with the predictions of prospect theory: the 
higher the loss aversion, the lower the probability of having LTCI and SDI. The dependent variable of 
columns (1)-(11) is an indicator variable if one owns a private LTCI or SDI policy. The first six columns 
<Panel A: sorted by loss aversion>
N Mean (Std Err) N Mean (Std Err) P-value
Own LTCI (0-1) 422 0.069 (0.012) 184 0.027 (0.012)     0.0411**
Own SDI (0-1) 393 0.127 (0.017) 175 0.069 (0.019)     0.0385**
Number of Private Health Insurance 423 0.418 (0.029) 186 0.376 (0.039) 0.4056
Age 422 50.27 (0.805) 184 52.14 (1.158) 0.1942
Gender (0-1) 422 0.671 (0.023) 184 0.652 (0.035) 0.6589 
ln_Income 422 9.875 (0.036) 184 9.831 (0.060) 0.5186
Wealtha 422 146473 (52104) 184 162543 (46416) 0.8495
Education Level(1-15) 422 9.265 (0.106) 184 9.484 (0.165) 0.2609
Cognitive Ability(1-5) b 418 4.074 (0.078) 182 4.082 (0.118) 0.9536
Hispanic Latino(0-1) 422 0.201 (0.020) 184 0.158 (0.027)  0.2051
Married(0-1) 422 0.434 (0.024) 184 0.424 (0.037) 0.8242
<Panel B: sorted by LTCI holdings>
LossAversion (λ, 0.86-4.0) 572      2.01 (0.043) 34        1.70 (0.139) 0.0811*
RiskTaking (self report, 0-10) c 1,235   4.52 (0.061) 184     4.66 (0.146)  0.4254 
RiskAversion (Income gamble, 1-10) d 1,232   7.14 (0.051) 184     6.95 (0.123) 0.1590
Two tailed t-test
for equal mean
(H0: μA = μB)
Individuals with a high 
degree of loss aversion 
(λ≥3)  (B)
Individuals who
do not own LTCI (C) 
Individuals who
 own LTCI (D)
Two tailed t-test
for equal mean
(H0: μC = μD)
Individuals with a low 
degree of  loss aversion 
(λ<3)  (A)
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show that loss aversion (λ) significantly reduces the probability of owning an LTCI (columns 1-2) and 
SDI (columns 7-8) after controlling for various covariates. In contrast, results in columns (6) and (11) 
indicate that the CRRA measure has no explanatory power in explaining insurance ownership. See also 
Table A.9 (Appendix A). Results in the table indicate that various dummy variables for CRRA are not 
jointly significant in explaining take-up of LTCI or SDI. 
 
Table 1.2 LTCI and SDI Ownership, Loss Aversion, Risk Aversion – Probit regression  
 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variables, LTCI and SDI, are 
indicator variables if an individual owns long-term care insurance or supplemental disability insurance. Self-employed 
individuals are excluded in the regression for SDI. LossAversion takes the values of 0.86, 1.0, 1.2, 1.5, 2.0, 3.0, or 4.0. CRRA 
(coefficient of relative risk aversion) is based on RiskAversion(Income gamble, 1-10). (See Footnotes of Table 1.1, d). The 
coefficient is computed by Hanna & Lindamood’s (2004) method. It takes the values of 0.008, 0.092, 0.306, 1.0, 2.0, 3.76, 7.53, 
14.51, 70, 150. i_Heuristics is an indicator variable if a respondent is subject to the gambler’s fallacy. The variable has a value of 
one if a respondent responded less than one percent regarding the question, “When playing slot machines, people win something 
about 1 in every 10 times. Julie, however, has just won on her first three plays. What are her chances of winning the next time she 
plays?” i_Accessibility is an indicator variable that has a value of one if the respondent answers “yes” to the question, “In the last 5 
years, have you asked for any advice from a financial professional about any of the following? Debt counseling, savings or 
investments, taking out a mortgage or a loan, insurance of any type, or tax planning.” Accessibility is based on the same survey 
question as i_Accessibility. It represents the average number of counseling visits. ProbHealthy takes the values of 0-100. It is based 
on the question, “Assuming that you are still living at [80/85/90], what are the chances that your health will allow you to live 
independently, that is, to live at home without help and manage your own affairs? 0 is absolutely no chance, and 100 is you are 
absolutely certain.” (the age [80/85/90] was randomly assigned). i_ProbHealthy is an indicator variable taking the value of one if 
ProbHealthy is equal to or greater than 90 percent (the third quartile of responses when the age of 80 was assigned) or 80 percent 
(the third quartile of responses when the age of 85 or 90 was assigned). i_LossAver2 is an indicator variable for high loss aversion 
(λ≥2.0). All variables are from the ALP. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
LossAversion (λ) -0.160** -0.175** -0.137* -0.688** -0.177** -0.311* -0.164** -0.166** -0.179** -0.163** -0.152
(0.0807) (0.0825) (0.0826) (0.277) (0.0823) (0.176) (0.0746) (0.0741) (0.0788) (0.0806) (0.137)
Age 0.0174*** 0.0186*** 0.0393*** 0.0200*** 0.0527*** -0.00474 -0.00514 -0.00408 -0.0110
(0.00648) (0.00671) (0.0119) (0.00765) (0.0136) (0.00463) (0.00475) (0.00541) (0.00943)
ln (Income) 0.130 0.128 1.034*** 0.198 0.519 -0.120 -0.130 -0.0386 -0.256
(0.157) (0.155) (0.315) (0.197) (0.419) (0.100) (0.0997) (0.127) (0.189)
Education(1-15) -0.0237 -0.0228 -0.0658 -0.00524 0.0534 -0.0271 -0.0230 -0.0451 -0.0421
(0.0403) (0.0405) (0.0610) (0.0473) (0.0934) (0.0345) (0.0346) (0.0414) (0.0698)
i_HispanicLatino 0.517** 0.538** 1.178*** 0.441 1.556*** 0.0904 0.0740 -0.0970 -0.194
(0.222) (0.227) (0.356) (0.268) (0.517) (0.197) (0.199) (0.219) (0.618)
i_Married -0.383** -0.383** -0.541 -0.422** -0.722* 0.160 0.184 0.123 0.339
(0.184) (0.188) (0.362) (0.209) (0.369) (0.151) (0.151) (0.174) (0.273)
i_Female 0.0230 0.0280 0.845*** -0.0615 0.813* -0.122 -0.102 -0.166 -0.0265
(0.193) (0.195) (0.314) (0.211) (0.461) (0.150) (0.151) (0.175) (0.283)
i_Heuristics*LossAversion -0.403* 0.00384
(0.242) (0.0896)
i_Accessibility*LossAversion 1.334**
(0.526)
Accessibility 0.124
(0.438)
i_ProbHealthy*i_LossAver2 -0.628** 0.00756
(0.319) (0.167)
ProbHealthy 0.00435 0.000622
(0.00426) (0.00353)
CRRA (ɤ ) 0.00159 0.00231
(0.00279) (0.00216)
Constant -1.290*** -3.238** -3.294** -13.68*** -4.306* -10.56** -0.921*** 0.621 0.733 0.282 2.414
(0.168) (1.647) (1.646) (3.545) (2.203) (4.321) (0.153) (0.976) (0.978) (1.203) (1.842)
Observations 606 606 598 266 490 177 568 568 557 445 161
Dependent Variable: SDIDependent Variable: LTCI
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The estimation results when linear probability model is employed are displayed in Table A.7 (Appendix 
A). They indicate an economically large impact of loss aversion on insurance take-up. For example, the 
estimated coefficient of loss aversion in column (2), -0.0152, implies that a one-unit increase of loss 
aversion decreases ownership probability by 1.52 percent points. As the average ownership rate of LTCI 
is only 5.61 percent in the merged sample, this implies that the difference in loss aversion can explain a 
substantial amount of variation in ownership. For example, an individual with a loss aversion of three is 
3.04 percent point (=2*1.52%p) more likely to own LTCI than a person with a loss aversion of one. 
 
 
Interaction between Loss Aversion, Narrow Framing, and Subjective Probability 
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 1.2 show that the magnitude of the effect of loss aversion is amplified by 
the degree of narrow framing. According to Kahneman (2003) and Guiso (2015), narrow framing is 
associated with the frequent use of “heuristics” and “low accessibility” to one’s existing portfolio. A 
significant negative sign of the i_Heuristics*LossAversion term in column (3) shows that loss aversion has a 
larger effect on insurance purchasing decisions for those who are subject to heuristics, and hence are more 
subject to narrow framing. A significant positive sign of the i_Accessibility*LossAversion term in column (4) 
indicates that loss aversion has a different effect for those who have taken financial advice and hence have 
more “access” (Kahneman 2003, p. 1,460) to their wealth and existing risks, and so are less subject to 
narrow framing.
24
 These results are consistent with prospect theory, which predicts that the effect of loss 
aversion is affected by the degree of narrow framing. In the case of SDI, the interaction effect was not 
significant (column 9). 
The results in columns (5) and (10) display the result when we add interaction terms between loss 
aversion and subjective probability (i_ProbHealthy*i_LossAver2). The result in column (5) indicates that the 
negative effect of loss aversion is large among those who expect that they will live independently at age 
80, 85, or 90 (i.e., to live at home without help and manage their own affairs). Since living independently 
at such ages means that the person does not use long-term care (i.e., w(1-p)↑), the result implies that loss-
aversion’s negative effect on LTCI is amplified by the subjective probability of not needing long-term 
care. This result is consistent with the second testable implication of the prospect theory model. The result 
in column (10) shows that the interaction effect is not significant in the case of SDI. 
                                           
24 For those who have taken financial advice, the total effect of loss aversion on take-up of LTCI is 0.646 (=1.334-0.688), which 
means that loss aversion has a positive effect on the take-up. This positive association suggests the possibility that financial 
advice may have changed the reference point as well. Specifically, the testable implication [3] states that if an individual’s 
reference point is ‘the wealth level under insurance coverage,’ then loss-aversion may increase insurance demand. This 
hypothesis will be further examined in the section for auto insurance.  
 
  20  
 
Loss Aversion and The Number of Private Health Insurance Plans 
  The results in Table 1.3 show that loss aversion is negatively associated with the number of private 
health insurance plans that individuals own, while risk aversion is not. To control for the crowding-out 
effect of public insurance (e.g., Medicaid, Medicare) on private health insurance, the number of public 
health insurance plans that a respondent owns is added as a control variable. Although the continuous 
measure (LossAversion) is not significant (columns 1-2), the dummy variable for high loss aversion 
(i_LossAver_4) has a significant negative sign (columns 3-6). Results in columns (7)-(10) show that 
conventional measures for risk aversion (CRRA, self-reported risk taking measure) have no explanatory 
power in predicting health insurance take-up when demographic variables are controlled for. 
 Possible interactions between loss aversion, narrow framing, and subjective probability are examined in 
columns (5)-(6). To do this, three interaction terms are added (i_Heuristics*LossAversion, 
i_Prob_LowMedExp*i_LossAver2, i_Accessibility*LossAversion). The significant negative sign of 
i_Prob_LowMedExp*i_LossAver2 indicates that loss aversion’s effect is large among those who expect that 
they will spend less than $500 in medical expenditures. This result is consistent with the predictions of the 
prospect theory model. Other interaction terms were insignificant. 
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Table 1.3 Private Health Insurance Ownership, Loss Aversion, & Risk Aversion -OLS 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.The dependent variable of columns (1)-(10) is 
the number of private health insurance plans an individual owns. It is based on the ALP question, (after asking if a respondent 
holds Medicaid, Medicare, or other public insurance plans), “Now, we'd like to ask about all the other types of health insurance 
plans you might have, such as insurance through an Now, we'd like to ask about all the other types of health insurance plans you 
might have, such as insurance through an employer or a business, coverage for retirees, or health insurance you buy for yourself, 
including any [Medigap or] other supplemental coverage. Do NOT include long-term care insurance. [Other than your Medicare 
HMO or Medicare Advantage Plan you've just told me about, how/How] many other plans do you have? Please enter zero for 
none.” i_LossAver_4 is an indicator variable for λ=4.0. The Number of public health insurance plans takes the values 0, 1, .., 4. 
Prob_HighMedExp is self-reported percent chance that a respondent will pay more than $1,500 in medical costs during the next 
year. i_Prob_LowMedExp is based on the question “On this same, 0 to 100 scale, what are the chances that you will spend more than 
$500 [in medical costs] during the coming year? 0 is absolutely no chance 100 is absolutely certain.” It takes the value of one if a 
respondent answers that the probability is less than 50 percent. Descriptions of other variables are provided in Footnotes of Table 
2. Also see Table A.3 in Appendix A. 
 
1.3.6 Robustness checks 
  Robustness Check 1: More Controls 
The results in Table 1.4 show that the association between loss aversion and insurance take-up 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
LossAversion (λ) -0.0237 -0.0309
(0.0226) (0.0214)
i_LossAver_4 (λ ≥4.0) -0.154** -0.126** -0.135** -0.224**
(0.0634) (0.0599) (0.0598) (0.0981)
Number of Public Health
 Insurance Plans one owns -0.169*** -0.167*** -0.166*** -0.153*** -0.152*** -0.152*** -0.153*** -0.153***
(0.0306) (0.0303) (0.0314) (0.0501) (0.0428) (0.0428) (0.0426) (0.0426)
Age 0.00194 0.00196 0.00162 0.00129 0.00104 0.00107 0.00112 0.00116
(0.00166) (0.00167) (0.00177) (0.00258) (0.00252) (0.00252) (0.00252) (0.00251)
ln (Income) 0.138*** 0.135*** 0.123*** 0.127* 0.247*** 0.248*** 0.251*** 0.250***
(0.0336) (0.0336) (0.0352) (0.0659) (0.0415) (0.0413) (0.0413) (0.0407)
Education(1-15) 0.0332*** 0.0328*** 0.0292*** 0.0498*** 0.0203* 0.0205* 0.0205* 0.0203*
(0.00979) (0.00981) (0.00999) (0.0158) (0.0116) (0.0117) (0.0118) (0.0118)
i_HispanicLatino -0.0217 -0.0207 -0.0133 -0.0775 -0.0512 -0.0478 -0.0471 -0.0480
(0.0509) (0.0504) (0.0517) (0.0775) (0.0724) (0.0720) (0.0709) (0.0711)
i_Married 0.0174 0.0160 0.0148 0.0285 -0.0130 -0.0147 -0.0151 -0.0148
(0.0454) (0.0455) (0.0481) (0.0698) (0.0432) (0.0429) (0.0431) (0.0430)
i_Female 0.106** 0.107** 0.0981* 0.101 0.0268 0.0270 0.0233 0.0257
(0.0484) (0.0483) (0.0508) (0.0777) (0.0418) (0.0421) (0.0412) (0.0427)
FamilySize -0.0310** -0.0307** -0.0283* -0.00921 -0.0469*** -0.0472*** -0.0455*** -0.0453***
(0.0141) (0.0142) (0.0144) (0.0236) (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0171) (0.0171)
i_Heuristics*LossAversion 0.0494
(0.0618)
i_Prob_LowMedExp*i_LossAver2 -0.149**
(0.0634)
Prob_HighMedExp 0.000132
(0.000772)
i_Accessibility*LossAversion 0.0519
(0.0391)
Accessibility -0.246
(0.191)
CRRA (ɤ) -0.000239
(0.000391)
i_CRRA_Q3 (ɤ ≥ 14.51) -0.0218
(0.0409)
RiskTaking(self report) -0.00245
(0.0104)
i_RiskTaking_Q3(self report ≥ 6) -0.000102
(0.0510)
Constant 0.453*** -1.259*** 0.423*** -1.281*** -1.098*** -1.375 -2.054*** -2.062*** -2.096*** -2.099***
(0.0545) (0.402) (0.0251) (0.391) (0.418) (0.860) (0.503) (0.502) (0.497) (0.497)
Observations 609 609 609 609 584 266 883 883 885 885
R-squared 0.002 0.141 0.007 0.142 0.144 0.146 0.131 0.131 0.130 0.130
Dependent vairable: The Number of Private Health Insurance Plans an Individual Owns
Loss Aversion and Private Health Insurance Risk Aversion and Private Health Insurance
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decisions is robust to alternative control variables. Literature on the LTCI and other insurance markets 
suggests that there could be additional explanatory variables for insurance take-up, such as wealth (Brown 
& Finkelstein, 2007; 2008), counterparty risk (Beshears et al., 2014), or health status  (Finkelstein & 
McGarry, 2006). Inheritance motives and the liquidity constraints could be additional factors that could 
affect insurance decisions. All results in Table 1.4 except for column (11) indicate that loss aversion does 
not lose its explanatory power when those variables are controlled for. The insignificant result in column 
(11) seems to be driven by the small size of the sample (N=181). The results in column (4), (8), and (12) 
show that loss-aversion’s effect on insurance take-up remains robust to the inclusion of occupational 
dummies. 
 
Table 1.4 Robustness Check 1 : More Controls 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All data is from the American Life Panel. The 
dependent variables are indicator variables if an individual owns LTCI (columns 1-4) or SDI (columns 5-8), and the number of 
private health insurance plans an individual owns (columns 9-12). i_LossAver_4 is an indicator variable taking the value of one if 
loss aversion(λ) is equal to 4.0. i_Inherit is an indicator variable for whether or not a respondent wants to leave more than $1,000 
as an inheritance. Wealth is the amount of real assets and financial assets of the family. LiquidityConst measures the degree of 
difficulty covering 5 days of expenses (self-report, 1 No difficulty, …, 5 Very Difficult). Counterparty_risk is a respondent’s degree 
of concern that a long-term care insurance company may not remain in business long enough to pay for one’s care (1-Strongly 
Disagree;...; 5-Strongly Agree). PoorHealth is the health status relative to other people (self-report, 1 Excellent,…, 5 Poor).  
    Dependent Variable: 
Explanatory variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
LossAversion (λ) -0.177** -0.206** -0.253** -0.169** -0.163** -0.202** -0.207* -0.175**
(0.0836) (0.0997) (0.121) (0.0769) (0.0789) (0.0942) (0.109) (0.0753)
i_LossAver_4 (λ ≥4.0) -0.149** -0.142** -0.0455 -0.122*
(0.0625) (0.0714) (0.109) (0.0627)
Age 0.0165** 0.0237** 0.0264* 0.0190*** -0.00508 -0.00497 -0.00146 -0.00367 0.00208 0.00412** 0.00499* 0.00313**
(0.00667) (0.00988) (0.0135) (0.00616) (0.00591) (0.00688) (0.0103) (0.00468) (0.00175) (0.00192) (0.00298) (0.00152)
ln (Income) 0.0763 0.360* 0.858** 0.153 0.0313 -0.0485 0.422 -0.123 0.0996** 0.140*** 0.108 0.137***
(0.150) (0.218) (0.367) (0.148) (0.118) (0.133) (0.287) (0.103) (0.0398) (0.0339) (0.0699) (0.0325)
Education(1-15) -0.0251 0.0267 0.0222 -0.0508 -0.0527 -0.0948** -0.179** -0.0134 0.0277*** 0.0586*** 0.0440** 0.0331***
(0.0429) (0.0513) (0.0684) (0.0456) (0.0372) (0.0461) (0.0792) (0.0372) (0.0103) (0.0127) (0.0189) (0.00962)
i_HispanicLatino 0.540** 0.673** 0.944** 0.596*** 0.251 -0.0990 -0.208 0.0998 0.00321 -0.0203 -0.0153 -0.0421
(0.229) (0.280) (0.384) (0.223) (0.242) (0.258) (0.419) (0.192) (0.0539) (0.0631) (0.0944) (0.0548)
i_Married -0.410** -0.232 -0.396 -0.393** -0.0131 0.166 0.0560 0.173 -0.00586 0.0125 0.0165 0.0175
(0.174) (0.235) (0.309) (0.182) (0.165) (0.189) (0.308) (0.149) (0.0479) (0.0598) (0.0953) (0.0460)
i_Female 0.0239 0.318 0.0779 0.00570 -0.106 -0.123 0.208 -0.124 0.0993** 0.195*** 0.259*** 0.0974*
(0.190) (0.259) (0.321) (0.226) (0.172) (0.208) (0.309) (0.162) (0.0481) (0.0542) (0.0798) (0.0523)
i_Inherit 0.228 -0.0299 0.124**
(0.186) (0.192) (0.0541)
ln(Wealth) 0.00792 0.00969 0.00516
(0.0180) (0.0184) (0.00487)
LiquidityConst(1-5) 0.0373 0.122** -0.00782
(0.0657) (0.0607) (0.0172)
CounterPartyRisk(1-5) -0.144 -0.0252 0.0189
(0.111) (0.0847) (0.0259)
PoorHealth (1-5) 0.145 0.258** -0.0779
(0.134) (0.123) (0.0598)
Number of Public Health
Insurance Plans one owns -0.161*** -0.136*** -0.0583 -0.174***
(0.0320) (0.0377) (0.0503) (0.0311)
Constant -2.930* -6.192*** -11.88*** -3.708** -1.276 1.142 -3.871 0.386 -1.005** -1.889*** -1.309 -1.414***
(1.662) (2.346) (4.005) (1.513) (1.214) (1.340) (2.687) (1.021) (0.463) (0.357) (0.841) (0.348)
Occupation dummies No No No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes
Observations 586 369 179 606 474 326 164 568 586 372 181 609
R-squared - - - - - - - - 0.143 0.170 0.160 0.153
P-value of model F-test 0.0162 0.00703 0.0361 0.0148 0.199 0.104 0.0108 0.406 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
LTCI SDI Number of Private Health Insurance Plans
Probit regression OLS regression
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Robustness Check 2: A Non-parametric Method 
 To examine if the results are confounded by the parametric forms of loss aversion/risk aversion 
measures, simple non-parametric estimations are employed. To do this, continuous measures for loss and 
risk aversion are converted into indicator variables (if the values are equal to or more than the first, 
second, and third quartile). Results in Table A.8 and A.9 (Appendix A) show that the results do not change 
when indicator variables are used: loss aversion has a significant negative sign while risk aversion does 
not. Specifically, results in Table A.9 show that three dummy variables for risk aversion (i_CRRA_Q1, 
i_CRRA_Q2, i_CRRA_Q3) are not jointly significant in explaining the ownership of LTCI and SDI among 
low-to-moderate wealth individuals. 
 
Robustness Check 3: Cohort Study (Baby boomers cohorts) 
To control for the heterogeneity coming from different age groups, we restrict our analysis to those who 
were born from 1946 to 1964 (baby boomers). The results in Table A.10 (Appendix A) indicate that, in the 
case of LTCI and private health insurance, loss aversion maintains its explanatory power even when the 
sample size is decreased to less than 270 observations. 
 
Exclusion of Alternative Explanations: Is the association between loss aversion and insurance take-up 
decisions necessarily evidence of prospect theory?   
 
Some researchers might argue that there are alternative reasons or channels other than prospect theory 
that can explain the association between loss aversion and insurance take-up decisions. This section rules 
out such alternative explanations. One possibility is measurement error, i.e., the possibility that the 
measure for loss aversion reflects risk aversion. One can rule out this possibility thanks to the negative 
sign of the coefficient of loss aversion in Table 1.2 - Table 1.4. If the measure for loss aversion (defined 
over losses and gains from the reference point) was actually a proxy for risk aversion (defined over final 
consumption), then the coefficient should have a positive sign, because if consumers are more risk-averse 
with respect to final consumption, then they should be more willing to insure themselves.
25
 But the 
coefficient has a negative sign. Hence, we can rule out the possibility of measurement error.
 
 
Another alternative explanation is religious beliefs: religious beliefs might have co-determined the 
aversion to gambling and insurance. Those who are averse to gambling due to religious beliefs might also 
be reluctant to buy insurance if they see that relying on insurance comes from a distrust of God’s 
protection.
26
 However, the results in Table A.12 (Appendix A) show that this is not the case: the 
                                           
25 Note that this statement holds regardless of the order of risk aversion: under the final-wealth approach, even the first-order risk 
aversion cannot explain the negative sign of the coefficient of loss aversion. Also note that, if the first-order risk aversion is not 
taken in the final-wealth approach, the implied concavity of the loss aversion measure in this paper is absurdly high.  
26 For example, Browne and Kim (1993, p. 621) summarize Zelizer’s (1979) argument as follows: “Zelizer (1979) notes that … 
many religious people believe that a reliance on life insurance results from a distrust of God’s protecting care.” 
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importance of religion, being Protestant, Catholic, etc., is not associated with any of the loss aversion 
measure (continuous loss aversion measure, two dummy variables for loss high loss aversion).  
 
1.3.7 Loss Aversion, WTP for Health Insurance, Hypothetical Insurance Choices 
   To clearly show that the negative relationship between loss aversion and insurance holdings is driven 
by the demand side (individuals’ unwillingness to buy insurance), this section examines how loss aversion 
is associated with (i) individuals’ willingness to pay (WTP) for health insurance and (ii) peoples’ 
insurance decisions in a hypothetical setting. To do this, various experimental surveys in the ALP are 
merged with the survey on loss aversion using individual identifiers. A survey on WTP for health 
insurance (columns 1-2) was conducted in November 2011. An experimental survey on hypothetical 
insurance choices (columns 3-6) was fielded in September 2013. 
   The first scatter plot in Figure 1.4 shows that loss-averse individuals have a significantly low WTP for 
health insurance. Regression results in Panel A of Table 1.5 confirm this. The Y-axis of Figure 1.4 and the 
dependent variable of columns (1)-(2) of Table 1.5 is the amount that individuals are both willing and able 
to pay for a more generous health insurance plan, which has low out-of-pocket costs for specialty drugs. 
In the OLS regressions, loss aversion exhibits a significant negative sign. 
   Columns (3) - (6) in Table 1.5 show that loss-averse individuals are more likely to choose ‘not to buy 
health insurance.’ In an ALP survey conducted in September 2013, respondents are asked to make 
hypothetical decisions among the suggested five health insurance plans. The five options are “(a) Plan 1; 
(b) Plan 2; (c) Plan 3; (d) Plan 4; (e) I would rather pay a penalty of per year or 1% of your annual income, 
whichever is greater and not purchase insurance.” Plan 1 – Plan 4 are reasonably priced health insurance 
plans with different levels of premiums, deductibles, and co-pay. The dependent variable in columns (3) 
and (6) is an indicator variable for whether or not a respondent chooses option (e). The probit regression 
results show that loss-averse individuals are significantly more likely to choose the option of ‘not buying 
insurance and paying the penalty.’ 
   In columns (5)-(6), possible interactions between loss aversion and subjective probability are 
examined. Although the interaction terms (i_Prob_LowMedExp*LossAversion) were not significant, the 
subjective probability term itself (Prob_HighMedExp) has a significant negative sign, indicating that most 
effects of subjective probability are concentrated in the subjective probability term rather than in the 
interaction term. This implies that those who expect they will spend more than $1,500 on medical 
expenditures during the next year (Prob_HighMedExp ↑) are less likely to choose the option of ‘not buying 
insurance.’ This is consistent with the prospect theory model, which predicts that subjective probability 
has a critical role in take-up. This result is also in line with the literature on moral hazards in insurance 
markets. 
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   The regression results in Panel B of Table 1.5 show that the risk aversion measure (CRRA) is not a 
good predictor of WTP for additional health insurance coverage or hypothetical insurance choices. The 
second scatter plot in Figure 1.4 also indicates that WTP is not associated with risk aversion. 
 
Figure 1.4- WTP for health insurance, loss aversion, and risk aversion 
       
Notes: This figure displays the scatter plot between WTP for a more generous health insurance plan (WTP_for_more_insu, Y-axis) 
and Loss Aversion (left figure, X-axis) and RiskAversion (Income Gamble, 1-10) (right figure, X-axis). 
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Table 1.5 Loss Aversion, WTP, Hypothetical Insurance Decisions 
  
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All data is from the American Life Panel. See 
Table A.3 (Appendix A) for details of the sources. LossAversion takes the values of 0.86, 1.0, 1.2, 1.5, 2.0, 3.0, or 4.0. CRRA 
(coefficient of relative risk aversion) is based on RiskAversion(Income gamble, 1-10). (See Footnotes of Table 1.1, d). The coefficient 
is computed by Hanna & Lindamood’s (2004) method. It takes the values of 0.008, 0.092, 0.306, 1.0, 2.0, 3.76, 7.53, 14.51, 70, 
150. The dependent variable of columns (1) and (2), WTP_for_more_insu, is the amount that a respondent chooses regarding the 
following question: “…In order to switch to the more generous health insurance plan that has low specialty drug costs, you would 
have to pay an additional premium each month… Please indicate the highest amount per month that you would be both willing 
and able to pay for the health insurance plan that has low specialty drug costs, instead of the high-cost plan: [$0; $1; $5; $10; $15; 
$20; $25; $30; $40; $50; $60; I would pay more than an additional $60 per month].” ($80 was assigned when ‘more than an 
additional $60’ is chosen). The dependent variable of columns (3) and (4), i_Not_buy_insu, is an indicator variable which takes a 
value of one if a respondent chooses the option (e) among the five options available in a hypothetical choice tasks. The five 
options are [(a) Plan 1; (b) Plan 2; (c) Plan 3; (d) Plan 4; (e) I would rather pay a penalty of per year or 1% of your annual income, 
whichever is greater and not purchase insurance]. Plan 1 – Plan 4 are reasonably priced health insurance plans that differ in terms 
of premiums, deductibles, doctor visit co-pay, and generic medicine co-pay. (displayed premiums change depending on the 
respondent’s age group as well). Prob_HighMedExp is self-reported percent chance that a respondent will pay more than $1,500 in 
medical costs during the next year. i_Prob_LowMedExp is based on the question “On this same, 0 to 100 scale, what are the chances 
that you will spend more than $500 [in medical costs] during the coming year? 0 is absolutely no chance 100 is absolutely 
certain.” It takes the value of one if a respondent answers that the probability is less than 50 percent.  
Dependent Var:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LossAversion(λ) -1.884*** -2.380*** 0.121** 0.113** 0.121* 0.122*
(0.604) (0.666) (0.0569) (0.0570) (0.0699) (0.0718)
Income(1-14) 0.187 0.0287 -0.0435** -0.0402** -0.0627** -0.0644**
(0.232) (0.274) (0.0188) (0.0202) (0.0256) (0.0260)
Age 0.0520 0.0118** 0.0102* 0.0113*
(0.0664) (0.00502) (0.00595) (0.00598)
Education(1-15) 0.417 -0.0249 -0.0377 -0.0303
(0.614) (0.0307) (0.0375) (0.0378)
i_Female -0.323 -0.0416 0.0987 0.0998
(1.725) (0.128) (0.154) (0.155)
i_HispanicLatino 3.300 -0.0177 -0.0220 -0.0474
(2.472) (0.146) (0.180) (0.181)
FamilySize 0.930 -0.0716* -0.0911** -0.0943**
(0.840) (0.0378) (0.0459) (0.0461)
i_Prob_LowMedExp*LossAversion -0.0432 -0.0496
(0.0873) (0.0879)
Prob_HighMedExp -0.00644*** -0.00656***
(0.00231) (0.00233)
i_Heuristics*LossAversion 0.0181
(0.0819)
Constant 9.760*** -2.356 -0.0769 -0.134 0.307 0.257
(1.877) (7.197) (0.172) (0.502) (0.624) (0.627)
Observations 34 34 460 460 333 330
R-squared 0.117 0.192 - - - -
Dependent Var:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CRRA(ɤ) -0.00195 -0.00263 0.00148 0.00123
(0.00462) (0.00457) (0.000929) (0.000941)
Income(1-14) 0.125* 0.185** -0.121*** -0.110***
(0.0730) (0.0757) (0.0155) (0.0163)
Age 0.00891 0.00973*
(0.0199) (0.00527)
Education(1-15) -0.329** -0.0575**
(0.147) (0.0260)
Gender 0.00796 -0.00856
(0.540) (0.0983)
HispanicLatino 0.245 -0.210
(0.842) (0.216)
FamilySize -0.375 0.0236
(0.248) (0.0382)
Constant 7.639*** 10.30*** 0.916*** 1.373**
(0.862) (2.450) (0.188) (0.605)
Observations 190 190 787 787
R-squared 0.014 0.054 - -
<Panel A> Loss Avesion,  WTP for Insurance, and hypothetical choices
<Panel B>  Risk Avesion,  WTP for Insurance, and hypothetical choices
WTP_for_more_insu <OLS> i_Not_buy_insu <Probit>
WTP_for_more_insu <OLS> i_Not_buy_insu <Probit>
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1.3.8 Loss Aversion and Auto Insurance Holdings  
   In the case of the auto insurance market, where the purchase of liability insurance is compulsory
27
 
and uptake ratio is about 85% in the U.S., the reference point could be ‘the wealth level under insurance 
protection.’ In contrast to discussions thus far, if such a reference point (i.e., holding insurance) is 
assumed, loss aversion may increase insurance demand. This is because, under such reference point, ‘not 
purchasing insurance’ is regarded as gambling. The potential gain and loss of ‘not purchasing insurance’ 
is as follows: a potential gain is, now, saved premiums (the gain is realized if an accident doesn’t occur) 
and a potential loss is lost benefits from an insurance company (the loss is realized if an accident occurs). 
Thus, the gain-loss value of ‘Not purchasing insurance’ is negatively associated with loss aversion. (i.e., 
the value of insurance is positively associated with loss aversion). Hence, loss-averse individuals do not 
execute the risky option of ‘not holding auto insurance.’ The following paragraph formalizes this idea. 
Suppose a prospect theory consumer’s initial wealth is W. There is a bad event (J ∈ st+1) with a 
probability of p. If the bad event occurs, the consumer suffers damage, L units of consumption. Let’s 
denote the reference point quantities of insurance plans as ?̅?, where ?̅?≤ L. One insurance plan, whose 
price is qt, pays off one unit of consumption in the next period if J is realized. A potential gain or loss 
from the purchase of at+1 units of insurance, where at+1 ≤ ?̅?, is as follows: 
Table 1.6. Gain-loss of insurance under the reference point insurance quantities of ?̅? 
 Reference point wealth 
Ex-post wealth level if one 
purchases at+1 units of insurance 
Gain or Loss from the reference point 
J ∈ st+1 is Not 
realized 
W-qt ?̅?+δ(?̅? − 𝐿) W-qt 𝑎𝑡+1 Gain: qt (?̅?-𝑎𝑡+1)−δ(?̅? − 𝐿) 
J ∈ st+1 is 
realized 
W-qt ?̅?+δ(?̅? − 𝐿) W-qt 𝑎𝑡+1+δ(𝑎𝑡+1 − 𝐿) Loss: (?̅?−𝑎𝑡+1)(𝛿 − 𝑞𝑡) 
 
 
Hence, given the problem set up in equation (1.2) in Section 1.2.3 and given ?̅?, the value function 
becomes as follows: 
𝑣(𝑎𝑡+1(s
t, st+1)|𝑟𝑒𝑓) = {
{𝑞𝑡 (?̅? − 𝑎𝑡+1) − δ(?̅? − 𝐿)}
𝛼    𝑖𝑓   𝐽 ∈ 𝑠𝑡+1  𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟 
− 𝜆 ∙ {(?̅?−𝑎𝑡+1)(𝛿 − 𝑞𝑡)}
𝛽   𝑖𝑓 𝐽 ∈ 𝑠𝑡+1  𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑠
, 
 
 ∴ 𝐸[𝑣′(at+1 )] =𝑤(1 − 𝑝𝑠𝑡+1) ∙ α ∙ {𝑞𝑡 (?̅? − 𝑎𝑡+1) − δ(?̅? − 𝐿)}
𝛼−1 ∙ (−𝑞𝑡) 
                             +𝑤(𝑝𝑠𝑡+1) ∙ 𝜆 ∙ 𝛽 ∙ { (?̅?−𝑎𝑡+1)(𝛿 − 𝑞𝑡)}
𝛽−1 ∙ ( 𝛿 − 𝑞𝑡) 
Since at+1 ≤ ?̅? and 𝛿 ≥ 𝑞𝑡, a high magnitude of 𝜆 leads to a positive value of 𝐸[𝑣
′(at+1 )]. The FOC, 
the equation (1.3) in Section 1.2.3, implies that an increase in 𝜆 results in an increase in the optimal 
                                           
27 More than 45 U.S. states mandate the purchase of liability insurance for bodily injury liability and property damage 
liability. The amount of minimum coverage requirements varies state-by-state. Common minimum coverage requirements are 
$25,000 / $50,000 for bodily injury ($25,000 for each person injured in an accident, up to a maximum of $50,000 for the entire 
accident) and $10,000 for property damage. 
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quantities of insurance, 𝑎𝑡+1
∗ . 
This section empirically tests that loss-averse individuals are more likely to hold compulsory auto 
insurance. To do this, loss aversion data is merged with auto insurance ownership data and vehicle 
ownership data in the ALP at an individual level. We limit the analysis to individuals who own vehicles 
for transportation. Descriptive statistics are provided in Table A.13 (Appendix A). The results in Table 1.7 
partially support the hypothesis. The dependent variable of columns (1)-(6) is an indicator variable of 
whether or not an individual who owns a vehicle is covered by vehicle insurance. Results in columns (1)-
(3) show that while the continuous measure of loss aversion and i_LossAver(λ≥2.0) are not significant 
(column 1-2), i_LossAver(λ≥1.2) has a significant positive association with auto insurance take-up 
(columns 3). In all columns (1)-(3), we find a significant positive sign of the interaction term 
(i_Heuristics*LossAversion), which suggests that the effect of loss aversion is amplified by the degree of 
narrow framing. We get similar results when we add state dummy variables (columns 4-6). Overall, the 
results suggest that the negative relationship between loss aversion and insurance take-up does not hold in 
the case of auto insurance and that a positive relationship holds, if any.  
Table 1.7 Auto Insurance holdings and Loss Aversion - Probit Regression  
  
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the level of U.S. states are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All data are from 
the ALP. The analysis is restricted to those who own vehicles for transportation, i.e., those who answered “Yes” regarding the 
question, “Do you own any vehicles for transportation, like cars, trucks, a trailer, a motor home, a boat, or an airplane?” Auto 
insurance ownership variable is based on the question, “[Note that this survey question does not distinguish public insurance 
from privately purchased insurance] Please indicate if you are currently covered by any of the types of insurance below, whether 
through your employer, self-purchase, or provided by the government. Choose all that apply: .., Vehicle insurance.”  
i_LossAver(λ≥2.0) is an indicator variable for λ≥2.0 . i_LossAver(λ≥1.2) is an indicator variable for λ≥1.2. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LossAversion(λ) 0.0230 0.0378
(0.0566) (0.0726)
i_LossAver(λ≥2.0) -0.0773 -0.0303
(0.150) (0.183)
i_LossAver(λ≥1.2) 0.245* 0.373**
(0.142) (0.176)
i_Heuristics*LossAversion 0.579** 0.573** 0.596** 0.622*** 0.618*** 0.641**
(0.251) (0.236) (0.278) (0.237) (0.228) (0.266)
Age 0.00366 0.00388 0.00396 0.00425 0.00429 0.00534
(0.00712) (0.00717) (0.00704) (0.00873) (0.00878) (0.00877)
Income(1-14) 0.0782** 0.0761** 0.0833** 0.106*** 0.105*** 0.115***
(0.0338) (0.0337) (0.0328) (0.0384) (0.0379) (0.0370)
Education(1-15) 0.128** 0.132** 0.120** 0.111** 0.115** 0.103**
(0.0523) (0.0527) (0.0499) (0.0556) (0.0560) (0.0524)
i_Hispanic Latino 0.359 0.360 0.368 0.186 0.190 0.198
(0.549) (0.551) (0.547) (0.521) (0.527) (0.512)
FamilySize -0.203*** -0.199*** -0.201*** -0.204*** -0.201*** -0.197**
(0.0645) (0.0636) (0.0646) (0.0772) (0.0761) (0.0771)
i_ Female -0.0552 -0.0482 -0.0579 -0.165 -0.173 -0.157
(0.241) (0.239) (0.244) (0.296) (0.295) (0.300)
i_Married 0.0872 0.103 0.0803 -0.0256 -0.0175 -0.0348
(0.230) (0.234) (0.233) (0.252) (0.254) (0.256)
Constant -1.315 -1.298 -1.421 -0.872 -0.813 -1.124
(1.531) (1.529) (1.544) (1.379) (1.353) (1.396)
State Dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 311 311 311 288 288 288
Dep. Variable: Indicator variable if an individual is covered by any vehicle insurance
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1.4 Puzzles in Insurance Markets and Prospect Theory Model of Insurance Demand 
1.4.1 Puzzles in insurance markets and the model  
The novel feature of the prospect theory model is that it can explain puzzles in insurance markets in a 
unified setting. First, this model explains the under-insurance puzzle in the LTCI and life insurance 
markets. If bi z>0 and λi>1, then actuarially fair or even favorable insurance can be rejected. The most 
important feature of the model is that it shows that consumers reject an insurance offer, even though they 
are risk-averse with respect to their life time income and wealth
28
: they reject the offer if bi z and λ are 
large enough even though they have a concave Bernoulli utility function (i.e. γ ≥ 1). In cases where risk 
averse consumers reject insurance offers, the utility coming from the hedging effects of insurance is 
dominated by disutility due to narrow framing and loss aversion (Proposition 1.4-1.5 in Appendix A.4). 
Second, this model may explain the greater popularity of annuities and life insurance that return 
premiums. Returning premiums (e.g., rebates, a death benefit of whole life insurance) reduces consumers’ 
aversion to insurance because it can change the frame from “risky investments” to “safe savings.” If the 
prominence of risky framing (z) is removed, then bi z can converge to zero. As a result, the disutility due to 
loss aversion may be reduced. (See Proposition 1.6 in Appendix A.4). 
Third, this model explains the tendency to over-insure small losses and choose low deductibles 
(Sydnor, 2010; Eckles & Wise, 2011). The rational model cannot explain why consumers insure small 
losses (such as cell phone warranties), most of which are actuarially highly unfavorable. It cannot explain 
this because even a very high degree of risk aversion (defined over final wealth or consumption) means 
risk neutrality with respect to small changes in wealth (see Sydnor, 2010). Thus, consumers should reject 
an insurance offer for small losses when the offer is actuarially unfavorable. The prospect theory model 
can explain the phenomenon in two ways. First, if individuals have a high degree of narrow framing and 
the reference point is ‘the wealth level under insurance coverage,’ then individuals have an incentive to 
protect small-scale risks due to loss-aversion (See Rabin and Thaler, 2001). Second, probability weighting 
or a subjective probability can explain the phenomenon. If the subjective probability, w(pi), is higher than 
the objective probability (pi), even an actuarially unfavorable insurance can be attractive to consumers. 
Availability heuristics can be also associated with this because people often imagine defective products 
when calculating probability. The popularity of flight insurance and the unpopularity of flood insurance 
can be explained in a similar manner: the extensive media coverage of flight accidents and the relatively 
brief coverage of natural disasters can distort the perceived risk (Johnson et al., 1993). Although the 
rational model can explain the phenomenon in a similar way, i.e., this is because a consumer’s expectation 
                                           
28 Various survey results show that people are risk-averse with regard to lifetime income. For example, 81 percent of respondents 
(total observations=1,417) chose the first job in the ALP survey asking “Suppose the chances are 50-50 that the second job would 
double your lifetime income and 50-50 that it would cut it by 20%. Would you take the first job or the second job?” 
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is distorted, calibration results by Sydnor (2010) show that, under expected utility theory, an implausibly 
high level of probability distortion is required to explain it. The model in this paper predicts that relatively 
small increases in the subjective probability lead to much higher demands because the effect is directly 
embedded in the term, ∑w(pi)v(xi). (See Proposition 1.7 in Appendix A.4). 
Related propositions (Propositions 1.4-1.7) under complete market assumptions (where actuarially fair 
state-contingent claims are offered) are presented in <Appendix A.4>. 
 
1.4.2 Calibration and under-insurance puzzle of LTCI 
 
This section illustrates a representative agent who has the preference of equation (1.2). Then, this 
section searches for the bound of bi z by looking at the conditions under which this agent rejects a typical 
LTCI policy sold in the U.S. Note that only 14 percent of Americans aged 60 and over hold private LTCI. 
   The situation of a 65-year-old U.S. citizen whose yearly income is $65,000 is shown in Table 1.8. His 
probability of ever using long-term care is 0.47 (Brown & Finkelstein 2008). If he needs the care, then he 
needs it for three years starting at the age of 81. The daily cost of long-term care is $100 per day ($36,500 
per year). Hence, he is facing the risk that his disposable income might drop to $18,500 per year during 
the ages of 81-83 with a probability of 0.47. Further, w(p)=p is assumed. To focus on the income 
protection effect of an insurance policy, the uncertainty surrounding his mortality is removed by assuming 
that the person will die at the age of 86. This section does not consider other market frictions such as the 
secondary payer status of Medicaid. 
Parameter values are specified as follows. A coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA, γ) is assumed 
to be three (baseline) following a long line of simulation literature. Although the CRRA measure is not 
significant in the empirical analysis in the previous section, we include CRRA here to incorporate 
individuals’ preferences for smooth consumption. The discount rate (δ) is set to 0.98. Two parameters 
associated with prospect theory (α, β) are assumed to be 0.88 following the study by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1992). 
Finally, this paper considers various degrees of loss aversion (λ =1.1, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5, 3.0, or 3.5). Given λi, 
this section searches for the lower bound of bi z that rejects a typical LTCI policy sold in the U.S. The 
typical LTCI policy is assumed to have a load of 0.18, following estimates by Brown and Finkelstein 
(2007).
29
 There is a one-time LTCI offer available at the age of 65. The coverage amount of this LTCI is 
fixed at $36,500 per year for a total of three years. If the 65-year-old U.S. citizen decides to buy LTCI, the 
person needs to pay the premiums for three years (at ages 65-67). 
                                           
29 Brown and Finkelstein (2007) estimate that a typical LTCI policy purchased by a 65-year-old U.S. citizen that is held until 
death has a load of 0.18. They also report that the load increases to 0.51 if the termination probabilities are accounted for. A 
formula for a load is as follows: ‘present value of the expected benefit of insurance’ = (1-load)x‘present value of premiums.’  
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The narrow framing term bi z is rescaled to be 𝑏𝑖 𝑧 = ?̂? × 𝐶0
−𝛾 where 𝐶0=65,000, following Barberis, 
Huang, and Santos (2001). 
         Table 1.8 Descriptive statistics and parameters of the model 
  
Figure 1.5 illustrates the lower bound of ?̂? depending on λi. For example, if λi is two, then those with 
bi z ≥ 7 reject the LTCI offer that has a load of 0.18. The figure shows that, as λi increases, a relatively 
small degree of narrow framing is enough for the representative agent to reject the LTCI offer. 
Considering that this paper assumed a highly concave utility function with the relative risk aversion (γ) of 
three, the result is remarkable. The result shows that narrow framing and loss aversion can easily explain 
why most people do not buy LTCI even though they are risk averse with respect to lifetime income. 
Figure 1.5 Lower bound of the degree of narrow framing  
  
Notes: This figure shows the lower bound of the degree of narrow framing depending on the coefficient of loss aversion (λ). The 
lower bound implies the smallest possible number of ?̂? for the representative agent consumer (equation 1.2) to reject a LTCI 
policy, given the parameter values in Table 1.8. (𝑏𝑖 𝑧 = ?̂? × 𝐶0
−𝛾) 
 
Table 1.9 highlights the difference between the rational agent model and the boundedly-rational agent 
model. When a typical LTCI policy with a load of 0.18 is offered to the representative agent with the 
parameter values in Table 1.8, a boundedly rational agent with ?̂? = 5 rejects the offer if λi is equal to or 
greater than 2.6, while a fully rational agent accepts it.  
Additionally, the two models require a different amount of subsidies to have agents purchase an 
actuarially unfavorable LTCI. When a highly loaded LTCI policy is offered that has a loading factor of 0.5, 
both agents reject the offer. To induce them to purchase the insurance, however, a boundedly rational 
agent with ?̂? of 5 and λi of 2.0 requires at least $8,278 of annual subsidies for three years, while a fully 
65 year old US citizen (unisex)
yearly income (consumption) $65,000 coef. of RRA (γ) 3.0
probability of ever using long-term care 0.47 discount rate (δ) 0.98
age of first use conditional on using 81 LTCI loading factor 0.18
years of use conditional on using 3
daily cost of long-term care $100 loss aversion (λ)  1.1, 1.5, 2.0, 3.0, 3.5
life expectancy (live until) 85 α , β 0.88
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rational agent requires only $1,840 of annual subsidies for three years.  
 
Table 1.9 Comparison between the Rational Model and the Boundedly Rational Model   
 
 
1.5 Four Hypothetical Policies 
This section discusses hypothetical policies that can help address the underinsurance problem. The 
FOC in equation (1.3) in Section 1.2.3 suggests that removing bi,z ∙ 𝐸[𝑣′(at+1 )] is key for stimulating 
insurance demand.
30
 We discuss four policies that affect bi,z or 𝐸[𝑣′(at+1 )]. 
 
(i) Framing removal policy: remove or reduce narrow framing (bi z0 by changing individuals’ 
perceptions) 
Financial education is one example: by informing people about the fundamental role of insurance (so 
that people focus on the hedging effect of insurance), the coefficient, bi z, could be reduced or removed. 
This is the best policy in terms of social welfare, since it directly removes consumers’ disutility and dead-
weight loss due to under-insurance. It is, however, extremely difficult to remove bi z completely, since 
narrow framing is essentially a personal trait that barely changes (Guiso 2015). 
 
(ii) Framing accommodation policy: given the restriction of narrow framing, help the insurance product 
be framed in a different way by allowing combined/hybrid products (bi z 0 by changing the features of 
financial products (z)) 
Allowing combined/hybrid health insurance that has not only insurance features but also savings 
features could be one example of this policy. In contrast to the framing removal policy, which attempts to 
remove the framing effect, this policy tries to reduce the framing effect by replacing one frame with 
another frame (e.g., a ‘risky gamble’ frame → ‘saving + insurance’ frame). The theory of the second best 
                                           
30 As Bernheim (2009) notes, it is important to examine if a behavioral model is general enough when discussing the policy 
implications of the behavioral model. This is because there may exist multiple representations that can justify a given choice 
pattern. Although this section uses the FOC of the equation (1.2), the policy discussions in this section are not sensitive to the 
specifications of the insurance model. Since the empirical results in Section 1.3 suggest that narrow framing and loss aversion 
negatively affect insurance demand, any policy that alleviates narrow framing and loss aversion can be an effective policy.  
Rational agents model
(Equation 2 with    = 0, γ=3)
Boundedly-rational agents model
(Equation 2 with    =5,γ=3)
When a LTCI policy that has a load of 0.18 is 
offered (ExpectedBenefit=0.82*Premium)
Accept Reject if λ ≥ 2.6
When a LTCI policy that has a load of 0.50 is 
offered (ExpectedBenefit=0.5*Premium)
Reject Reject if λ ≥ 1.3
How much annual subsidy is needed to induce loss-
averse individuals (λ=2.0) to buy the LTCI policy 
that has a load of 0.50 ?  
(ExpectedBenefit=0.5*Premium)
$1,840 $8,278
( λ = 2.0 is assumed)
?̂? ?̂?
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(Lipsey & Lancaster, 1956) suggests that this policy might be a better policy if we cannot remove the 
constraint imposed by narrow framing. One implication of this idea is that regulating the LTCI or other 
insurance markets so that the industry does not sell combined/hybrid products could be detrimental to the 
economy, given the restriction of narrow framing. 
 
(iii) Subsidy/Fine policy: give a subsidy/penalty so that the marginal value of insurance can be zero or 
positive (𝐸𝑣′(a ) 0 or +). Subsidies/fines also affect demands through the conventional utility term, V(∙). 
Giving a subsidy by providing tax benefits is an example of this policy. This is the most common 
policy in the U.S. and other countries. This policy has two potential effects. The first-order effect is to 
make the valuation (Ev(a)), which is negative without subsidies, close to zero or positive. The second-
order effect of a subsidy is that it might change framing, b i z. The government’s tax benefit on certain 
insurance can act as a strong signal that the insurance is necessary and beneficial to individuals. This 
could reduce b i z . However, studies by Goda (2011) and Courtemanche and He (2009), which report 
small effects of subsidies on LTCI demands, suggest that total effects of those first and second order 
effects are insubstantial. 
Imposing fines for not having insurance also has similar two-way effects. The difference between the 
subsidy and fine policies is that fining policy could be more effective than the subsidy policy because 
fines are regarded as losses, and hence its effect is amplified by λ. Literature on “goal framing” supports 
this. They report that emphasizing negative consequences of not participating in a program has a greater 
persuasive impact than emphasizing positive consequences attending the program (Levin, Schneider, & 
Gaeth, 1998). 
 
(iv) Reference points adjustment policy: educate people so that having an insurance policy becomes 
the standard (𝐸 𝑣′(a ) 0 or +) (i.e., replace not having insurance as the reference point with having 
insurance). 
Literature in behavioral economics suggests that “goals and aspirations” or “minimum requirements” 
can be reference points (Koop & Johnson, 2012). Hence, educating people so that they perceive having 
insurance as a “bottom line” or “starting point” of financial planning, could change the reference point 
and change the value of 𝐸 𝑣′(a ). The empirical result in Section 1.3.8 (a positive association between 
loss aversion and auto insurance take-up) is in support of this idea. 
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1.6 Conclusion 
   This paper has explored how loss-aversion is associated with insurance take-up behavior. Loss 
aversion is measured by using respondents’ attitudes (accept or turn down) toward six monetary games 
that may cause losses. The empirical results show that loss aversion significantly distorts insurance 
purchasing decisions: loss-averse individuals express a low willingness to pay for health insurance; they 
are unwilling to buy health insurance in a hypothetical insurance choice experiment; and loss-averse 
individuals indeed have a low ownership rate of long-term care insurance, supplemental disability 
insurance, and private health insurance. This paper also shows that the effect of loss aversion on insurance 
demand may interact with narrow framing and subjective probability. In addition, this paper provides 
suggestive evidence for the importance of reference points in determining the relationship between loss-
aversion and insurance take-up. In the case of auto insurance, the related reference point of which is likely 
to be ‘the wealth level under insurance coverage,’ a negative relationship between loss-aversion and 
insurance ownership is not found. Instead, a weak positive relationship is found if any.  
   The insurance model in this paper, which is based on Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) and is 
closely related to Gottlieb (2012), provides key insights in understanding the underinsurance puzzle in 
insurance markets. The model incorporates two measures of attitude toward risk: a conventional risk-
aversion measure defined over final wealth (capturing the concavity of Bernoulli’s utility function) and 
the loss-aversion measure defined over gains and losses from the reference point (capturing the concavity 
of Kahneman and Tversky’s value function). In the model, while conventional risk aversion increases 
insurance demand, loss aversion may decrease demand, depending on the reference point. And the effect 
of loss aversion is amplified by the degree of narrow framing. This model explains why people do not buy 
insurance without introducing any market frictions. It also explains why people do not purchase insurance 
even though they are risk-averse with respect to final wealth. If the effect of loss aversion prevails under 
the reference point of ‘not holding insurance’, consumers choose not to insure themselves even though 
they are risk-averse toward final wealth. The calibrated results of the model on the LTCI market provide 
important implications about public policy on health insurance: a substantial amount of subsidy is needed 
to induce a boundedly rational consumer to buy insurance. Policy discussions in the previous section 
indicate that broadening individuals’ narrow framing and changing individuals’ reference points may be 
key to address the underinsurance problem.
31
 
  
                                           
31 See Chetty (2015) on pragmatic benefits of the behavioral approach. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Loss Aversion, Life Insurance, and Savings 
 
2.1 Introduction  
An increasing number of studies demonstrate that behavioral factors such as loss-aversion and narrow 
framing affect consumers’ insurance purchasing decisions. A recent study by Gottlieb and Mitchell (2015) 
shows that the U.S. elderly who are subject to narrow framing, i.e., those who view each problem within a 
narrow frame and hence fail to recognize the risk hedging effect of insurance, are less likely to hold long-
term care insurance (LTCI). Hwang (2016) also notes that boundedly rational consumers may evaluate 
insurance within a narrow frame of “gain vs. loss.” A potential gain from an insurance contract is the 
benefits from the insurance company (the gain is realized if an accident occurs), and the potential loss 
from an insurance contract is the premiums paid (the loss is realized if an accident does not occur). 
Hwang finds that loss-averse individuals, i.e., those who are sensitive to potential losses in the premiums, 
are less likely to hold LTCI, supplemental disability insurance (SDI), and private health insurance. 
Hwang’s study also demonstrates the importance of reference points in insurance decisions by showing 
that the negative relationship between loss-aversion and insurance ownership does not hold in the case of 
auto insurance, where the reference points could be different.
1
  
However, prior studies have not considered the possibility that loss-aversion may distort savings 
decisions as well. The literature on precautionary savings suggests that savings can be a partial substitute 
for insurance: Individuals can prepare for uncertain future events by either purchasing insurance plans or 
by accumulating more wealth, which can serve as a financial buffer. Hence, loss-averse individuals may 
choose savings as a means to prepare for uncertain future events rather than choosing pure protection 
insurance, which may cause losses. In other words, loss aversion may decrease the demand for insurance 
and increase the demand for precautionary saving. 
This paper investigates how loss-aversion affects both insurance and savings decisions. Specifically, it 
tests empirically if the above hypothesis holds, i.e., if loss-aversion depresses insurance demand and 
stimulates precautionary saving. It measures individuals’ loss-aversion using small-amount gamble 
questions (e.g., whether or not the respondent wants to accept a risky investment that has equal chances of 
                                           
1 In the case of auto insurance, the purchase of liability insurance is mandatory and about 85 percent of drivers hold a policy. 
Hence the reference point could be ‘the wealth level under insurance protection.’ In contrast, the take-up ratio of LTCI and SDI is 
only 9.9% (as of 2013) and 19.2% (as of 2012), according to the ALP data set. Hence, the reference point for LTCI and SDI 
purchasing decisions could be ‘the wealth level without insurance protection.’ See Hwang (2016) for details. 
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winning $300 or losing $100).
2
 It then merges the loss-aversion measure with the life insurance 
ownership data and the wealth data in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). 
The empirical test results are found to be consistent with the above hypothesis: the U.S. elderly with a 
high degree of loss aversion show a significantly low ownership ratio of term-life insurance (pure 
protection insurance). Conditional on having any type of life insurance, loss-averse individuals are more 
likely to own whole-life insurance, which accumulates cash values and hence serves as a partial savings 
vehicle. This paper also presents empirical evidence that loss aversion has a significant impact on 
households’ portfolio decisions by increasing precautionary savings: the households with a loss-averse 
household head or spouse tend to hold a higher level of wealth than others, in terms of (i) deposits in 
checking/savings/money market accounts, CD, and bonds and (ii) the total net worth. We show that this 
empirical evidence in households’ wealth holdings remains robust when we restrict the samples to age 
cohorts, exclude extreme values, or apply different specifications, although the significance of this 
evidence is slightly weaker than the results found in term-life and whole-life insurance choices. 
This paper contributes to the existing literature on loss aversion and household portfolio choices by 
presenting the first empirical evidence of how loss aversion relates to precautionary saving. Although 
Hwang (2016) demonstrates that loss aversion depresses individuals’ willingness to purchase insurance,  
that study did not explore how loss aversion distorts savings decisions. The literature on loss-aversion and 
households’ stock market participation (e.g., Dimmock & Kouwenberg, 2010) also has neglected loss-
aversion’s effects on savings. This paper is also related to literature on the behavioral economics of 
retirement saving. Although the literature has demonstrated the importance of default options and the 
prevalence of heuristics in savings decisions (for reviews, see Benartzi & Thaler, 2007), it has not 
provided micro-level evidence on the role of loss-aversion. This paper first associates loss-aversion and 
savings by examining two types of life insurance that differ in the savings feature: term-life, which has no 
savings element, and whole-life, which has a substantial savings element. As a result, this paper provides 
the first empirical evidence that the choices of term-life vs. whole-life insurance are affected by loss-
aversion. This paper then shows that the result in term-life vs. whole-life choices can be generalized to 
conventional savings by showing that households’ net worth is also affected by loss-aversion. This paper 
thereby sheds light on the puzzle of why the elderly tend to dissave little after retirement, a phenomenon 
that is called the savings puzzle (Kotlikoff, 1988) or the annuity puzzle (Benartzi, Previtero, & Thaler, 
2011). 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 reviews the related literature. Section 2.3 provides 
background information on prospect theory and constructs a permanent income / life cycle savings-
                                           
2 Rejection of this gamble means that the respondent’s degree of loss aversion (λ) is greater than three. (λ > 300/100) 
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insurance model when individuals are subject to behavioral biases, especially narrow framing and loss 
aversion. It derives five testable implications from the model: (1) Loss aversion decreases the demand for 
term-life insurance. (2) Loss aversion may increase the demand for savings (precautionary saving) (3) 
Since whole-life insurance is a combination of insurance and savings, loss-aversion may have either a 
positive or a negative impact on the holdings of whole-life insurance. (4) Two weights for bequests 
(bequest weight for the death at t+1 vs. bequest weight for the death at t+2) have different impacts on 
term-life insurance and savings. Specifically, an increase in the bequest weight for t+1 (premature death) 
increases the demand for term-life insurance but decreases the demand for savings. In contrast, an 
increase in the bequest weight for t+2 (expected death) decreases the demand for term-life insurance but 
increases the demand for savings. (5) The effect of loss aversion on the demand for term-life insurance is 
amplified by the degree of narrow framing and the subjective probability of survival. Section 2.4 
empirically tests the five testable implications of the model using individual-level data from the HRS. It 
first examines if ownership of term-life and whole-life insurance is associated with loss-aversion and then 
focuses on if households’ total wealth levels are also associated with loss-aversion. Section 2.5 
summarizes the results.  
 
2.2 Background: Life Insurance and Related Literature 
2.2.1 Institutional Background of Life Insurance 
Term-Life vs. Whole- Life Insurance 
Life insurance is a type of insurance that pays out lump-sum death benefits to a designated recipient 
upon the death of the insured person. Depending on the duration of the protection, life insurance can be 
classified into two types: term-life insurance, which covers a specified term (e.g., 10, 15, 20, or 30 year 
terms), and whole-life insurance, which covers a policyholder’s entire life. Specifically, the face value of 
term-life insurance is paid out to beneficiaries only if the insured dies within the specified term. In 
contrast, the face value of whole-life insurance is paid out upon the insured death regardless of the timing 
of the death. Another important feature of whole-life insurance is that it also serves as a savings vehicle 
because parts of the premiums are used to accumulate cash value. Hence, whole-life insurance can be 
regarded as a combination of insurance and savings, while term-life insurance provides a pure financial 
protection (Brown 2001). Indeed, policy-holders of whole-life insurance can borrow money based on the 
cash value of the insurance policy. LIMRA (2014) reported that there was $131 billion in whole-life 
insurance loans outstanding in the U.S. in 2013. 
Whole-life policies owned by the elderly include substantial savings elements. Specifically, Brown 
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(2001) reported that, based on 1995 the Survey of Consumer Finance, the median of the cash values held 
by the U.S. individuals aged 70 or older were 67 percent of the face value. The high proportion of the 
savings element is not surprising because the savings elements of whole-life insurance increase with a 
policy-holder’s age, while the pure insurance elements decrease. Figure 2.1 illustrates the cash value of a 
whole-life policy with a face value of $100,000 sold by New York Life Insurance Company. One can see 
that cash values or savings elements increase substantially with age.  
 
Figure 2.1 Proportion of Protection and Savings Elements in a Whole Life Insurance Contract 
Issued at Age 35  
    
Data Source: Insure.com (2015). Data retrieved from http://www.insure.com/life-insurance/cash-value.html 
Notes: Based on a 35-year-old nonsmoking male with a preferred-rate of a $100,000 whole life insurance policy sold by New 
York Life Insurance Company. Life expectancy of the person is assumed to be 83.  
 
 
 
Although term-life insurance provides protection only for a pre-specified term, most term-life insurance 
policies sold in the U.S. are renewable up to a maximum age limit. This means that policy holders can 
sign up for another term period at the end of the initial term, without having to show that the insured is in 
good health (Department of Financial Service of New York State; Brown 2001). Premiums due on 
renewal, however, tend to increase substantially. The maximum age limits vary across insurance 
companies. For example, the maximum age limit is 95 in the case of MetLife, which has the largest 
market share in the U.S. life insurance market. 
 
Individual vs. Group Policy  
Group life insurance is a type of life insurance that covers an entire group of people. Group life 
insurance is typically offered by an employer or professional association to its employees or members. 
The most common type of group life insurance is employer-provided term-life insurance. Employers pay 
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some or all of the premiums of term-life insurance as a part of a benefits package. Many employers limit 
coverage of group term-life insurance to $50,000 because insurance expenses providing coverage of up to 
$50,000 for term-life insurance are deductible by the employer in the U.S. Whole-life insurance is rarely 
offered as group life insurance. 
 
2.2.2 Related Literature 
2.2.2.1 Determinants of Life Insurance Take-up 
Studies by Mossin (1968), Yaari (1965), and Fisher (1973) laid the theoretical foundation for the 
determinants of life insurance. These studies point out that risk aversion, bequest motives, labor income, 
wealth, and prices (premiums of insurance, returns of other assets) are determinants of life insurance 
demand. Specifically, those who have high risk aversion and strong bequest motives are more likely to 
buy life insurance, and those who live by working are more likely to purchase insurance than those who 
live off the proceeds of their wealth (Fisher 1973).  
Despite the theoretical importance of risk aversion in insurance demand, little empirical evidence is 
reported on the relation between the measures for risk-aversion and ownership of life or non-life 
insurance. Green (1963, 1964) explored the relationship between the two. He measured individuals’ risk 
aversion using attitudes toward small and large gambles. He concluded that there is no correlation 
between risk aversion and ownership of health, auto, and life insurance. Similarly, recent studies by 
Gottlieb and Mitchell (2015) and Hwang (2016) find no association between the CRRA measure for risk 
aversion and ownership of long-term care insurance, supplemental disability insurance, or private health 
insurance. Another line of research has attempted to measure the magnitude of each household’s risk, its 
so-called ‘financial vulnerability’ (e.g, volatility of standard of living if a major income earner of the 
household were to decease), and investigates its association with insurance ownership. Bernheim, Carman, 
Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (2003), Bernheim, Forni, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (2003), Mountain (2015) find no 
association between a household’s financial vulnerability and its life insurance ownership. In contrast, Lin 
and Grace (2007) report that households’ financial vulnerability is positively associated with life 
insurance ownership. 
Rather than using direct measures for risk-aversion, most empirical studies on insurance purchasing 
behavior have used demographic variables (e.g., age, gender, family structure) as a proxy for risk aversion 
due to the difficulty of measuring attitudes toward risk. These studies have reported inconsistent and 
contradictory results as to which effects (positive or negative) demographic factors have on the take-up of 
life insurance (Zietz, 2003; Outreville, 2014). Specifically, Outreville’s (2014) literature survey reports 
that “Almost all past research dealing with panel or survey data in the United States has focused on life 
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insurance purchasing behavior as a function of various demographic and socioeconomic variables” (p. 
170). For example, the literature has included gender, age, marital status, and education as the proxies for 
risk aversion based on the fact that women, elderly, married, and undereducated individuals are more risk-
averse. Regarding the effect of demographic variables on life insurance, prior studies have reported mixed 
results. For example, Outreville’s literature survey summarizes the effects of age on life insurance 
holdings as follows: half of the literature reports a positive association of age with life insurance holdings 
while the other half reports a negative association. Some studies report an insignificant relation between 
age and life insurance holdings. Similar contradictory findings are reported on the effects of education, 
marital status, and family size on life insurance ownership.
3
 
Several studies associate bequest motives with life insurance take-up. Bernheim (1991) suggests 
empirical evidence indicative of strong bequest motives using income and insurance ownership data on 
the U.S. elderly. Bernheim finds that a high level of social security benefits is positively associated with 
ownership of life insurance and concludes that this could be evidence of a strong bequest motive. The 
rationale for this conclusion is that individuals buy life insurance to de-annuitize their wealth because, 
under strong bequest motives, individuals can be over-annuitized by government-provided Social Security 
annuities. Bernheim’s annuity offset model of life insurance is carefully examined by Brown (2001) using 
detailed life insurance ownership data in which two types of life insurance (term-life vs. whole-life) are 
distinguishable. Brown shows empirical evidence to the contrary of the annuity offset model, including 
the facts that (i) many individuals own term-life insurance and private annuities at the same time, and (ii) 
Social Security benefits are not significantly positively associated with holdings of term-life insurance.  
  
2.2.2.2 Behavioral Factors and Insurance Buying Decisions 
A growing body of research has begun to explore the effects of behavioral tendencies on insurance 
purchasing decisions. However, to our knowledge, no empirical evidence is provided for the life 
insurance market. An earlier study by Johnson et al. (1993) shows that availability heuristics and framing 
effects are associated with individuals’ willingness to pay for insurance (flight, auto, and disability 
insurance). For example, the study shows that consumers express a higher willingness to pay for 
insurance when the relevant accident comes across their mind readily and vividly (availability heuristics). 
                                           
3 These inconsistencies in empirical studies seem to be associated with the possibility that demographics variables affect 
insurance holdings through multiple channels. For example, gender affects insurance holdings directly or indirectly through its 
association with risk aversion. Specifically, being female means that the person is less likely to be a major income earner for the 
household; hence, females are less likely to demand life insurance (direct impact). But in terms of risk aversion, females are more 
risk averse than males; hence, women may have a higher willingness to pay for insurance (indirect impact through risk-aversion). 
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It also shows that consumers tend to prefer expensive return-of-premium insurance to much cheaper 
insurance that returns a lower amount of money, which is actuarially better (framing effect: guarantee or 
rebate frames are preferred). An experimental study by Brown, Kling, Mullainathan, and Wrobel (2008) 
also reports a similar framing effect: people’s willingness to pay for annuities are affected by the way 
annuity products are described, i.e., the insurance on consumption frame vs. the investment frame. Only 
recently have researchers begun to relate behavioral factors to real-world insurance holdings data beyond 
the laboratory settings. Gottlieb and Mitchell (2015) show that narrow framing, as measured by an 
indicator variable for whether a respondent changes his decision when problems are presented within a 
negative frame, is negatively associated with ownership of long-term care insurance using the HRS data 
set. Hwang (2016) focuses on loss aversion and shows that loss aversion, as measured by the amount of 
acceptable losses in small-amount gambles, is negatively associated with the holdings of long-term care 
insurance, supplemental disability insurance, and private health insurance using the ALP data set. 
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2.3 Model: Loss Aversion, Term-Life Insurance, and Saving  
2.3.1 Background: Prospect Theory’s Loss Aversion & Insurance 
Loss aversion means people’s tendency to be more sensitive to losses than the same amount of gains. 
This is one of the most important features of Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979, 1992) prospect theory.  
Prospect theory states that people decide whether to buy a prospect or a lottery based on the expected 
value of potential gains and losses from the reference point. More formally, prospect theory states that the 
gain-loss value from a prospect is ∑w(pi)v(xi), where w(∙) is the probability weighting function, pi is 
probabilities of possible outcomes, and v(∙) is the value function, and xi is a random variable representing 
losses or gains from the prospect. Kahneman and Tversky specify the value function as 
𝑣(𝑥) =  {
𝑥𝛼                  𝑖𝑓 𝑥 ≥ 0
−𝜆(−𝑥)?̃?   𝑖𝑓  𝑥 < 0
 , where λ is the coefficient of the loss aversion. 
   According to prospect theory, whether to participate in a lottery depends on several parameters, such 
as the degree of loss aversion (𝜆), reference point (this determines gains or losses, xi), probability 
weighting (w(∙)), and the degree of diminishing sensitivity (𝛼, ?̃?). Kahneman and Tversky (1992) have 
found that, in their laboratory experiments, most people exhibit a 𝜆 greater than one. This implies that 
people are more sensitive to potential losses than the same amount of potential gains. Kahneman and 
Tversky estimated that α and ?̃? were less than one. 
This paper focuses on the role of loss aversion when a particular reference point is adopted. It also 
examines how loss aversion interacts with probability weighting. This paper, however, does not focus on 
the role of diminishing sensitivity because it assumes that insurance is evaluated in both the gain and loss 
domains, where α and ?̃? play little role. 
 
Figure 2.2 Value Function of Prospect Theory 
 
 Source: Kahneman and Tversky (1979, p. 279)  
 
reference point 
1 
λ 
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If people assess the value of insurance as they access the gain-loss value of a lottery, then the value of 
insurance is negatively associated with the degree of loss aversion, λ. Hence, loss-averse individuals may 
be less likely to purchase insurance. Specifically, the expected gain-loss value of a prospect, E[𝑣(𝑥)], is 
negatively associated with the degree of loss aversion, λ. To see this, suppose the probability of gain from 
a prospect is p and the probability of loss from the prospect is 1-p. Furthermore, assume 𝑤(𝑝) = 𝑝 for 
simpliticy. In this case, the expected value of the prospect is Ev = p*𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛𝛼 − (1-p)*λ*𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠?̃?. Hence, the 
value from a prospect is negatively associated with the degree of loss aversion. The two underlying 
assumptions in deriving the result are as follows: first, people have narrow framing (i.e., people isolate 
risk) in the sense that they only care about the gain-loss value of a prospect, not about the diversification 
effect that the prospect will bring to their existing portfolio; second, the reference point is “the wealth 
level when one does not engaging in the prospect,” which means that no gains or no loss occurs if a 
person does not take the action of buying insurance. (See Proposition 1 of Hwang (2016)). One can also 
see that loss aversion interacts with ‘1-p’ (i.e. ∂ Ev /∂λ=(1-p)*𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠?̃?). This implies that the effect of loss 
aversion is large among those who believe that an accident will not occur. 
To exemplify the effect of loss aversion, consider a lottery that has 50-50 chances of winning $200 or 
losing $100. Further assume that a person has a preference with α = ?̃? = 1, 𝑤(𝑝𝑖) = 𝑝𝑖. One can show 
that whether this person will accept or turn down the lottery depends on the person’s degree of loss 
aversion (λ). For example, if the person has a λ of three, the person will turn down the lottery because the 
gain-loss value of the lottery is negative (0.5*$200
1
-0.5*3.0*$100
1
=-$50). If the person had a λ of 1.5, 
then the person would accept the lottery because the gain-loss value would become positive. (0.5*$200
1
-
0.5*1.5*$100
1 
= +$25). 
 
2.3.2 Model  
This paper considers the effect of loss aversion on life insurance take-up and savings within the context 
of Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes’ (2002; 2004) life cycle / permanent income model with a bequest motive. 
In this model, individuals face uncertainty regarding future earnings and the length of life. There are three 
periods in the model (t, t+1, and t+2). Individuals are alive for sure at t, but it is uncertain whether he/she 
will survive at t+1. Those who survive at t+1 die for sure at t+2. One can think of period t (“young”) as 
ages 30-60, period t+1 (“old”) as ages 60-90, and period t+2 as the time around death, as Dynan et al. 
points out (2004, p. 403). The two possible states of the second period are notated as st+1 = {s1, s2}. If s1 
is realized, then the person dies at the beginning of t+1. If s2 is realized, then the person survives at t+1 
(and dies at t+2). The amount of bequests he/she leaves in the event of death at the beginning of t+1 and 
t+2 is Qt+1 and Qt+2 respectively. Individuals’ subjective probability of experiencing s1 and s2 is 𝜋1 and 
𝜋2 respectively, where 𝜋1+𝜋2=1. Faced by uncertain future events, individuals decide how much to 
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consume, save, and buy life insurance in the first period. 
Most previous studies, including Dynan et al. (2002; 2004), assume a perfectly rational consumer and 
use the following preference specification: a consumer maximizes expected lifetime utility coming from 
consumptions (Ct, Ct+1) and bequests (Qt+1, Qt+2): 
(2.1)  𝐸?̃?t = 𝑈(𝐶𝑡) + Et [ D ∙ β ∙ G𝑡(𝑄𝑡+1) + (1 − D) ∙ β { 𝑈(𝐶𝑡+1) + 𝐺𝑡+1(𝑄𝑡+2)}] 
D is an indicator variable that is equal to one if s1 (death) is realized and zero otherwise. 
U(∙) and G(∙) represent utility functions for consumptions and bequests. β is a discount factor (0 
≤ β ≤ 1). 
This paper extends the domain of preference: it assumes a boundedly rational consumer who gets 
utility not only from consumptions and bequests but also from the “gain-loss” utility of risky assets, 
following the prospect theory literature (e.g., Barberis, Huang, and Santos, 2001; Hwang, 2016). A 
boundedly rational consumer maximizes the following expected utility: 
(2.2)  𝐸𝑈𝑡= 𝑈(𝐶𝑡) + Et [?̂? ∗ 𝑣(𝑎) + D ∙ β ∙ G𝑡(𝑄𝑡+1) + (1 − D) ∙ β{𝑈(𝐶𝑡+1) + 𝐺𝑡+1(𝑄𝑡+2)}] 
The term, v(a), represents the gain-loss value of insurance, where v(∙) is Kahneman and Tversky’s 
(1979) value function and a is quantities of term-life insurance. One important parameter of the value 
function is the loss aversion (λ) (See equation (2.3)). The term ?̂? is a scaling factor that reflects the 
degree of narrow framing. A high magnitude of ?̂? indicates that an individual’s decision is significantly 
affected by the gain-loss value of insurance. Note that a boundedly rational consumer’s utility in (2.2) 
includes the fully rational consumer’s utility in (2.1). Specifically, a perfectly rational consumer’s 
objective function is a particular case of a boundedly rational consumer’s objective function where ?̂? is 
zero. In this regard, equation (2.2.) deals with a more generalized problem. 
(2.3) 𝑣(𝑥) =  {
𝑥𝛼                  𝑖𝑓 𝑥 ≥ 0
−𝜆(−𝑥)?̃?  𝑖𝑓  𝑥 < 0
  
(2.4) U(Ct) =
Ct
1−γ
1−γ
  
(2.5) Gt(Qt+1) = 𝑑?̂?
Qt+1
1−γ
1−γ
,  γ > 0, 𝑑?̂? ∈ [0 1] 
  The value function in (3) represents how a prospect or a risky asset is evaluated. Variable x is a random 
variable and λ is a coefficient of loss aversion.  
  The utility function for consumptions and bequests is assumed to be CRRA utility function (equations 
(2.4)-(2.5)). The term 𝑑?̂? in (2.5) is the weighting function for bequests, which is commonly used in the 
related literature (e.g., Fischer, 1973). If 𝑑?̂? is one, this indicates that an individual attains the same level 
 45  
 
of utility from bequests as consumptions. A 𝑑?̂? of zero indicates that an individual does not value 
bequests.  
Two assets are available in the economy: single-period term-life insurance and a riskless bond. Term-
life insurance, at+1(s1), pays out at+1 units of consumption in the event of st+1=s1 and nothing otherwise. 
The unit price of the term-life insurance at t is qt. The quantity of a riskless bond is denoted bt+1. A 
positive value of bt+1 means saving. No non-negativity restrictions are imposed on at+1(s1) or bt+1. (Note 
that having negative holdings of at+1(s1) is analogous to buying annuities). There is, however, perfect 
enforcement of financial contracts. This asset market is complete because consumers can re-allocate 
resources across different states and periods by buying and selling at+1(s1) and bt+1. 4 Earnings at t are 
denoted 𝑒𝑡.  
Consumers’ budget constraints are as follows: 5 
(2.6)  Ct  + qt ∙ 𝑎t+1(s1)   + bt+1     ≤ et 
(2.7)           Qt+1(s1)          ≤ et+1(s1) + 𝑎t+1(s1) + Rt+1 ∙ bt+1 
(2.8) Ct+1(s2) + Qt+2(s2)          ≤ et+1(s2)             +           Rt+1 ∙ bt+1 
Equation (2.6) illustrates that an individual decides how much to consume, buy term-life insurance, or 
buy riskless bonds, given the earnings at t. At period t+1, if the person dies (𝑠𝑡+1 = 𝑠1), then all of his 
assets become the bequests that he leaves to his heirs (equation 2.7). The assets include earnings (e.g., 
Social Security survivors benefits), death benefits of term-life insurance, and the principal and interests of 
bonds. Equation (2.8) illustrates the case where a person survives at t+1 (𝑠𝑡+1 = 𝑠2): the person decides 
how much to consume and how much to leave as bequests. 
A boundedly rational consumer’s problem is as follows:  
(2.9) Given prices {𝑞𝑡, 𝑅𝑡+1},  maxct, 𝑎t+1(s1), 𝑏𝑡+1,𝑄𝑡+1(𝑠1),𝑄𝑡+2(𝑠2) 𝐸𝑈𝑡    
           subject to (6), (7), (8), 𝐶𝑡≥0, 𝐶𝑡+1(𝑠2)≥0, 𝑄𝑡+1(𝑠1) ≥ 0, and 𝑄𝑡+2(𝑠2) ≥ 0 
The Lagrangian and the first order conditions (FOC) for interior solutions are as follows:
6
  
(2.10) 𝑳 = U(𝐶𝑡) + 𝐸𝑡[?̂? ∗ 𝑣(𝑎𝑡+1(𝑠1))] + 𝜋1𝛽 𝑑?̂?  𝑈(𝑄𝑡+1(𝑠1)) + 𝜋2𝛽 𝑈(𝐶𝑡+1(𝑠2)) + 𝜋2β 𝑑𝑡+1̂ 𝑈(𝑄𝑡+2(𝑠2)) 
         −𝜇𝑡  ∙ [(𝐶𝑡) + 𝑞𝑡 ∙ 𝑎𝑡+1(𝑠1) + 𝑏𝑡+1 − 𝑒𝑡] 
         −𝜇𝑡+1(𝑠1) ∙ [𝑄𝑡+1(𝑠1) − 𝑒𝑡+1(𝑠1) − 𝑎𝑡+1(𝑠1) − 𝑅𝑡+1 ∙ 𝑏𝑡+1] 
           −𝜇𝑡+1(𝑠2) ∙ [𝐶𝑡+1(𝑠2) + 𝑄𝑡+2(𝑠2) − 𝑒𝑡+1(𝑠2) − 𝑅𝑡+1 ∙ 𝑏𝑡+1] 
                                           
4  The introduction of another type of insurance to the economy, for example 𝑎t+1(s2) , 
does not change the oplimal level of consumption or bequests. 
5 Budget constraints hold with equality as strictly monotonic utility functions were assumed. 
6 Since CRRA utility function satisfies inada conditions, C* > 0. And since CRRA with γ > 0 is strictly concave, FOCs 
guarantee unique global max. 
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(2.11) {𝐶𝑡}       𝑈
′(𝐶𝑡)                  = 𝜇𝑡 
(2.12) {𝑄𝑡+1(𝑠1)} 𝜋1𝛽 𝑑?̂?  𝑈
′(𝑄𝑡+1(𝑠1))      = 𝜇𝑡+1(𝑠1) 
(2.13) {𝐶𝑡+1(𝑠2)}  𝜋2𝛽 𝑈
′(𝐶𝑡+1(𝑠2))                 = 𝜇𝑡+1(𝑠2) 
(2.14) {𝑄𝑡+2(𝑠2)}  𝜋2β 𝑑𝑡+1̂ 𝑈
′(𝑄𝑡+2(𝑠2))       = 𝜇𝑡+1(𝑠2) 
(2.15) {𝑎𝑡+1(𝑠1)}  𝑞𝑡  𝜇𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡[?̂? ∗ 𝑣′(𝑎𝑡+1(𝑠1))] = 𝜇𝑡+1(𝑠1) 
(2.16) {𝑏𝑡+1}     𝑅𝑡+1 [ 𝜇𝑡+1(𝑠1) + 𝜇𝑡+1(𝑠2) ] = 𝜇𝑡 
The above FOCs can be summarized as follows: 
(2.17) 𝑞𝑡  𝑈
′(𝐶𝑡) − 𝐸𝑡[?̂? ∗ 𝑣′(𝑎𝑡+1(𝑠1))] = 𝜋1𝛽 𝑑?̂?  𝑈
′(𝑄𝑡+1(𝑠1)) 
(2.18)  
1
Rt+1
𝑈′(𝐶𝑡) = 𝜋1𝛽 𝑑?̂?  𝑈
′(𝑄𝑡+1(𝑠1)) + 𝜋2𝛽 𝑈
′(𝐶𝑡+1(𝑠2)) 
(2.19)  
1
Rt+1
𝑈′(𝐶𝑡) = 𝜋1𝛽 𝑑?̂?  𝑈
′(𝑄𝑡+1(𝑠1)) + 𝜋2𝛽 𝑑𝑡+1̂ 𝑈
′(𝑄𝑡+2(𝑠2)) 
 
The intertemporal budget constraint summarizing (2.6), (2.7), and (2.8) is as follows: 
(2.20) Ct + 𝑞𝑡 ∙ 𝑄𝑡+1(s1) + (
1
Rt+1
− 𝑞𝑡) [Ct+1(s2) + Qt+2(s2)] = et + 𝑞𝑡 ∙ et+1(s1) + (
1
Rt+1
− 𝑞𝑡)∙et+1(s2)  
 
Optimal Levels of Saving and Term-Life Insurance for Perfectly Rational Agents (i.e., ?̂? = 𝟎) 
By plugging the FOCs into (2.17), one can get optimal levels of consumption, bequests, and assets. We 
first look at a perfectly rational consumer’s optimal choice by setting ?̂? = 0. 
(2.21)  𝐶𝑡
∗ =
𝑒𝑡+𝑞𝑡𝑒𝑡+1(𝑠1)+
1−𝑞𝑡𝑅𝑡+1
𝑅𝑡+1
 𝑒𝑡+1(𝑠2)
1+𝑞𝑡(
𝛽𝜋1
𝑞𝑡
𝑑?̂? )
1
𝛾⁄   +  (
1−𝑞𝑡𝑅𝑡+1
𝑅𝑡+1
)1−
1
𝛾⁄ (𝛽𝜋2)
1
𝛾⁄  ∙{1+ 𝑑𝑡+1̂
1
𝛾⁄  }
 
(2.22) 𝑄𝑡+1(𝑠1)
∗ = (
𝛽𝜋1
𝑞𝑡
𝑑?̂?  )
1
𝛾⁄  ∙ 𝐶𝑡
∗ 
(2.23) 𝐶𝑡+1(𝑠2)
∗ =  (
𝑅𝑡+1
1−𝑞𝑡𝑅𝑡+1
 𝛽 𝜋2 )
1
𝛾⁄ ∙ 𝐶𝑡
∗ 
(2.24) 𝑄𝑡+2(𝑠2)
∗ = (
𝑅𝑡+1
1−𝑞𝑡𝑅𝑡+1
 𝛽 𝜋2 𝑑𝑡+1̂ )
1
𝛾⁄ ∙ 𝐶𝑡
∗ 
(2.25) 𝑎𝑡+1(𝑠1)
∗ = [(
𝛽𝜋1
𝑞
𝑡
𝑑?̂? )
1
𝛾⁄ − (
𝑅𝑡+1
1 − 𝑞
𝑡
𝑅𝑡+1
 𝛽 𝜋2 )
1
𝛾⁄ ∙ {1 +  𝑑𝑡+1̂
1
𝛾⁄
}] ∙ 𝐶𝑡
∗   +  𝑒𝑡+1(𝑠2) − 𝑒𝑡+1(𝑠1) 
(2.26) 𝑏𝑡+1
∗         =
1
𝑅𝑡+1
∙ [ (
𝑅𝑡+1
1−𝑞𝑡𝑅𝑡+1
 𝛽 𝜋2 )
1
𝛾⁄ ∙ (1 + 𝑑𝑡+1̂
1
𝛾⁄ ) ∙  𝐶𝑡
∗  −  
1
 𝑅𝑡+1
∙  𝑒𝑡+1(𝑠2) 
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Mossin’s (1968) Theorem and Yaari’s (1965) Result 
Equation (2.25) shows a perfectly rational consumer’s optimal level of term-life insurance. Note that if 
(i) premiums of term-life insurance are fair (𝑞𝑡 = 𝛽𝜋1; here, it is also assumed that a subjective 
probability is the same as the objective probability), (ii) a bequest motive is sufficient to be 𝑑?̂?=𝑑𝑡+1̂=1, 
and (iii) the price motive for saving is neutral (i.e., 𝛽 ∙ 𝑅𝑡+1=1), then Mossin’s (1968) result holds: risk-
averse individuals fully insure themselves if premiums are fair. Under such conditions, the optimal 
quantities of insurance and bond are 𝑎𝑡+1(𝑠1)
∗= 𝑒𝑡+1(𝑠2) − 𝑒𝑡+1(𝑠1) − 𝐶𝑡
∗ and 𝑏𝑡+1
∗ =
1
𝑅𝑡+1
∙ { 2 ∙ 𝐶𝑡
∗  −
 𝑒𝑡+1(𝑠2)}. This leads to an allocation 𝐶𝑡
∗ = 𝑄𝑡+1(𝑠1)
∗=𝐶𝑡+1(𝑠2)
∗ = 𝑄𝑡+2(𝑠2)
∗. 
If we assume that there is no bequest motive (𝑑?̂?=𝑑𝑡+1̂=0), while keeping the assumptions (i) & (iii), 
then Yaari’s (1965) full annuitization result holds: risk-averse individuals with no bequest motive fully 
annuitize their assets. Under these assumptions, the optimal quantities of insurance and bond are 
𝑎𝑡+1(𝑠1)
∗∗ =  𝑒𝑡+1(𝑠2) − 𝑒𝑡+1(𝑠1) − 𝐶𝑡
∗∗  and 𝑏𝑡+1
∗∗ =
1
𝑅𝑡+1
∙ { 𝐶𝑡
∗∗  − 𝑒𝑡+1(𝑠2)} .
7
 This leads to an 
allocation of 𝐶𝑡
∗∗ = 𝐶𝑡+1(𝑠2)
∗∗ > 0 and 𝑄𝑡+1(𝑠1)
∗∗ = 𝑄𝑡+2(𝑠2)
∗∗ = 0 , which means a full 
annuitization.  
Although this three-period model of saving and term-life insurance is simple, it enables analysis of 
various aspects of term-life insurance and saving (𝑏𝑡+1):  
① life cycle / permanent income motives for saving;  
② precautionary motives for saving;  
③ the effect of a bequest motive on life insurance and saving; 
④ the effect of loss aversion on life insurance and saving; 
  This paper focuses on “④ the effect of loss aversion on life insurance and saving” while considering 
①-③. In particular, considering the precautionary motives for saving (Skinner, 1987) is important 
because this means that savings can be a substitute of insurance.  
 
Introduction of Whole-Life Insurance 
Whole-life insurance serves as a saving instrument as well as insurance: whole-life insurance 
accumulates cash value, and consumers can withdraw money based on the reserved fund of the insurance 
policy (savings feature); furthermore, whole-life insurance pays out death benefits if the insured dies 
                                           
7 Note that 𝐶𝑡
∗∗ > 𝐶𝑡
∗ 
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(insurance feature). In the three-period model, purchasing whole-life insurance is the same as 
simultaneously purchasing term-life insurance and riskless bonds (𝑏𝑡+1). Formally, one can imagine 𝑎𝑡+1̃ 
units of whole-life insurance that can be purchased at t. Assume that the cash value of this insurance 
becomes 𝑅 ∙̃ 𝑎𝑡+1̃ at t+1 and ?̃?
2 ∙ 𝑎𝑡+1̃ at t+2. If the insured dies at t+2 (i.e., 𝑠𝑡+1 = 𝑠2), then the 
insurance pays out death benefits of ?̃?2 ∙ 𝑎𝑡+1̃. If the insured dies at t+1 (i.e., 𝑠𝑡+1 = 𝑠1), then the 
whole-life insurance pays out ( θ + ?̃?) ∙ 𝑎𝑡+1̃ units of consumption as death benefits. In this case, 
purchasing 𝑎𝑡+1̃ units of whole-life insurance is the same as purchasing the same units of riskless bonds 
and purchasing θ ∙ 𝑎𝑡+1̃ units of term-life insurance. 
 
2.3.3 Testable Implications of the Model 
 
[A1] Increase in loss aversion (λ) decreases the demand for term-life insurance (𝒂𝒕+𝟏(𝒔𝟏)
∗) 
   A1 holds because loss aversion creates a negative gain-loss utility whenever an individual purchases 
term-life insurance. Hence loss aversion decreases the demand for term life insurance, 𝑎𝑡+1(𝑠1)
∗.  
FOCs show this prediction more clearly. Plugging (2.17) into (2.18) and (2.19) leads to the following 
equations: 
(2.27) 
1
Rt+1𝑞𝑡
 𝐸𝑡[?̂? ∗ 𝑣′(𝑎𝑡+1(𝑠1))] = 𝜋2𝛽 𝑈
′(𝐶𝑡+1(𝑠2)) − (
1−Rt+1𝑞𝑡
Rt+1𝑞𝑡
) 𝜋1𝛽 𝑑?̂?  𝑈
′(𝑄𝑡+1(𝑠1)) 
(2.28) 
1
Rt+1𝑞𝑡
 𝐸𝑡[?̂? ∗ 𝑣′(𝑎𝑡+1(𝑠1))] = 𝜋2𝛽 𝑑𝑡+1̂ 𝑈
′(𝑄𝑡+2(𝑠2)) − (
1−Rt+1𝑞𝑡
Rt+1𝑞𝑡
) 𝜋1𝛽 𝑑?̂?  𝑈
′(𝑄𝑡+1(𝑠1)) 
   To figure out how loss aversion affects  𝐸𝑡[?̂? ∗ 𝑣′(𝑎𝑡+1(𝑠1))] , we first look at  𝐸𝑡[?̂? ∗
𝑣(𝑎𝑡+1(𝑠1))], which is the expected gain-loss value when purchasing 𝑎𝑡+1(𝑠1) units of term-life 
insurance. A potential gain of the insurance is the present value of the net benefits from the insurance 
company (𝛽𝑎𝑡+1(𝑠1) − 𝑞𝑡 𝑎𝑡+1(𝑠1)). The gain is realized if 𝑠𝑡+1 = 𝑠1. A potential loss of the insurance 
is the premium paid (𝑞𝑡  𝑎𝑡+1(𝑠1)). The loss is realized if 𝑠𝑡+1 = 𝑠2. Hence, the expected gain-loss value 
is as follows: 
(2.29) 𝐸𝑡  ?̂? 𝑣(𝑎𝑡+1(𝑠1)) = ?̂? [ 𝜋1 ∙ { 𝛽𝑎𝑡+1(𝑠1) − 𝑞𝑡 𝑎𝑡+1(𝑠1)}
𝛼 − 𝜋2𝜆 ∙ {𝑞𝑡 𝑎𝑡+1(𝑠1)}
?̃?] 
   Thus, if we take derivatives with respect to 𝑎𝑡+1(𝑠1), then we have 
(2.30)  𝐸𝑡[?̂? ∗ 𝑣′(𝑎𝑡+1(𝑠1))]=?̂? [α𝜋1(𝛽 − 𝑞𝑡){ 𝛽𝑎𝑡+1(𝑠1) − 𝑞𝑡 𝑎𝑡+1(𝑠1)}
𝛼−1 − ?̃?𝜋2𝜆 𝑞𝑡 {𝑞𝑡 𝑎𝑡+1(𝑠1)}
?̃?−1]. 
   Hence, an increase in λ decreases the marginal gain-loss value (left-hand-side (LHS) of (27)). To keep 
the equality, the right-hand-side (RHS) of (2.27) must decrease. This means that 𝑈′(𝑄𝑡+1(𝑠1)) should 
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increase relative to 𝑈′(𝐶𝑡+1(𝑠2)). (Note that (
1−Rt+1𝑞𝑡
Rt+1𝑞𝑡
) is a positive value). To increase the marginal 
utility of a bequest in the case of death at t+1 (𝑄𝑡+1(𝑠1)) relative to that of consumption in the case of 
survival (𝐶𝑡+1(𝑠2)), the level of bequest (𝑄𝑡+1(𝑠1)) should decrease relative to the consumption 
(𝐶𝑡+1(𝑠2)). Similarly, equation (2.28) implies that the level of a bequest at t+1, (𝑄𝑡+1(𝑠1)) should 
decrease relative to the level of a bequest at t+2 (𝑄𝑡+2(𝑠2)). Budget constraints (2.7) and (2.8) imply that 
decreasing 𝑄𝑡+1(𝑠1)  relative to 𝐶𝑡+1(𝑠2)  and 𝑄𝑡+2(𝑠2)  can be attained by decreasing term-life 
insurance. That is, the transfer of resources from state 𝑠1 to state 𝑠2 can be accomplished by reducing 
term-life insurance holdings. 
 
[A2] An increase in loss aversion (λ) increases savings (𝐛𝐭+𝟏*) 
   This means that loss-averse individuals save more in order to use savings as a financial buffer against 
potential bad events in the future instead of using term-life insurance as a financial buffer. FOC (2.18) 
provides the rationale for this. Equation (2.18) implies that marginal cost of giving up today’s 
consumption should be the same as the expected marginal benefits of tomorrow’s bequest and 
consumption. Suppose 𝑎𝑡+1(𝑠1) decreases or becomes zero because of a high loss-aversion. This leads 
to an increase in today’s consumption (𝐶𝑡) and a decrease in the bequest for s1, 𝑄𝑡+1(𝑠1). Hence, the 
LHS of (2.18) decreases, while the first term in the RHS increases. To maintain equality, the second term 
in the RHS (the marginal utility of tomorrow’s consumption) should decrease. Hence, the level of 
tomorrow’s consumption, 𝐶𝑡+1(𝑠2), should increase. This is done by increasing savings (𝑏𝑡+1). Similar 
logic applies to the FOC (2.19) and leads to the same conclusion.  
 
[A3] Loss aversion has less impact on the take-up of whole-life insurance than that on term-life 
insurance. 
 This is because whole-life insurance serves as a saving instrument as well. Even if 𝑠𝑡+1 = 𝑠2 is 
realized, the insured can still withdraw money based on the reserved fund of the whole-life insurance 
policy. Hence, the potential loss from whole-life insurance is smaller than that from term-life insurance.  
 
[A4] The weights for bequests (𝒅?̂?, 𝒅𝒕+?̂?) have different impacts on term-life insurance and saving. 
An increase in 𝒅?̂? increases the demand for term-life insurance, while it decreases the demand for 
saving (𝒃𝒕+𝟏). In contrast, an increase in 𝒅𝒕+?̂? decreases the demand for term-life insurance, while 
it increases the demand for saving (𝒃𝒕+𝟏). 
   The weight, 𝑑𝑡 ,̂ represents the desire for leaving bequests in the event of an unexpected premature 
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death (𝑑?̂?), while 𝑑𝑡+1̂ represents the desire for leaving bequests for an expected death at a later time. 
 An increase in 𝑑?̂? increases the demand for term-life insurance, while it decreases the demand for 
saving (𝑏𝑡+1). This is because a transfer of resources to the state of premature death (s1) is made by term-
life insurance. A formal proof is provided in Appendix B.2. 
   In contrast, an increase in 𝑑𝑡+1̂ decreases the demand for term-life insurance, while it increases the 
demand for saving (𝑏𝑡+1). This is because a transfer of resources to state s2 can be attained by reducing 
term-life insurance and increasing savings. A formal proof is provided in Appendix B.2. 
 
[A5] The effect of loss aversion on the demand for term-life insurance is amplified by the degree of 
narrow framing (?̂?) and the subjective probability of survival (𝝅𝟐). 
Equation (30) shows this prediction clearly. Since the scaling factor, ?̂?, determines the degree to which 
the gain-loss value affects individuals’ decisions, a high magnitude of ?̂? implies a high impact of loss 
aversion (λ) on insurance take-up. And since the potential loss is associated with 𝑠𝑡+1 = 𝑠2, the 
subjective probability of experiencing s2 (𝜋2) affects the impacts of loss aversion. 
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2.4 Empirical Tests using the Health and Retirement Study 
2.4.1 Loss Aversion Data 
The degree of loss aversion, which is formally defined by λ = 
−𝑣(−𝑥)
𝑣(𝑥)
, captures the relative value of 
losses compared to the same amount of gains. Kahneman and Tversky (1992) measure loss aversion using 
the amount of gains that a respondent requires to accept a risky game where the loss is fixed. We will use 
a similar measure. 
We use the HRS, longitudinal panel data that survey a representative sample of approximately 20,000 
Americans over the age of 50 every two years (HRS webpage). The HRS allows researchers to include a 
one-time survey called an ‘experimental module’ so that researchers can investigate special topics by 
interviewing (by telephone or in-person) a sub-sample of the HRS. Survey questions about respondents’ 
attitudes toward small-amount risky investments are included in the Prospect Theory Module of the 2012 
HRS. Details of the Prospect Theory Module are explained in the principal investigators’ study on narrow 
framing and long-term care insurance (Gottlieb and Mitchell, 2015). Specifically, this paper uses the 
following questions, which were randomly assigned to about 1,900 HRS respondents:
 8
 
 
“Suppose that a relative offers you an investment opportunity for which there is a 50-50 chance 
you would receive [$103 or have to pay $100]. Would you agree to this investment? 
(1) Receive $103 or pay $100      (2) Receive $107 or pay $100  
(3) Receive $110 or pay $100      (4) Receive $115 or pay $100  
(5) Receive $120 or pay $100      (6) Receive $130 or pay $100  
(7) Receive $300 or pay $100”   
 
These questions measure the amount of potential gains a respondent demands for a fixed amount of 
potential losses. Those who demand a large amount of gains are assumed to have a higher degree of loss 
aversion. For example, a person who rejects investments (1)-(5) but accepts investments (6)-(7) is 
assumed to have the λ of 1.30 (λ =130/100). A person who rejects investments (1)-(6) but accepts the 
investment (7) is assumed to have the λ of three (λ =300/100). A person who rejects all investments, 
including investment (7), is assumed to have the largest λ, which is greater than three.  
Among the selected sample of 1,900 elderly people, 1,698 completed the survey. Table 2.1 shows the 
results. Nineteen percent of the respondents are estimated to have a λ of three. Approximately two thirds 
of the respondents are estimated to have an even higher degree of loss aversion. As a result, the median of 
λ is estimated to be higher than three, which is higher than Kahneman and Tversky’s estimation result 
                                           
8 Technically, not all seven questions are asked to respondents. All respondents are first asked ‘(4) Receive $115 or pay $100’ 
question. If a respondent agrees to this investment, then, ‘(2) Receive $107 or pay $100’ is asked. If a respondent does not agree 
to the initial question (4), then ‘(6) Receive $130 or pay $100’ is asked. Similar rules are applied to the subsequent questions. For 
details, see Gottlieb and Mitchell (2015) 
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(median of λ = 2.25). It seems that this high loss aversion is associated with the sample of the HRS, which 
only surveys the elderly (aged 51 or more), who, in general, have a more conservative attitude toward risk 
than the young.  
 
Table 2.1 Estimation Results of Loss Aversion (λ) 
 
Source: HRS 2012, Prospect Theory Module 
 
Table B.4 (Appendix B) presents the degree of loss aversion by demographics. Although there is no 
statistical significance, females, those aged 70 or older, less educated people, and those with fewer 
children tend to be more loss-averse. Risk aversion, which is based on the status-quo-bias-free lifetime 
income gamble questions (Barsky et al., 1997), shows a similar pattern.  
 
2.4.2 Life Insurance Ownership and Wealth data 
Detailed information on the definitions, sources, and characteristics of the data is reported in Table B.1-
B.3 (Appendix B). Life insurance ownership information is based on the following questions from the 
2012 HRS (N=18,712): 
 
(i) “Do you have any life insurance, including individual or group policies? IWER: Do not 
include burial insurance.” (HRS code: NT011) 
(ii) “How many different life insurance policies do you have?          
IWER: Include individual policies, group policies, or paid-up policies if R asks.” (NT012) 
(iii) “[What/Altogether, what] is the total face value of [this policy/these policies], that is, the 
amount of money the beneficiary would get if you were to die?” (NT013) 
N (percent)
Receive $103 or pay $100      95 (5.6) 1.03
Receive $107 or pay $100      22 (1.3) 1.07
Receive $110 or pay $100      5 (0.3) 1.10
Receive $115 or pay $100      66 (3.9) 1.15
Receive $120 or pay $100      24 (1.4) 1.20
Receive $130 or pay $100      24 (1.4) 1.30
Receive $300 or pay $100      323 (19.0) 3.00
  Reject 'Receive $300 or pay 
$100'
1,139 (67.1)
higher than 3.0
(5.0 is assigned)
Total 1,698 (100.0)
Risky investments
Those who accept the 
investment but rejects other 
less favorable investment offers
Implied
Loss Aversion (λ) 
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The HRS also collects ownership information about whole-life insurance. 
(iv) “[Is this a life insurance policy that builds/Are any of these life insurance policies ones that 
build] up a cash value that you can borrow against, or that you would receive if the policy were 
to be cancelled?  
Def: (These are sometimes called 'Whole Life' or 'Straight Life Policies.')” (NT018) 
(v) “How many such policies do you have?” (NT019) 
(vi) “What is the current face value of [these policies/this policy]?” (NT020) 
 
Since the 2012 HRS does not survey the ownership of term-life insurance, we estimate term-life 
insurance ownership information based on the fact that life insurance is either term-life or whole-life 
insurance. For example, suppose a respondent answers that he has two life insurance plans, and their total 
face value is $20,000. If the person answers that he has one whole-life insurance plan the face value of 
which is $12,000, then the person is assumed to have one term-life insurance plan whose face value is 
$8,000.   
To examine if the estimated ownership data on term-life insurance is reasonable, the estimated data was 
compared with a data set based on real interviews on term-life insurance holdings. The 1993 HRS 
(AHEAD survey) interviewed those aged 70 or older about ownership of term-life insurance (for details, 
see Brown 2001). The questions on ownership of term-life insurance were discontinued after the 1993 
survey. Although there is a considerable time gap between the two surveys (2012 vs.1993), given the 
scarcity of individual-level term-life insurance ownership data, this is one feasible way to assess if our 
estimated data is reasonable. In the 1993 HRS, the ownership rate of term-life insurance among married 
men and women aged 70 and older was 41.74 and 30.14 percent respectively. In the 2012 HRS, the 
estimated ownership rate of term-life insurance among married men and women aged 70 and older was 
37.51 and 26.09 percent respectively. Considering the time gap, it seems that the difference falls within an 
acceptable range. Both data show that roughly one third of those aged 70 or older own term-life insurance, 
indicating that many U.S. elderly utilize the renewal option of term-life insurance.
9
 
In the 2012 HRS data as a whole (aged 51 and older), 56.0 percent of people were found to hold life 
insurance: 38.0 percent owned term-life insurance and 25.4 percent owned whole-life insurance. Among 
them, 7.4 percent owned both term-life and whole-life insurance (see Table 2.2). The median of the total 
                                           
9 Considering that one primary goal of life insurance is to protect families against the loss of the primary wage earner, which 
is especially true in the case of term-life insurance, the elderly’s owning of (term-) life insurance raises questions regarding their 
motives since most elderly people do not earn wage income. Regarding this question, Brown (2001) has discussed various 
reasons: (1) protection of the spouse against loss of pension or Social Security income, (2) residue from attempts during working-
age to protect human capital, (3) tax planning (4), covering funeral expenses (p. 117). 
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face value conditional on owning any life insurance was $45,000, and the conditional average of the total 
face value was $116,105. Life insurance owners had on average 1.54 life insurance plans. In the case of 
term life insurance, the median of the total face value conditional on holding any term-life plan was 
$50,000, and the conditional average of the total face value was $124,589.  
  Table 2.2 Life Insurance Ownership of the U.S. Elderly in 2012 (Age≥51) 
 
Note: unweighted data. Source: HRS 2012 
 
Detailed ownership information in Table B.5 (Appendix B) shows that wealthy, highly-educated, male, 
and married individuals, as well as those with children, are more likely to hold a life insurance policy.  
One important limitation of the HRS data is that it does not distinguish if a respondent’s life insurance 
policy is an individual policy or a group policy. Since many employers provide term-life insurance as a 
part of a workplace benefits package, this limitation could be a confounding factor in investigating how 
an individual’s behavioral tendencies affect insurance buying decisions. To alleviate this issue, we take 
the following approaches. First, the analysis is restricted to those aged 60 or older in all regressions, so 
that our samples are less affected by the employer-provided term-life policies, which are tied to 
employment (of those aged 60 or older in the HRS sample, only 20.26 percent are employed). Second, an 
indicator variable is added to determine whether the respondent is currently working in all regressions. 
Third, for the robustness check, occupation dummies are added for the respondent’s job with the longest 
reported tenure.
10
 Fourth, whether or not loss aversion is associated with the probability of “holding 2 or 
more plans of term-life insurance” and with the amount “face value of term life −$50,000” is tested 
based on the fact that employer-provided term-life policies are typically limited to one plan with a face 
value of $50,000.  
Five variables are used for household wealth levels in 2012: Stock, House, Nonrisky, Net Financial Worth, 
and Net Worth. The source of these wealth variables is the “RAND HRS Income and Wealth Imputations-
Version O (March 2016).” Stock is the net value of stocks, mutual funds, and investment trusts that a 
household owns (RAND HRS code: H11WSTCK). House is a net value of primary residence 
                                           
10 Employer-provided term-life insurance has a renewal option, which means that those who retire may keep term-life coverage 
if they decide to pay premiums by themselves. Hence, retirees’ term-life ownership can be affected by past employment history. 
Control of past occupation history can alleviate this issue. 
Any life insurance Term-life Whole-life
Ownership rate (own=1) 0.560 0.380 0.254
Amount | Own
  Medican($)   $45,000  $50,000 $30,000
  Mean ($) $116,105 $124,589 $75,005
Average number of plans | Own 1.54 1.37 1.33
 55  
 
(H11WTOTH). Nonrisky is the sum of the ‘value of checking, savings, or money market accounts,’ ‘value 
of CDs, government savings bonds, and T-bills,’ and the ‘net value of bonds and bond funds.’ 
(H11WCHCK+H11WCD+H11WBOND). Net Financial Worth is the net value of non-housing financial 
wealth (Stock + Nonrisky + net value of all other saving − value of other debt (other than mortgages, land 
loans, or home loans); H11WTOTN). Net Worth is total net wealth including secondary residences 
(H11WTOTB). 
Table 2.3 reports five wealth variables by age group. One important pattern to note is that the elderly 
continue to accumulate wealth even after retirement: those aged 70-79 have a higher wealth level than 
those aged 60-69; those aged 80-89 have an even higher wealth level. This wealth accumulation pattern is 
not consistent with the predictions of the permanent income / life cycle model of saving, which predicts a 
substantial dissaving after retirement. 
 
Table 2.3 Median Levels of Household Wealth by Age Group in 2012 (Nominal dollars) 
 
Note: unweighted cross-section data in 2012. Source: RAND HRS Income and Wealth Imputations-Version O (March 2016) 
  
2.4.3 Loss Aversion and Term-life insurance & Whole-life insurance 
2.4.3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
   To control for the employer-provided term-life insurance and the life cycle effect of saving, we restrict 
our sample to those 60 and older. When one uses all samples of the HRS (i.e., those 51 and older), 
however, one can also find a similar empirical result, i.e., a negative association between loss aversion 
and the take-up of term-life insurance. See Table B.6 (Appendix B). 
   Panel A of Table 2.4 shows that loss aversion is significantly negatively correlated with the term-life 
insurance holdings and positively correlated with the household’s wealth. These results are consistent 
with the prediction [A1]-[A2] in the previous section. Specifically, the high loss-aversion group shows a 
significantly lower ownership rate of term-life insurance than the low loss-aversion group (34.4 % vs. 
41.4%). In terms of both the number of term-life insurance policies (0.450 vs. 0.571) and the total 
coverage amount of term-life insurance (logged value: 2.959 vs. 4.033), the high loss-aversion group has 
significantly lower figures. In contrast, being highly loss averse or not is not statistically significantly 
associated with whole-life insurance, which is a combination of insurance and savings. If we look at the 
Age 51-59 60-69 70-79 80-89 90-99
(Number of Households) (3,732) (3,095) (3,048) (1,503) (413)
Stock 0 0 0 0 0
House 20,000 60,000 80,000 79,000 0
Nonrisky 1,000 2,500 5,000 10,000 6,000
Net Fin Worth 0 2,000 7,975 18,450 10,000
Net Worth 50,000 111,500 160,000 173,800 79,000
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pure savings side, Net Financial Worth and Net Worth are positively correlated with loss aversion. This is 
consistent with the model, which predicts that loss aversion may increase precautionary saving. 
   Except for gender, there is no measurable difference in demographics between the low loss-aversion 
and high loss-aversion groups in terms of cognitive ability, education, marital status, and number of 
children. 
   Panel B of Table 2.4 reports ownership information for term-life and whole-life insurance, conditional 
on owning any type of life insurance. Loss aversion is significantly negatively correlated with term-life 
insurance holdings and weakly positively correlated with whole-life insurance. 
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Table 2.4 Loss Aversion, Term-life and Whole-life insurance, and Wealth (age≥60) 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. own_life (own_term, own_whole) is an indicator variable if a 
respondent owns any life insurance (term-life insurance, whole-life insurance). num_life (num_term, num_whole) is the number of 
any life insurance (term-life insurance, whole-life insurance) a respondent holds. log_amt_life (log_amt_term, log_amt_whole) is the 
natural log of ‘the face value of life insurance (term-life insurance or whole life insurance) + 1’. cognitive is a respondent’s total 
score on the quantitative number series of the HRS. edu is years of education.  log_Stock (log_House, log_Nonrisky, log_NetFinWorth, 
log_NetWorth) is the natural log of ‘Stock (House, Nonrisky, NetFinWorth, NetWorth) +1’ (The value in the log is replaced with one if 
the original value is less than one).   
Sources: 2012 HRS, RAND HRS Income and Wealth Imputations-Version O (March 2016) 
 
  
Panel A. HRS sample aged 60 or more
Two tailed t-test for
equal mean
p-value
own_life 0.594 (0.028) 0.563 (0.018) 0.3553
num_life 0.917 (0.057) 0.828 (0.034) 0.1723
log_amt_life 5.916 (0.312) 5.198 (0.192)    0.0475**
own_term 0.415 (0.029) 0.342 (0.017)    0.0275**
num_term 0.573 (0.047) 0.448 (0.026)   0.0153**
log_amt_term 4.031 (0.311) 2.950 (0.176)     0.0016***
own_whole 0.251 (0.025) 0.272 (0.016) 0.5018
num_whole 0.323 (0.037) 0.358 (0.025) 0.4442
log_amt_whole 1.144 (0.210) 1.031 (0.123) 0.6333
log_Stock 2.752 (0.285) 2.525 (0.170) 0.4856
log_House 8.398 (0.297) 8.684 (0.183) 0.4117
log_Nonrisky 7.095 (0.256) 7.535 (0.149) 0.126
log_Net Fin Worth 6.841 (0.305) 7.483 (0.177) 0.0616*
log_Net Worth 10.478 (0.245) 11.002 (0.134) 0.0475**
cognitive 518.0 (2.07) 516.2 (1.33) 0.4623
edu 12.78 (0.187) 12.58 (0.105) 0.3251
married 0.561 (0.028) 0.575 (0.018) 0.6708
female 0.534 (0.029) 0.610 (0.017) 0.0225**
kids 3.302 (0.118) 3.224 (0.074) 0.5790
Panel B. Samples are restricted to those who own any type of life insurance (Age≥60)
Two tailed t-test for
equal mean
p-value
own_term|Own life 0.713 (0.035) 0.630 (0.024) 0.0544*
num_term|Own life 0.988 (0.065) 0.825 (0.040) 0.0301**
log_amt_term|Own life 7.209 (0.402) 5.770 (0.271) 0.0035***
own_whole|Own life 0.433 (0.038) 0.501 (0.025) 0.1326
num_whole|Own life 0.556 (0.057) 0.662 (0.040) 0.1391
log_amt_whole|Own life 2.278 (0.394) 2.358 (0.260) 0.8646
N=171 N=411
Those with low
loss aversion (λ≤3)
<Average λ=2.26>
Those with high 
loss aversion (λ>3)
<λ=5.0>
N=303 N=792
Those with low
loss aversion (λ≤3)
Those with high 
loss aversion (λ>3)
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2.4.3.2 Regression Results 1: Loss Aversion, Term-Life and Whole-Life Insurance 
Our estimating equations are as follows: 
   1(insurance)𝑖    =  𝑐1 + 𝛼1𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖?̇? + 𝜀𝑖 ……………Probit Model 
   Number_of_insu𝑖 = 𝑐2 + 𝛼2𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖?̈? + 𝑒𝑖 ………… OLS 
   Log_amount_insu𝑖 = 𝑐3 + 𝛼3𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖 ………. Tobit Model 
Where 1(insurance)𝑖 is an indicator variable for whether an individual 𝑖 owns term-life (or whole-
life) insurance, Number_of_insu𝑖 is the number of term-life (or whole-life) insurance policies that the 
individual owns, and Log_amount_insu𝑖 is the natural log of the total face value of the term-life (or 
whole-life) insurance that the individual owns, and 𝑋𝑖 denotes control variables. The Tobit model is 
employed for the last equation because Log_amount_insu𝑖 is left-censored at zero. Note that a person’s 
desire for insurance protection can be measured using the face value of insurance only if the person owns 
life insurance. If the person does not own life insurance, then the measure of the desire is unduly coded as 
zero. Hence, the Tobit model is appropriate. 
Estimation results in Table 2.5 indicate that loss aversion is significantly negatively associated with 
ownership of term-life insurance and weakly positively associated with whole-life insurance, which is 
consistent with the predictions [A1] and [A3] of the model. Columns (1)-(3) in the Panel B of Table 5 
shows that the negative association between loss aversion and term-life insurance ownership holds after 
controlling for various factors including bequest motives (if one has a written will, the number of children, 
and marital status), age, gender, income, wealth, education, and employment status. Columns (4)-(6) of 
Table 2.5 report that loss aversion is positively associated with whole-life insurance holdings, but the 
relationship is not statistically significant. 
Table 2.5 indicates that loss aversion has an economically meaningful effect on the ownership 
probability of term-life insurance and a large effect on the coverage amount of term-life insurance. If the 
marginal effect of loss aversion is calculated at means of explanatory variables using column (1) of Panel 
B in Table 2.5, the marginal effect is calculated to be −1.9. This indicates that a one-unit change in loss 
aversion decreases the probability of owning term-life insurance by 1.9 percent point. Although the figure, 
-1.9 percent point, is itself not large, considering that the ownership probability of term-life insurance is 
only 36.0 percent in the sample, it is appropriate to interpret that loss aversion has economically 
meaningful effects on term-life insurance holdings. Column (2) of Panel B indicates that a one-unit 
change in loss aversion decreases the number of term-life policies by 0.0358. Column (3) of Panel B in 
Table 2.5 indicates an economically large impact of loss aversion on the coverage amount of term-life 
insurance. Column (3) reports that a unit increase in loss aversion decreases the coverage amount by 71.2 
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percent. 
 Table 2.6 reports the regression results when samples were restricted to those who own any type of 
life insurance. It shows that not only term-life insurance, but also whole-life insurance, has a statistically 
significant relationship with loss-aversion. Columns (4)-(5) show that the positive association between 
whole-life insurance ownership and loss-aversion becomes statistically significant when we focus on the 
choices between term-life and whole-life insurance. The marginal effects of loss-aversion measured at 
means of explanatory variables of Table 2.6 are as follows: for those who own any type of life insurance, 
a one-unit change in loss aversion decreases the probability of owning term-life insurance by 3.0 percent 
point, decreases the number of term-life policies by 0.06, and decreases the desired coverage amount of 
term-life by 61.5 percent point. 
   The effect of a bequest motive on term-life and whole-life insurance appears to be in line with the 
prediction [A4] of the model: the desire for leaving bequests for an expected death at a later time (𝑑𝑡+1̂) 
increases the demand for saving. Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 report that the bequest motive as measured by an 
indicator variable if an individual has a written will is positively associated whole-life insurance. 
Although the act of writing a will is open to interpretation, when the problem is narrowed down as to 
whether the act is associated with 𝑑?̂? or 𝑑𝑡+1̂, it is reasonable to interpret that the act is associated with 
𝑑𝑡+1̂. 
   An indicator variable for being currently employed is estimated to be significantly positively 
associated with term-life insurance but not with whole-life insurance. This result is consistent with the 
fact that (i) those with labor income are more likely to purchase term-life insurance because one primary 
function of term-life insurance is to replace labor income in the event of an income earner’s death; and (ii) 
current workers are more likely to be covered by the employer-provided term-life plan.  
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Table 2.5 Loss Aversion, Term-life & Whole-life insurance (age≥60) 
  
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Dependent variables are individual-level indicator variables for owning term-life or whole-life insurance (column 1 & 4 
respectively), the number of term-life or whole-life plans (column 2 & 5 respectively), and the natural log of ‘face value of term-
life or whole-life insurance +1’ (column 3 & 6 respectively). lossavers is a continuous variable for loss aversion (1.03, 1.07,…5.0). 
will is an indicator variable for having a written will. log_networth is the natural log of ‘the total net wealth including secondary 
residence (H11WTOTB) +1’ (The value in the log is replaced with one if the original value is less than one).  edu is years of 
education. kids is the number of children. employed is an indicator variable for the person is currently working. 
Panel A. Simpe Regression
Term-Life Insurance Whole-Life Insurance
(1) Probit (2) OLS (3) Tobit (4) Probit (5) OLS (6) Tobit
VARIABLES own_term num_term log_amt_term own_whole num_whole log_amt_whole
lossavers -0.0529* -0.0371** -0.901*** 0.0483 0.0230 0.414
(0.0297) (0.0186) (0.347) (0.0316) (0.0143) -0.734
Constant -0.128 0.640*** -1.206 -0.829*** 0.251*** -23.95***
(0.131) (0.0843) (1.598) (0.141) (0.0618) (3.470)
Observations 1,051 1,050 987 1,051 1,048 862
R-squared 0.004 0.002
Panel B. Regressions with control variables
Term-Life Insurance Whole-Life Insurance
(1) Probit (2) OLS (3) Tobit (4) Probit (5) OLS (6) Tobit
VARIABLES own_term num_term log_amt_term own_whole num_whole log_amt_whole
lossavers -0.0513* -0.0358* -0.712** 0.0488 0.0228 0.374
(0.0305) (0.0183) (0.329) (0.0323) (0.0144) (0.728)
will 0.0459 0.0300 0.344 0.213** 0.0882** 5.612**
(0.0950) (0.0578) (1.070) (0.0992) (0.0447) (2.290)
log_income 0.0179 0.0234 0.112 0.0264 0.0193 0.570
(0.0368) (0.0203) (0.416) (0.0334) (0.0131) (0.830)
log_networth 0.0379*** 0.0152** 0.391** 0.00720 0.00428 0.302
(0.0134) (0.00621) (0.159) (0.0131) (0.00485) (0.310)
female -0.115 -0.0873* -0.972 -0.216** -0.142*** -7.222***
(0.0852) (0.0507) (0.971) (0.0874) (0.0431) (1.859)
married -0.0427 -0.00395 0.151 0.00981 0.00899 -0.0868
(0.0966) (0.0570) (1.107) (0.100) (0.0474) (2.252)
age -0.0567 -0.0243 -0.706 0.146* 0.0566 3.349
(0.0764) (0.0412) (0.888) (0.0875) (0.0386) (2.169)
age_sq 0.000300 0.000125 0.00323 -0.00101* -0.000380 -0.0233
(0.000513) (0.000272) (0.00600) (0.000590) (0.000259) (0.0147)
edu 0.0441*** 0.0121* 0.553*** 0.00744 0.00319 0.142
(0.0144) (0.00705) (0.167) (0.0153) (0.00709) (0.369)
kids 0.00280 -0.00964 0.0383 0.0246 0.00425 0.00589
(0.0199) (0.0102) (0.227) (0.0205) (0.00929) (0.437)
employed 0.218** 0.145** 2.696** 0.113 0.0278 3.602
(0.108) (0.0666) (1.173) (0.115) (0.0515) (2.452)
Constant 1.218 1.207 19.28 -6.575** -2.106 -152.8*
(2.849) (1.545) (33.06) (3.239) (1.411) (78.74)
Observations 1,042 1,041 978 1,042 1,039 854
R-squared 0.047 0.029
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Table 2.6 Choices Between Term-Life & Whole-Life Insurance Conditional On Holding Any Life 
Insurance (Age≥60) 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Dependent variables are an individual-level indicator variable for owning term-life insurance (column 1) and whole-life 
insurance (column 4), the number of term-life or whole-life plans (column 2 & 5 respectively), and the natural log of ‘face value 
of term-life or whole-life insurance +1’ (column 3 & 6 respectively). lossavers is a continuous variable for loss aversion (1.03, 
1.07,…5.0). will is an indicator variable for having a written will. log_networth is the natural log of ‘the total net wealth including 
secondary residence (H11WTOTB) +1’ (The value in the log is replaced with one if the original value is less than one).  edu is 
years of education. kids is the number of children. employed is an indicator variable for whether the person is currently working. 
See Table B.1 (Appendix B) for details of variables. 
  
  
  
Term-Life Insurance Whole-Life Insurance
(1) Probit (2) OLS (3) Tobit (4) Probit (5) OLS (6) Tobit
VARIABLES own_term num_term log_amt_term own_whole num_whole log_amt_whole
lossavers -0.0823* -0.0597** -0.615** 0.0839** 0.0479** 0.763
(0.0427) -0.0268 (0.251) (0.0406) (0.0236) (0.695)
will -0.0780 -0.0357 -0.521 0.212* 0.0959 4.026*
(0.125) (0.0836) (0.817) (0.121) (0.0690) (2.137)
log_income -0.0414 0.0180 -0.224 -0.00310 0.0211 0.315
(0.0543) (0.0364) (0.284) (0.0544) (0.0294) (0.871)
log_networth 0.0370** 0.0141 0.214* -0.0166 -0.00418 0.0568
(0.0181) (0.0106) (0.129) (0.0182) (0.00947) (0.326)
female -0.0378 -0.0797 -0.262 -0.206* -0.186*** -6.040***
(0.116) (0.0747) (0.765) (0.112) (0.0687) (1.822)
married -0.0953 -0.0224 -0.202 0.0417 0.0236 -0.0133
(0.133) (0.0869) (0.878) (0.126) (0.0758) (2.202)
age -0.112 -0.0345 -0.820 0.178* 0.0936 3.354*
(0.109) (0.0654) (0.739) (0.104) (0.0642) (2.009)
age_sq 0.000720 0.000220 0.00476 -0.00117* -0.000591 -0.0226*
(0.000734) (0.000433) (0.00500) (0.000697) (0.000435) (0.0136)
edu 0.0459** 0.00292 0.380** -0.0230 -0.00960 -0.128
(0.0219) (0.0134) (0.148) (0.0211) (0.0135) (0.380)
kids -0.0338 -0.0381** -0.222 0.0115 -0.00727 -0.192
(0.0278) (0.0168) (0.189) (0.0271) (0.0158) (0.465)
employed 0.195 0.129 1.601* 0.0405 -0.0139 2.110
(0.155) (0.0992) (0.956) (0.147) (0.0798) (2.532)
Constant 4.666 2.241 36.68 -6.589* -3.193 -136.8*
(4.085) (2.443) (27.37) (3.884) (2.341) (74.22)
Observations 579 578 515 579 576 391
R-squared 0.037 0.037
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Interaction with The Subjective Probability of Survival 
   This paper now addresses the prediction [A5]: if the effect of loss aversion on insurance demand is 
amplified by the degree of narrow framing and the subjective probability of survival. First, it examines if 
the negative effect of loss aversion is more prominent among those who expect that they will not die in 
the near future (those who expect that they are more likely to lose premiums if they purchase term-limited 
insurance). To measure the subjective probability of survival, the HRS question is used, which asks the 
percent chance that a respondent will live at least 11~15 more years (prob_live80100). A dummy variable, 
livesure, indicates that the respondent responded 90~100 percent to the question. Column (3) of Table 2.7 
reports a significant negative coefficient of the interaction term (lossavers × livesure) in the regression for 
log_amt_term, indicating that the effect of loss aversion is indeed large among those who expect that they 
will live 11~15 more years with the probability of 90 percent or more. Columns (1)-(2) of Table 2.7, 
however, show that the interaction term is not significant in the regressions for own_term or num_term. 
Another result to note is that the subjective probability of survival itself (prob_live80100) shows a positive 
sign, not a negative sign, as the model has predicted, although all coefficients are not statistically 
significant. Overall, while some of the results are in line with the model’s prediction, there are somewhat 
weaker results in terms of loss aversion’s interaction with subjective probability. 
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Table 2.7 Interaction between Loss Aversion and Subjective Probability of Survival (Age≥60) 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. prob_live80100 is the respondents’ subjective 
expectation on the percent chance that he/she will live at least 11~15 more years. It is based on the question “What is the percent 
chance that you will live to be [85/80/90/95/100] or more? (00-10-20-…-100). [assigned ages are as follows: 80 (IF AGE IS 65-
69) 85 (IF AGE IS 70-74) 90 (IF AGE IS 75-79) 95 (IF AGE IS 80-84) 100 (IF AGE IS 85-89)]. livesure is an indicator variable 
for prob_live80100 being 90-100 percent. See Table B1 (Appendix B) for details of variables. 
 
Interaction with The Degree of Narrow Framing (proxied by the inverse of taking financial advice) 
Kahneman (2003) points out that narrow framing is associated with the “low accessibility” to the person’s 
existing risk and portfolio. This paper posits that those who have taken financial advice from financial 
experts are more likely to have realized his/her existing risk and thus are more likely to have broad 
framing rather than narrow framing. Financial advice may also have direct impacts on life insurance take-
up because financial experts may encourage individuals to purchase a life insurance plan. To capture these 
effects, the HRS 2014 module question regarding financial advice is used. The variable advice is an 
indicator variable for whether the person took financial advice from experts (e.g., bank officer, financial 
Term-Life Insurance Whole-Life Insurance
(1) Probit (2) OLS (3) Tobit (4) Probit (5) OLS (6) Tobit
VARIABLES own_term num_term log_amt_term own_whole num_whole log_amt_whole
lossavers -0.0449 -0.0330* -0.611* 0.0544 0.0237 0.404
(0.0316) (0.0194) (0.336) (0.0337) (0.0153) (0.739)
lossavers x livesure -0.0589 -0.0192 -0.909** -0.00676 0.00208 -0.602
(0.0359) (0.0184) (0.433) (0.0371) (0.0200) (0.840)
prob_live80100 0.00219 9.69e-05 0.0309 0.000765 0.000486 0.0420
(0.00171) (0.00103) (0.0191) (0.00177) (0.000830) (0.0380)
will 0.0476 0.0394 -0.0685 0.186* 0.0797* 5.548**
(0.0981) (0.0598) (1.091) (0.102) (0.0470) (2.305)
log_income -0.00401 0.0165 -0.0963 0.0328 0.0214 0.387
(0.0381) (0.0221) (0.415) (0.0358) (0.0144) (0.795)
log_networth 0.0387*** 0.0154** 0.384** 0.00854 0.00502 0.325
(0.0138) (0.00658) (0.161) (0.0136) (0.00510) (0.313)
female -0.107 -0.0858 -0.846 -0.229** -0.148*** -7.474***
(0.0888) (0.0534) (1.006) (0.0904) (0.0451) (1.867)
married -0.0243 -0.00983 0.312 0.0107 0.00614 -0.286
(0.100) (0.0594) (1.134) (0.104) (0.0499) (2.266)
age -0.0763 -0.0381 -1.383 0.263** 0.0825 3.720
(0.109) (0.0620) (1.238) (0.116) (0.0572) (2.713)
age_sq 0.000445 0.000223 0.00814 -0.00183** -0.000559 -0.0261
(0.000750) (0.000423) (0.00858) (0.000801) (0.000395) (0.0187)
edu 0.0431*** 0.0126* 0.537*** 0.00438 0.00152 0.0905
(0.0150) (0.00752) (0.170) (0.0161) (0.00769) (0.376)
kids 0.00903 -0.00572 0.0641 0.0185 0.000534 -0.0678
(0.0207) (0.0108) (0.231) (0.0211) (0.00978) (0.446)
employed 0.252** 0.166** 2.938** 0.103 0.0215 3.516
(0.111) (0.0691) (1.191) (0.117) (0.0536) (2.449)
Constant 1.967 1.731 43.47 -10.80** -3.043 -163.8*
(3.938) (2.243) (44.59) (4.214) (2.030) (96.93)
Observations 968 967 911 968 965 791
R-squared 0.046 0.030
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consultant). When the advice variable is merged with the loss aversion data, there are fewer than one 
hundred samples. Although the sample size is less than ideal, interesting patterns that are consistent with 
the model are found in the regression results. The results of columns (1)-(3) in Table 2.8 suggest that the 
negative effect of loss aversion on term-life insurance is low among those who have taken financial 
advice from financial experts, although statistical significance is lacking (see the coefficients for i_lossaver 
× advice). Columns (4)-(5) in Table 2.8 report a statistically significant interaction effect (i_lossaver × 
advice), indicating that the positive effect of loss aversion on whole-life insurance is canceled out by 
financial advice. Direct effects of financial advice on term-life and whole-life ownership (apart from the 
interaction effect with loss aversion) are captured by the advice term, but all of them are insignificant. 
Table 2.8 Interaction between Loss Aversion and Narrow Framing (proxied by the inverse of taking 
financial advice, Age≥60) 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
advice is an indicator variable for getting advice from financial experts. It is based on the 2014 HRS Module questions “Do you 
[and your[partner/husband/wife]] have someone such as a friend or relative, or bank officer, lawyer or financial consultant who 
regularly helps you with handling your money or property or other financial matters such as signing checks, paying bills, dealing 
with banks and making investments?  [Yes /No]” and “[IF YES] Who helps you [and your [partner/husband/wife]] with your 
finances?  1.Child Or Child-In-Law 2.Other Relative  3.Friend  4.Lawyer 5.Bank Officer 6.Financial Consultant, Accountant 
Or Other Professional Investment Counselor  7.Other, Specify.” The value of zero is assigned if a respondent chooses “No” to 
the first question or “1~4, or 7” to the second question. The value of one is assigned if a respondent choose Yes in the first 
question and (5 or 6) in the second question (getting help from financial experts).  
Term-Life Insurance Whole-Life Insurance
(1) Probit (2) OLS (3) Tobit (4) Probit (5) OLS (6) Tobit
VARIABLES own_term num_term log_amt_term own_whole num_whole log_amt_whole
lossavers -0.229* -0.107* -2.306** 0.260** 0.0978** 37.16***
(0.122) (0.0564) (1.035) (0.122) (0.0399) (0.461)
i_lossaver_advice 0.874 0.537 10.07 -2.238** -0.619* -154.5
(0.917) (0.325) (8.289) (1.065) (0.364) (0)
advice -0.496 -0.356 -4.242 1.262 0.386 74.41
(0.761) (0.242) (6.676) (0.848) (0.251) (0)
will -0.707* -0.251 -5.382 0.762* 0.250 21.96***
(0.415) (0.160) (4.014) (0.396) (0.156) (2.001)
log_income 0.281 0.142 3.821 0.0580 0.0589 6.659***
(0.257) (0.116) (2.454) (0.248) (0.119) (0.216)
log_networth 0.0184 0.00456 0.156 0.0848* 0.0175 0.0112
(0.0472) (0.0170) (0.475) (0.0446) (0.0144) (0.182)
female 0.220 0.0449 1.782 -0.441 -0.165 -2.281
(0.333) (0.119) (3.451) (0.343) (0.161) (1.756)
married -0.439 -0.169 -4.741 -0.202 -0.0362 2.996
(0.421) (0.159) (4.332) (0.434) (0.192) (1.968)
age -0.0245 -0.00482 -0.393 -0.00559 -0.00343 -0.897***
(0.0256) (0.00866) (0.282) (0.0213) (0.00904) (0.0322)
edu 0.0608 0.0189 0.183 -0.0716 -0.0231 -2.020***
(0.0645) (0.0199) (0.570) (0.0551) (0.0290) (0.165)
kids 0.0576 0.0163 0.859 0.154* 0.0544 2.665***
(0.0794) (0.0326) (0.779) (0.0859) (0.0391) (0.366)
employed 0.154 0.165 0.707 0.290 -0.0165 -6.983***
(0.437) (0.201) (4.366) (0.465) (0.183) (1.422)
Constant -1.432 -0.495 -9.975 -2.734 -0.548 -201.6***
(3.397) (1.308) (36.24) (2.979) (1.506) (2.307)
Observations 92 92 90 91 91 73
R-squared 0.243 0.109
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Robustness Checks 
First, the possible effect of employer-provided term-life insurance is further controlled for. The 
dependent variable of columns (1)-(2) is in Panel A of Table B.7 (Appendix B) is an indicator variable for 
owning two or more policies of term-life insurance. The dependent variable of columns (3)-(4) is the log 
of the “coverage amount of term-life insurance−$50,000.” By using these dependent variables, we 
consider the possibility that one term-life insurance plan with the coverage amount of $50,000 or less can 
be provided by employers. The results in columns (1)-(3) of Panel A show that the negative effect of loss 
aversion on term-life insurance is significant even if the possibility that the first term-life insurance policy 
is provided by employers is considered. In the case of column (4), loss aversion is only marginally 
significant (p-value: 12.8 percent). However, in this case too, loss aversion maintains its negative sign. In 
Panel B of Table B7 (Appendix B), regression results are reported when 13 occupation dummy variables 
based on industry codes with the longest reported tenure are added. There are still significant coefficients 
of loss aversion in the regressions for term-life insurance. 
Second, the sample is restricted to low-wealth individuals to consider the possibility that (i) the level of 
wealth may affect individuals’ attitude toward loss and (ii) to control for the heterogeneous tax-exemption 
or tax-deference effects of life insurance that differs by wealth levels (Brown 2001). In particular, the 
possibility that wealth levels co-determine loss aversion (in the form of decreasing absolute risk aversion 
(DARA) or increasing absolute risk aversion (IARA)) and life insurance ownership decisions can be ruled 
out by looking at similar wealth-level individuals. This study chooses low-wealth individuals who are less 
likely to be affected by tax incentives of whole-life insurance. The results in Table B.8 (Appendix B) 
show that statistical significance is somewhat weakened from the baseline results as the sample size has 
halved. Still, loss aversion is significant at 5 percent in the regression for num_term and at 10 percent in 
the regression for log_amt_term. 
   Third, a risk-aversion measure is added to address a possible omitted variable problem. The status-
quo-bias-free lifetime income gamble questions by Barsky et al. (1997) are used to measure risk-aversion. 
Note that the lifetime income gamble questions capture the concavity of Bernoulli’s utility-of-wealth 
function, which represents risk attitude when the magnitude of risk is large and when all risks are assessed 
comprehensively within a broad frame. This contrasts the loss-aversion questions capturing the concavity 
of Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979, 1992) value function when the magnitude of risk is small and when 
each risk is likely to be assessed in isolation from each other. The number of observations in which both 
risk-aversion and loss-aversion measures are available is about 360. Panel A in Table B.9 (Appendix B) 
reports that loss aversion maintains its significant negative sign in the regressions for term-life insurance 
holdings and shows a positive sign in the regressions for whole-life holdings. One thing to note is that the 
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risk-aversion measure shows a significant negative sign in the regression for whole-life insurance. To 
further examine the relationship between risk aversion and life insurance holdings, the loss-aversion 
measure is dropped from explanatory variables so that the relationship can be tested in a large sample. 
When loss aversion is dropped from the covariates, available observations are increased to about 4,000 
individuals. In this large data set, risk aversion is found to be an insignificant variable in the regressions 
for whole-life insurance (See Panel B of Table B.9 (Appendix B)). This relationship between risk aversion 
and life insurance holdings is further explained using an age cohort sample. 
   Fourth, the sample is restricted to those in the same life-cycle stage, those aged 60-69 in particular. 
Table B.10 (Appendix B) reports the results. These results are similar to the previous results: loss aversion 
is significantly negatively associated with term-life insurance and is positively associated with whole-life 
insurance. Note that even if the risk aversion measure is added to this age cohort sample, loss aversion’s 
effects remain robust while risk-aversion is not significant (Panel B of Table B.10, Appendix B). Another 
pattern to note is that, although statistically insignificant, risk aversion tends to be positively associated 
with term-life insurance ownership and negatively associated whole-life insurance ownership. This 
pattern is consistent with the rational aspects of purchasing insurance. 
Fifth, the Bivariate Probit, SUR, and Bivariate Tobit models are employed to consider the cases where 
decisions to buy term-life and whole-life are jointly determined.
11
 Since term-life and whole-life 
insurance are partial substitutes of each other, owning one type of life insurance may have a negative 
effect on the purchase of the other type of life insurance. Results for Bivariate Probit model for two 
binary outcomes (own_term, own_whole) are reported in columns (1)-(2) in Table B.11 (Appendix B). 
Although the estimated coefficients of loss-aversion are similar to the baseline results in Table 2.5 (two 
separate Probit models), the correlation (ρ) between term-life and whole-life ownership is estimated to be 
−0.228 and significant at 1%. This indicates that the two types of life insurance are indeed partial 
substitutes of each other. This negative correlation is in line with previous literature, such as Frees and 
Sun (2010). Columns (3)-(4) report SUR estimation results for the number of plans, which can be more 
efficient than two separate OLS regressions. Columns (5)-(6) report estimation results of the Bivariate 
Tobit model for the coverage amount. The results are not significantly different from those in Table 2.5. 
Lastly, an indicator variable is used for high loss-aversion rather than using a continuous measure for 
loss aversion. The indicator variable (i_lossaver) takes the value of one if the person’s loss aversion is 
greater than three and zero otherwise. Table B12 (Appendix B) reports similar results to those in Table 2.5. 
If the marginal effects of loss-aversion are calculated based on column (1), then having high loss aversion 
is estimated to lower the probability of owning term-life insurance by 6.25 percent point (a marginal 
                                           
11 For estimation, Stata codes biprobit, sureg, and mvtobit are used. 
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effect measured at means of explanatory variables). 
 
2.4.3.3 Regression Results 2: Loss Aversion and Household Wealth 
This section examines if loss aversion increases savings (Prediction [A2]) by looking at loss-
aversion’s association with households’ wealth levels. Since the logged wealth variables are left-censored 
at zero, the Tobit model is employed. Analyzed samples are restricted to those aged 65 or more so that the 
focus is on those who have entered the retirement stage and hence finished their wealth accumulation 
processes. Columns (1) and (6) in Table 2.9 report that loss aversion is negatively associated with 
log_Stock, which represents the sum of the amount of stocks, mutual funds, and investment trusts a 
household holds. This negative association is consistent with the model (loss-averse individuals are less 
likely to hold risky-looking assets) and the literature on loss-aversion and stock market participation 
(Dimmock & Kouwenberg, 2010). Columns (3) and (8) report that loss aversion is positively associated 
with log_Nonrisky, the amount of non-risky assets as measured by the sum of the ‘value of checking, 
savings, or money market accounts,’ ‘value of CD, government savings bonds, and T-bills,’ and the ‘net 
value of bonds and bond funds.’ Columns (5) and (10) show that loss aversion is positively associated 
with Net Worth, the sum of household’s net financial asset and real estate asset, including secondary 
residences. These results are in line with the prediction [A2]. 
  Another result to note is that having a written will is significantly positively associated with levels of 
wealth. (columns (6)-(10) in Table 2.9). Although our estimation strategy does not resolve the possible 
reverse causality issue (i.e., wealthy individuals are more likely to write a will), the strong positive 
correlation is in line with the model’s prediction [A4]. 
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 Table 2.9 Loss Aversion and Household Wealth (Tobit model, Age≥ 65) 
 
  Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
occupation_dummies are 13 dummy variables based on the industry code for job with longest tenure (RAND HRS code:    
  R11JLIND). own_house is an indicator variable for owning house (H11WOHOUS). 
 
Robustness Checks 
First, we apply quantile regressions because asset holdings data can be sensitive to extreme values. 
Results in Table 2.10 reports median regression results in columns (2)-(5) and a 95 percentile regression 
result in column (1).
12
 Similar to the results in Table 2.9, loss aversion has a positive association with 
log_NetWorth and log_Nonrisky and a negative association with log_Stock. Figure 2.3 shows the 
coefficients of loss-aversion when quantile regressions with various percentiles are applied. It shows that 
loss aversion’s effects on asset holdings differ depending on wealth quantiles. Loss aversion’s effects are 
significant among low-to-moderate wealth households.  
Second, the sample is restricted to those in the same life-cycle stage, those aged 65-70 in particular. The 
results in Table B.13 (Appendix B) show that, although statistical significance has been weakened, loss-
aversion’s association with log_Stock and log_NetWorth remains similar to the baseline results in Table 2.10. 
Third, the indicator variables are used for high loss aversion (i_lossaver, i_lossaver2) rather than using a 
continuous variable for loss aversion. The results in Table B.14 (Appendix B) show that, although 
                                           
12 A 95 percentile quantile regression is applied because only about 11 percent of households participate in the stock market. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES log_Stock log_House log_Nonrisky log_NetFinWorth log_NetWorth log_Stock log_House log_Nonrisky log_NetFinWorth log_NetWorth
lossavers -0.802* 0.201 0.297** 0.259 0.254** -1.019** 0.158 0.229* 0.128 0.171**
(0.457) (0.168) (0.131) (0.164) (0.118) (0.440) (0.155) (0.119) (0.152) (0.0866)
log_income 5.978*** 0.859*** 1.154*** 1.695*** 0.776*** 3.763*** 0.310 0.802*** 1.033*** 0.230**
(0.735) (0.288) (0.275) (0.396) (0.206) (0.819) (0.214) (0.232) (0.306) (0.106)
edu 1.622*** 0.296*** 0.535*** 0.669*** 0.315*** 1.101*** 0.156* 0.283*** 0.375*** 0.159***
(0.252) (0.0819) (0.0658) (0.0880) (0.0532) (0.265) (0.0845) (0.0662) (0.0861) (0.0410)
age 0.161* -0.0917*** 0.0661*** 0.128*** -0.00855 3.037 0.562 -0.314 0.510 0.0638
(0.0916) (0.0336) (0.0238) (0.0307) (0.0190) (1.850) (0.605) (0.445) (0.541) (0.272)
age_sq -0.0194 -0.00410 0.00232 -0.00265 -0.000324
(0.0120) (0.00393) (0.00286) (0.00346) (0.00173)
will 10.05*** 2.273*** 2.352*** 3.603*** 1.860***
(1.578) (0.476) (0.360) (0.481) (0.245)
female 2.798** 0.437 0.442 0.631 0.186
(1.294) (0.436) (0.333) (0.442) (0.219)
married 4.576*** 3.166*** 0.815** 1.416*** 0.978***
(1.497) (0.486) (0.360) (0.488) (0.227)
kids -0.986*** 0.0383 -0.0908 -0.117 0.00495
(0.331) (0.0923) (0.0723) (0.0951) (0.0488)
employed -2.159 -0.0496 -0.427 -0.440 0.477
(2.002) (0.616) (0.471) (0.656) (0.314)
i_hispanic -16.59*** -0.753 -2.638*** -2.748*** -0.453
(5.180) (0.935) (0.811) (0.979) (0.495)
own_house 1.879 1.305*** 1.843*** 4.539***
(1.946) (0.445) (0.563) (0.387)
Constant -100.4*** 1.941 -17.44*** -29.64*** -1.244 -183.3** -20.55 1.762 -36.82* -2.568
(10.90) (4.163) (3.633) (5.008) (2.826) (71.33) (23.22) (17.24) (21.05) (10.56)
occupation_dummies O O O O
Observations 834 834 834 834 834 829 829 829 829 829
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statistical significance varies depending on the types of dummy variables, the overall results are similar to 
the baseline results in Table 2.9. 
Fourth, the risk-aversion measure (Barsky et al., 1997) is added to address a possible omitted variable 
problem. The number of observations in which both risk-aversion and loss-aversion measures are 
available is only 197. Table B.15 (Appendix B) reports that loss aversion has a significant negative sign in 
the regression for log_stock (Column 1). Loss aversion maintains its positive sign in the regression for 
log_NetWorth but the coefficient is not statistically significant (Column 5). Another point to note is that, in 
all columns (1)-(5), the risk aversion measure is not statistically significant. To further check if the 
insignificance of the risk aversion measure is caused by too few samples, the loss-aversion measure is 
dropped from explanatory variables so that the relationship between risk aversion and wealth can be 
tested in a large sample. When loss aversion is dropped from covariates, available observations are 
increased to 2,215 individuals. In this large data set, risk aversion is found to be an insignificant variable 
in all regressions (Columns 6-10 in Table B.15). These results suggest that the risk aversion measure does 
not have additional explanatory power on wealth levels when demographic variables are controlled for. 
This, in turn, implies that although the main regression results do not include the risk aversion measure, 
the results may not have an omitted variable problem caused by the exclusion of the risk aversion 
measure.
13
 
 
Table 2.10 Loss Aversion and Household Wealth (Quantile Regression, Age≥ 65) 
 
   Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
                                           
13 Note that most empirical studies on insurance purchasing behavior have used demographic variables (e.g., age, gender, family 
structure) as a proxy for risk aversion instead of using direct measures for risk aversion due to the difficulty of obtaining an 
appropriate risk aversion measure (Outreville, 2014, p. 170). Recent studies by Hwang (2016) and Gottlieb and Mitchell (2015) 
report that the CRRA measure is not a statistically significant determinant of take-up of long-term care insurance or private health 
insurance. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES log_Stock log_House log_Nonrisky log_NetFinWorth log_NetWorth
quantile 0.95 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
lossavers -0.252** 0.0875* 0.192* 0.00832 0.113**
(0.122) (0.0509) (0.103) (0.136) (0.0484)
log_income 1.110*** 0.426*** 1.166*** 1.329*** 0.838***
(0.135) (0.0563) (0.114) (0.150) (0.0536)
age 0.0367 -0.0100 0.0699*** 0.0869*** -0.00423
(0.0227) (0.00947) (0.0192) (0.0253) (0.00902)
edu 0.466*** 0.110*** 0.422*** 0.555*** 0.178***
(0.0542) (0.0226) (0.0458) (0.0604) (0.0215)
Constant -6.970*** 5.899*** -14.83*** -18.34*** 1.073
(2.384) (0.995) (2.013) (2.658) (0.947)
Observations 834 834 834 834 834
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Figure 2.3 Coefficients of loss aversion by quantiles when qualtile regressions are estimated at all 
percentiles (specification: columns (2)-(5) of Table 2.10) 
 
   
    
Notes: Shaded regions indicate the 95% confidence interval of quantile regressions when dependent variables are log_House, 
log_Nonrisky, log_NetFinWorth, and log_NetWorth (columns (2)-(5) of Table 2.10). Bold lines in the center of the shaded regions 
indicate the effects of loss aversion on log_House (by qunatiles of log_House), log_Nonrisky (by quantiles of log_Nonrisky), 
log_NetFinWorth (by quantiles of log_NetFinWorth), and on log_NetWorth (by quantiles of log_NetWorth). Straight dotted lines 
indicate the coefficient and 95% confidence intervals of OLS regressions. 
 
 
  
Log_House Log_Nonrisky 
Log_NetFinWorth Log_NetWorth 
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2.5 Summary  
The modeling part of this paper examines how loss aversion would affect life insurance buying 
decisions and savings decisions within the context life cycle / permanent income savings model with a 
bequest motive. The five testable predictions from the model were first derived and then tested 
empirically. 
First, three predictions ([A1]-[A3]) can be summarized as follows: While loss aversion decreases the 
demand for term-life insurance, it may increase the demand for savings. Loss-aversion may have either a 
negative or a positive impact on the holdings of whole-life insurance, since whole-life insurance is a 
combination of insurance and savings. The sign of the impact will be determined by the proportion of 
protection vs. savings elements that a whole-life insurance plan contains. Empirical test results using the 
HRS data set were consistent with these predictions. Loss-averse elderly people had a significantly low 
ownership ratio of term-life insurance. They also had a lower number of term-life policies and lower 
coverage amounts of term-life insurance. In contrast, loss-averse elderly people possessed higher levels of 
wealth than others in the form of non-risky assets. In its relationship with whole-life insurance, loss-
aversion showed a positive association with whole-life insurance holdings, but its statistical significance 
was less robust. This occasional positive association is consistent with the fact that whole-life insurance 
held by the elderly has considerable savings elements.  
The model’s fourth prediction was that two weights for bequests (bequest weight for the death at t+1 vs. 
bequest weight for the death at t+2) have different impacts on term-life insurance and savings ([A4]). In 
particular, the model predicted that an increase in the bequest weight for t+2 (expected death) would 
decrease the demand for term-life insurance, while it would increase the demand for savings. Empirical 
results were in line with this prediction. The bequest motive for expected death as measured by an 
indicator variable for having a written will was not significant in the regressions for term-life insurance 
holdings but was significant with a positive sign in the regressions for whole-life insurance holdings. The 
indicator variable for the bequest motive showed the strongest association with levels of net worth, which 
represents pure savings. 
The model’s fifth prediction was that the effect of loss-aversion on the demand for term-life insurance 
is amplified by the subjective probability of survival and the degree of narrow framing ([A5]). The 
findings were somewhat weaker but still consistent with this prediction. For example, the negative effect 
of loss aversion on the coverage amount of term-life was large among those who were confident that they 
would not die in the near future.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Behavioral Welfare Analysis of Insurance Markets: The Case of 
Narrow Framing and Loss Aversion 
 
3.1. Introduction 
   Narrow framing (Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993) refers to people’s behavioral tendency to look at a 
problem within a narrow context. Individuals with narrow framing tend to isolate their choice problems, 
even when these choice problems are associated with other problems. For example, perfectly rational 
consumers who have a broad frame realize that insurance coverage is associated with existing risk and 
that insurance coverage hedges existing risk because insurance benefits serve as a financial buffer when 
existing wealth is decreased substantially. In contrast, people with narrow framing neglect the association 
between insurance benefits and existing risks. These consumers overlook the hedging effect and only 
focus on the monetary outcome of an insurance contract. When one focuses only on monetary outcome 
(gain or loss),1 insurance can appear to be as a risky investment because it does not pay out anything if an 
accident does not occur.  
   When narrow framing is combined with another behavioral tendency, loss aversion – people’s tendency 
to be more sensitive to potential losses than to the same amount of potential gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979, 1992), insurance can seem to be not only a risky investment but also an unfair investment.2 Hence, 
insurance policies are less attractive to consumers with narrow framing and loss aversion.  For loss-averse 
individuals, an actuarially fair gamble looks like an unfair gamble. This is because an actuarially fair 
gamble with equal chances of gains or losses provides only the same amount of potential gains as losses. 
To loss-averse individuals, the disutility of losses is greater than the utility of the same amount of gains, 
so the subjective value of the actuarially fair gamble is negative to them. (See Hwang (2016) for how 
narrow framing distorts people’s perception of insurance.) Since an increase in loss aversion creates a 
more negative value, loss-averse consumers are less likely to accept a gamble or a risky investment. 
                                                                
1  In terms of the monetary outcome, gains occur if an accident occurs (gain = benefits from insurance company) and losses occur 
if an accident does not occur (loss = paid premiums). 
2
  Decisions that are affected by narrow framing and loss aversion can be characterized by Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979, 1992) 
value function: 𝑣(𝑥) =  {
𝑥𝛼                  𝑖𝑓 𝑥 ≥ 0
−𝜆(−𝑥)𝛽  𝑖𝑓  𝑥 < 0
.  Variable x is a monetary outcome of a gamble or a risky investment (gain or loss) 
and λ is the coefficient of loss aversion. As the value function only considers the monetary outcome, it reflects narrow framing. 
The function can incorporate loss aversion by setting λ >1 when α=β. The value function explains people’s aversion to a gamble 
as follows: for example, consider a gamble with a 50-50 chance of winning $20 or losing $10. If a person has α=β=1 and λ=2.5, 
then the expected value of the gamble is negative (0.5*$201 - 0.5*2.5*$101 = -$2.5). Note that the subject value is negative due to 
loss aversion even though the gamble is actuarially favorable. 
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Hence, loss-averse consumers are less likely to buy insurance. 
Recent studies by Hwang (2016) and Gottlieb and Mitchell (2015) have provided micro-level evidence 
on the effects of loss aversion and narrow framing in insurance uptakes. Hwang (2016) shows that the 
uptake of supplemental disability insurance, long-term care insurance, and private health insurance is 
negatively associated with loss aversion. Gottlieb and Mitchell (2015) focus on the effect of narrow 
framing, which they show is negatively associated with the take-up of long-term care insurance. 
   This paper conducts a welfare analysis of insurance markets when individuals are subject to behavioral 
biases. This paper attempts to address the following question: What is the socially optimal level of 
insurance when consumers have aversions to insurance due to narrow framing and loss aversion? Would 
the optimal level be full insurance as suggested by the neo-classical economic theory, which assumes 
perfectly rational consumers? 
The central issue in addressing this question is whether or not the social welfare function (SWF) should 
take into consideration how behavior influences preferences. There are two opposing schools of thought 
on this issue (Bernheim & Rangel, 2005). The first school of thought argues that social planners should 
not consider behavioral components since these are anomalies or mistakes that are often self-destructive.  
The second school of thought claims that social planners should respect behavioral components on the 
grounds that they affect actual choices, which may reveal true preferences.  
    Regarding the matter, a special issue of the Journal of Public Economics (August 2008), titled 
“Happiness and Public Economics,” published two studies exploring how to identify true preferences 
from consumers’ mistake-prone behavior. The first is by Beshears et al. (2008), who summarize six 
approaches that help discern true preferences from mistakes. The second study is by Kőszegi and Rabin 
(2008); it stresses that measuring “happiness” or “experienced utility” is needed to conduct welfare 
analysis (instead of entirely relying on revealed choices). This paper applies the methods proposed by 
these two studies to the case of narrow framing and loss aversion in the context of insurance demand. 
   The results reveal that narrow framing and loss aversion need to be considered in normative analysis at 
least to some extent because these behavioral biases may partially, if not fully, shape true preferences. The 
evidence that suggests narrow framing and loss aversion are part of true preferences is as follows. 
Kőszegi and Rabin (2009) have provided a theoretical foundation using reference-point dependent 
preferences that shows that narrow framing may in fact be true rational preference. The fact that highly 
educated individuals and even professional traders have narrow framing and loss aversion also supports 
this view, indicating that narrow framing and loss aversion are a part of experienced and informed 
preferences, which are more likely to be true preferences. Although further research is needed, loss 
aversion seems to affect experienced happiness: the regression analysis in this paper shows that loss-
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averse individuals express that their families and themselves are worse off after U.S. healthcare reform, 
which mandates the purchase of health insurance. The literature on regret aversion (for example, Loomes 
and Sugden, 1982) and an empirical study by Guiso (2015) show that loss aversion is associated with ex-
post happiness through the sensation of “regret.” 
   This paper then shows that if the SWF respects the behavioral component of insurance demand, then the 
Pareto efficient level of insurance could be lower than the full-insurance level. 
   This paper contributes to the field of behavioral public economics (Bernheim and Rangel, 2005; 2009; 
Kőszegi and Rabin, 2009; Loewenstein & Ubel, 2008) by providing the first discussion of the appropriate 
normative insurance model for welfare analysis in the case of narrow framing and loss aversion. Although 
researchers have begun to pay attention to the appropriate normative model in the case of “present-
biased” preferences (Bernheim, Fradkin, and Popov, 2015; Carroll et al., 2009) or “probability weighting” 
(Barberis, 2013), relatively few scholars have examined narrow framing and loss aversion. Rabin and 
other researchers have shown that narrow framing can lead to mistakes (Rabin and Weizsäcker, 2009), but 
in some situations, narrow framing can be true rational preference (Kőszegi and Rabin, 2009). This paper 
extends Kőszegi, Rabin, and Weizsäcker’s studies by applying these findings to insurance economics.  
   This paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents a consumer’s decision utility function when the 
consumer is subject to narrow framing and loss aversion. Section 3.3 investigates the challenge for 
planners when individuals have such a decision utility function. This section shows that, if the decision 
utility function represents true preferences, then the socially optimal level of insurance could be lower 
than the full-insurance level. Section 3.4 discusses whether or not researchers have to take into account 
the behavioral aspects of preferences when conducting a welfare analysis. To identify whether narrow 
framing and loss aversion are true preferences or just mistakes, this section introduces two approaches, 
one proposed by Beshears et al. (2008) and one proposed by Kőszegi & Rabin (2008).  Beshears et al. 
(2008) have summarized six criteria to identify normative preferences from consumers’ mistake-prone 
choice behaviors: (1) structural estimation, (2) active decisions, (3) asymptotic choice, (4) aggregated 
revealed preferences, (5) reported preferences, and (6) informed preferences (p. 1,787). This paper applies 
the six criteria one by one to the case of narrow framing and loss aversion. It then moves to Kőszegi & 
Rabin’s (2008) approach, which stresses the role of happiness measures in identifying true preferences. 
Using Rand American Life Panel (ALP) data, it then explore if experienced wellbeing is associated with 
loss aversion. Section 3.5 presents several examples of welfare analysis in the U.S. health insurance 
market. It discusses the welfare implications of narrow framing and loss aversion using the calibrated 
result of the behavioral insurance model. Section 3.6 concludes this paper.  
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 3.2 A Consumer’s Problem under Narrow Framing and Loss Aversion 
3.2.1 Consumer’s Problem: 
In contrast to the rational approach where the domain of choices is only a consumption vector (X), the 
behavioral approach considers a generalized choice problem where the domain of choice is not only a 
consumption vector (X) but also ancillary conditions (d) (Bernheim & Rangel, 2009). Examples of the 
ancillary conditions include framing effect (the way in which alternatives are described), exposure to an 
anchor, and the salience of a default option (Bernheim 2009, p 294; Salant & Rubinstein, 2008). The 
generalized choice problem describes a consumer’s choice patterns more comprehensively by using 
ancillary conditions. If a researcher restricts the domain of a choice problem to X, then an individual’s 
choice looks inconsistent if the person reverses his choice depending on ancillary conditions (i.e., C(X, d0) 
≠ C(X, d1), where C is a choice correspondence). For example, if a consumer reverses his choice when the 
same alternatives are presented in a different way (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky’s (1981) Asian disease 
problem), the rational approach labels it as an irrational or inconsistent choice. In the behavioral 
approach, however, the difference in decisions can be justified by the difference in the ancillary 
conditions (d0 ≠ d1). A perfectly rational choice is a particular case of the generalized choice problem 
where a consumer’s choice is identical regardless of ancillary conditions (i.e., C(X, d0) = C(X, d1)). 
Hwang’s (2016) insurance model considers a generalized choice problem when the ancillary conditions 
are narrow framing and loss aversion. Following the prospect theory literature (e.g., Barberis, Huang, & 
Santos, 2001), Hwang assumes that consumers get utility not only from final consumption (c), but also 
from the value (v(a)) of state-contingent claims (a) when evaluated in isolation from existing risks. 
Specifically, the value is determined by Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) value function, v(⋅), as shown in 
(3.2) 
U(𝑐, 𝑎) = 𝑢(𝑐) + 𝑏 ∗ 𝑣(𝑎) …………………...……..……………………………………………….(3.1) 
 
𝑣(𝑥) =  {
𝑥𝛼                 𝑖𝑓 𝑥 ≥ 0
−𝜆(−𝑥)𝛽  𝑖𝑓  𝑥 < 0
, where x is a random variable*, λ is the coefficient of loss aversion…. (3.2) 
 
              * The random variable depends on the quantities of insurance policies (a) that a consumer holds 
 
   The function, u(·), represents Bernoulli’s utility function defined over consumption. A scaling factor, b, 
represents the degree of narrow framing: a positive b means that the person is subject to narrow framing 
while b of zero means that the person is perfectly rational. Hence, the utility function in the model admits 
both perfectly rational and behavioral consumers. The value function v(x) reflects a consumer’s aversion 
to risky investments. This is because the expected value (E v(x)) of risky investments is usually negative 
due to loss aversion. For example, to a consumer with λ=2 and α=β=1, the subjective expected value of a 
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risky investment with a 50-50 chance of winning $15 or losing $10 is negative (E v(x) = 0.5*($15)1-
0.5*2*($10)1= -$2.5). Hence, the consumer might reject the offer even though it is actuarially favorable. 
Hwang (2016) explains that narrow framers under-insure themselves because of the term b*v(a), whose 
expected value becomes negative if they buy insurance. Since Hwang’s insurance model admits varying 
degrees of narrow framing, insurance models that assume perfectly rational consumers or perfectly 
behavioral consumers are a specific case of Hwang’s model where the degree of narrow framing, b, is 
zero or very large.  
Specifically, a consumer’s problem with the CRRA type of u(·) can be written as follows: 
Given prices {qt(s
t, st+1)st+1∈S}
∞
t=0 , 
Maxct(st), 𝑎t+1(st,st+1)  𝐸  ∑ 𝛿
𝑡  [∞𝑡=0  
Ct(s
t)1−γ
1−γ
 + bi ∙  𝑣𝑖(𝑎𝑡+1(s
t, st+1)|𝑟𝑒𝑓) ] , 
where 𝑣𝑖(𝑎𝑡+1(s
t, st+1)|𝑟𝑒𝑓) = {
(δ ∙ 𝑎𝑡+1 − 𝑞𝑡 ∙ 𝑎𝑡+1)
𝛼    𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑡+1  𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑠                 
  −𝜆𝑖(𝑞𝑡 ∙ 𝑎𝑡+1)
𝛽              𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑡+1 𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟
,  
, E is the expectation operator based on a subjective probability, ref is the reference point which is 
assumed to be the wealth level when a consumer does not hold insurance, and γ > 0. 
subject to:  ct(s
t) + ∑  𝑞𝑡st+1∈S (s
t, st+1) 𝑎t+1(s
t, st+1) ≤ et (s
t) +at(s
t)  ∀t, ∀st 
ct(s
t) ≥ 0, 𝑎t+1(s
t, st+1) ≥ 0  ∀t, ∀st,∀𝑠𝑡+1  ……………………………………....…….(3.3) 
 
The term, at+1(s
t, st+1), is the quantities of state-contingent claims (Arrow securities) that pay off at+1 
units of consumption in the next period if and only if st+1 occurs. The price of one unit of the contingent 
claim is denoted as qt. Gains from an insurance contract occur if st+1 is realized. The exact amount of net 
gains from purchasing at+1 units of insurance policies is δ ∙ 𝑎𝑡+1 – 𝑞𝑡 ∙ 𝑎𝑡+1.  Losses occur if st+1 is not 
realized. The amount of losses is the same as paid premiums, 𝑞𝑡 ∙ 𝑎𝑡+1. The term, bi, represents a degree 
of narrow framing: a greater bi implies that the consumer is more subject to narrow framing. The term, 
et(s
t), represents an endowment in each period.  
Two testable implications of the model are as follows: (i) an increase in loss aversion leads to a 
decrease in insurance demand (because λi↑ => vi(at+1) ↓ => U(u, at+1) ↓ ) and (ii) the negative effect of 
loss aversion is amplified by the degree of narrow framing (because 𝑣𝑖(𝑎𝑡+1) is multiplied by bi). 
 
3.2.2 Empirical Evidence on The Behavioral Insurance Model 
Hwang (2016) provides empirical evidence consistent with the insurance model (3.3) using US 
individual-level data: loss-averse individuals have a low uptake of long-term care insurance, supplemental 
disability insurance, and other private health insurance. He also shows that the negative impact of loss 
aversion on LTCI demand is amplified by the degree of narrow framing (bi ). In addition, he finds that 
loss-averse individuals express a low willingness to pay for health insurance and they tend to choose the 
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option of ‘not buying health insurance and pay penalty’ in a hypothetical choice experiment that targeted 
the Affordable Care Act. Hwang measures loss aversion (λi) using the acceptability of a set of risky games 
(i.e., 50% chance to lose $x and 50% chance to win $6) in which x is varied. (λi=6/xm , where xm is the 
largest amount of losses that person i is willing to accept). With the calibrated result of the model, Hwang 
shows that the high level of narrow framing and loss aversion can explain the low demand for long-term 
care insurance without introducing any market frictions.3  Using this model, Hwang also argues that 
consumers’ willingness to pay for insurance depends not only on the concavity of their Bernoulli utility 
function (𝛾), but also on the degree of narrow framing (bi ) and loss aversion (λi).  
Gottlieb and Mitchell (2015) focus on the role of narrow framing in the demand for long-term care 
insurance. They find that narrow framing, which is measured by an indicator variable for whether or not 
an individual reverses his decision within a negative frame, is negatively associated with ownership of 
long-term care insurance. 
 Bhargava, Loewenstein, and Sydnor (2015) show that individuals’ health insurance choices are better 
explained by a heuristics process than a sophisticated utility-maximizing process. They find that a 
majority of workers at a large U.S. firm choose an actuarially-dominated health insurance option (rather 
than choosing the best option). They report that similar results are observed in their follow-up 
hypothetical choice experiments. 
  
                                                                
3 That is, because of the behavioral term, bi ∙  𝑣(𝑎𝑡+1(s
t, st+1)), which is negative for those who have narrow framing and loss 
aversion, these individuals choose not to buy insurance to avoid a decrease in utility. 
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3.3 Social Planner’s Problem When Agents Have Narrow Framing and Loss Aversion 
The utility function in Hwang’s (2016) model describes how individuals make decisions on insurance. 
In this sense, we name the descriptive utility in equation (3.3) “decision utility” following Kahneman, 
Wakker, and Sarin (1997). After decisions are made, the satisfaction or utility that consumers really 
experience could be different from decision utility. We name the utility that consumers really experience 
“experiencing utility.”    
Pareto efficient allocations can be characterized as solutions of a social planner’s problem.4 Hence, in 
order to find the Pareto efficient level of insurance, this section explores an appropriate social planner’s 
problem. The first part of this section illustrates a social planner’s problem when consumers are assumed 
to be perfectly rational preferences. In this case, as Mossin (1968) has shown, having full insurance 
coverage is optimal if consumers are risk averse and premiums are fair. We then consider the case where 
all agents are behavioral and the behavioral components of preference are authentic and stable 
preferences. (i.e., decision utility=true utility). We show that the socially optimal level of insurance could 
be lower than the full-insurance level when behavioral components (individuals’ aversion to insurance 
due to narrow framing and loss aversion) are reflected in the SWF.  
 
3.3.1 A Standard Social Planner’s Problem (Perfectly Rational Utility Function) 
A perfectly rational consumer’s problem can be written as (3.4) or (3.5). And a social planner’s 
problem associated with the consumer can be written as (3.6). Notations are as follows: 𝑢(⋅) is Bernoulli’s 
utility function, which it is defined over periodic consumption; 𝜋(𝑠𝑡) is the probability of the event 
history, 𝑠𝑡; at+1 is the quantity of Arrow securities;  qt is the unit price (one-period ahead price) of Arrow 
securities; eit is the endowment; pt is the date-0 price of Arrow securities; 𝜇𝑖
 is the Pareto weight. 
 
 (a) Consumers problem (Sequential Problem) 
Given prices, {qt(s
t, st+1)st+1∈S}
∞
t=0 , 
Maxct(st), 𝑎t+1(st,st+1)  ∑ ∑  𝑠𝑡∈𝑆𝑡 𝛿
𝑡𝜋(𝑠𝑡)∞𝑡=0 u(𝑐𝑡
𝑖(𝑠𝑡))   
  subject to:  cit(s
t) + ∑  𝑞𝑡st+1∈S (s
t, st+1) 𝑎𝑡+1
𝑖 (st, st+1) ≤ e
i
t (s
t) +ait(s
t)  ∀t, ∀st 
cit(s
t) ≥ 0, 𝑎𝑖t+1(s
t, st+1) ≥ 0  ∀t, ∀st,∀𝑠𝑡+1  ………………………………..…..….(3.4) 
 
  
                                                                
4 Note that allocations that solve the social planner’s problem are Pareto optimal. Formally, if u* solves a social planner’s 
problem (Max ∑ 𝜇𝑖  𝑢
𝑖𝑛
𝑖=1  with 𝜇𝑖  >0 ∀ 𝑖), then u* belongs to Pareto frontier 
( (𝑢1, … , 𝑢𝑛) is Pareto frontier if ∄ any allocation ( 𝑢1
′ , … , 𝑢𝑛
′ ) such that 𝑢𝑖
′ ≥ 𝑢𝑖 for all i and 𝑢𝑖
′ > 𝑢𝑖 for some i ). Furthermore, 
if 𝜇𝑖  add up to one, then all the Pareto optimal allocations can be obtained by the social planner’s problem (Negishi 
characterization). 
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 (b) Consumers problem (Date-0 economy) 
Given prices, {pt(s
t) }∞t=0, 𝑠𝑡 ∈ 𝑆𝑡 
Max𝑐𝑡𝑖(st)  
 ∑ ∑  𝑠𝑡∈𝑆𝑡 𝛿
𝑡𝜋(𝑠𝑡)∞𝑡=0  𝑢(𝑐𝑡
𝑖(𝑠𝑡))   
subject to:  ∑ ∑ 𝑝𝑡𝑠𝑡∈𝑆𝑡 
∞
𝑡=0 (𝑠
𝑡) 𝑐𝑡
𝑖 (𝑠𝑡) ≤   ∑ ∑ 𝑝𝑡𝑠𝑡∈𝑆𝑡
∞
𝑡=0 (𝑠
𝑡) 𝑒𝑡
𝑖 (𝑠𝑡)  
                    cit(s
t) ≥ 0,  ∀t, ∀st  …………………………………….………….….….(3.5) 
 
  (c) Social planner’s problem: 
 Max𝑐𝑡𝑖∈𝐼(st)  
 ∑  𝑖∈𝐼 ∑  ∑  𝑠𝑡∈𝑆𝑡 𝛿
𝑡  𝜇𝑖 𝜋(𝑠
𝑡)∞𝑡=0  𝑢(𝑐𝑡
𝑖(𝑠𝑡))   
     subject to:  ∑ 𝑐𝑡
𝑖(𝑠𝑡)  𝑖∈𝐼  ≤ ∑ 𝑒𝑡
𝑖(𝑠𝑡) 𝑖∈𝐼     ∀t, ∀s
t 
     , where 𝜇𝑖 > 0  ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼  and  ∑ 𝜇𝑖
 
𝑖∈𝐼  = 1  ………………..…………….………………..………..(3.6) 
 
   Under this set-up, if consumers are risk averse (𝑢(·) is strictly concave), and if insurance premiums are 
fair, then having full insurance coverage is optimal. (Mossin, 1968) 
 
3.3.2 A Planner’s Problem When Consumers Have Non-Standard Utility Function 
3.3.2.1 Technical Challenges 
As is shown in (3.6), a planner’s problem is to maximize an objective function under the resource 
constraint. The objective function of a social planner is set to be the sum of individuals’ utility function 
weighted by Pareto weights. If we follow this rule, conceptually a planner’s problem can be represented 
as follows: 
 
max𝑐𝑖∈𝐼  ∑  
 
𝑖∈𝐼  𝜇𝑖 ( u (c
i) + bi*v(ai) )     s.t. resource constraint,  𝜇𝑖  is the Pareto weight ……….....(3.7) 
 
However, one cannot use this equation. This is because the behavioral term in 3.7 (bi ∙  𝑣𝑖(𝑎
𝑖)) includes 
Arrow securities (ai).  Since a planner’s problem is a resource allocation problem that does not involve 
any prices, the behavioral term with Arrow securities cannot be reflected in a social planner’s problem 
directly. Thus, reflecting a consumer’s aversion to insurance in a planner’s problem, without explicitly 
introducing Arrow securities, is key to solving the planner’s problem. 
 
3.3.2.2 The Idea of a Date-0 Indifference Curve Reflecting Behavioral Biases 
   One way to reflect consumers’ aversion to insurance policies in a planner’s problem is to construct a 
date-0 indifference curve that reflects such aversion. This paper notes that transfer of wealth across states 
can be obtained only by purchasing Arrow securities. One way to reflect consumers’ aversion to Arrow 
securities is penalizing the wealth state that is obtained by Arrow securities. That is, if a wealth state 
deviates from the initial state (“e” in Figure 3.1), it should be penalized, since the state can be obtained 
only through Arrow securities. In order to move further to a different wealth state from the initial state, a 
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consumer needs to purchase more quantities of Arrow securities. As a result, the gap between the level of 
utility when there is no narrow framing and loss aversion and the utility when there are such behavioral 
biases widens as one’s wealth state moves away from the initial wealth state (See Figure 3.1). Therefore, 
an indifference curve that reflects narrow framing and loss aversion can be depicted by a kinked 
indifference curve in Figure 3.1, as is pointed out by Gottlieb (2012).  
Figure 3. 1 Date-0 indifference curve reflecting narrow framing & loss aversion 
 
3.3.2.3 The Utility Function with Narrow Framing & Loss Aversion in a Date-0 Economy  
 Assume, as in equation (3.3), the utility function in a sequential market economy is as follows: 
 𝑈(ct(s
t),  𝑎t+1(s
t, st+1)) = 𝑢(ct(s
t)) + b ∙  𝑣(𝑎𝑡+1(s
t, st+1)|𝑟𝑒𝑓)  
                   where 𝑣(𝑎𝑡+1(s
t, st+1)|𝑟𝑒𝑓) = {
(δ ∙ 𝑎𝑡+1 − 𝑞𝑡 ∙ 𝑎𝑡+1)
𝛼    𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑡+1  𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑠                 
  −𝜆(𝑞𝑡 ∙ 𝑎𝑡+1)
𝛽              𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑡+1 𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟
 …(3.8) 
For simplicity, further assume that α = β. 
 Constructing a utility function in a date-0 economy equivalent to the equation (3.8) is the key to finding 
the efficient level of insurance numerically. In the above equation, a consumer’s aversion to insurance is 
represented by ‘b ∙  𝑣(𝑎𝑡+1(s
t, st+1)|𝑟𝑒𝑓)’, which is a function of the quantities of one-period-ahead 
Arrow securities (𝑎𝑡+1(s
t, st+1)) for a given reference point (ref) which is assumed to be the wealth level 
when a consumer does not hold insurance. A challenging part in constructing a date-0 utility function is 
that one has to reflect a consumer’s aversion to Arrow securities, while not explicitly using the term 
(Arrow securities). 
i
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   The challenge, however, can be addressed by using the idea of a kinked utility function. Specifically, the 
equation (3.8) could be re-written as follows: 
 
𝑈(ct(s
t),  𝑒t(s
t))= 𝑢(𝑐𝑡(𝑠
𝑡)) − 𝑏 ·  𝑣 ̃(𝑐𝑡(𝑠
𝑡) − 𝑒𝑡(𝑠
𝑡)) , where 𝑣 ̃(·) ∝ 𝜆 ……….…………..….(3.9) 
   
 The utility function in equation (3.9) reflects the facts that any consumption that is different from the 
initial endowment is penalized in proportion to ‘𝑐𝑡(𝑠
𝑡) − 𝑒𝑡(𝑠
𝑡)’ because the consumption level above or 
below the initial endowment can be obtained only through Arrow securities, to which a consumer has 
aversion.  In the process, constructing the function ?̃?(⋅) from 𝑣(∙) is key. 
 
3.3.2.4 An Example of the Utility Function 
   In order to explore how the utility function (3.9) works, this section looks at a simple example. If we 
assume that 𝑢(𝑐𝑡(𝑠
𝑡)) = 𝑙𝑛(𝑐𝑡(𝑠
𝑡)) and 𝑣 ̃(𝑐𝑡(𝑠
𝑡) − 𝑒𝑡(𝑠
𝑡)) =  𝜆 · (𝑐𝑡(𝑠
𝑡) − 𝑒𝑡(𝑠
𝑡))2, then the equation 
(3.9) can be re-written as follows: 
U(ct(s
t), et(s
t) )= 𝑙𝑛(𝑐𝑡(𝑠
𝑡)) − 𝑏 · 𝜆 · (𝑐𝑡(𝑠
𝑡) − 𝑒𝑡(𝑠
𝑡))2 …………………………………...……....(3.10) 
   Assume that there are two periods, 0 and 1. There is no uncertainty at t=0. At period 1, there are equal 
chances of the endowment being 1 or 5. (i.e., 𝑒𝑡(𝑠
𝑡) = {1, 5;
1
2
   
1
2
}  ). Suppose an actuarially fair insurance 
offer for state 1 (et=1) is given to a consumer. The insurance pays off 4 dollars if state 1 is realized. Its 
premium is 2. Assume the consumer can either accept or reject this insurance offer. If the consumer 
accepts it, the level of his consumption becomes three units regardless of the state. 
   If the above consumer is perfectly rational (i.e., b=0), he is willing to accept the insurance offer. Since 
he is risk-averse (i.e., he has a strictly concave log utility function), he will accept the insurance offer to 
attain the maximum utility level of ln(3) ≈ 1.0986.  
   However, if the consumer is a narrow framer (i.e., b>0), then he could become worse off by buying 
insurance. If he does not buy insurance, his consumption level becomes either one unit or five units. 
Hence, his utility level is ½* ln1 + ½ * ln5 ≈ 0.8047. If he purchases the insurance policy, his utility is 
½* [ ln3 + 𝑏 · 𝜆 ·(3-1)2  + ln3 + 𝑏 · 𝜆 ·(3-5)2]  = ln3- 4·  𝑏 · 𝜆 ≈1.0986 - 4· 𝑏 · 𝜆. Thus, if 4· 𝑏 · 𝜆 is greater 
than 0.2939 (i.e. b⋅𝜆 > 0.0735), then the consumer rejects the offer. That is, if the degree of narrow 
framing and loss aversion is large, then the consumer chooses not to insure himself. 
   If 𝑏 · 𝜆 is not too large, and if partial insurance offers are given, then partial insurance can be the 
optimal decision as well. Table 3.1 reports the utility level the consumer with the utility function (3.10) 
gets when partial insurance options are available. Bold numbers in the figure mean that the consumer can 
maximize the utility under that level of insurance coverage. One can see that the optimal insurance level 
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changes depending on the magnitude of the degree of narrow framing and loss aversion (𝑏 · 𝜆): if b⋅λ is 
zero (i.e., the consumer is not subject to behavioral biases), then the full insurance level is optimal; if b⋅λ 
is 0.2, then partial insurance (buying an insurance policy that covers one unit of consumption if s1 occurs) 
is optimal; if b⋅λ is three, then not buying insurance is optimal. Note that, in the case of  b⋅λ of three 
(CASE 3), not purchasing insurance is optimal even though the consumer is risk-averse and the insurance 
offer is actuarially fair. 
 
Table 3.1 Optimal insurance level when different magnitudes of 𝒃 · 𝝀 are assumed in (3.10) 
 
 
 
3.3.3 Socially Efficient Level of Insurance – A Graphical Analysis Using Edgeworth Box 
We will start with a standard Arrow-Debreu exchange economy where state-contingent commodities are 
traded. There is no aggregate uncertainty in this economy. There is one consumption good. There are two 
possible states, s1 and s2. State-contingent commodities are defined by goods delivered only if a 
particular state occurs. Hence, in this economy, we have two state-contingent commodities. In CASE I 
and II, we will assume that one consumer is fully rational and risk-neutral. One can think of this consumer 
as a government. The other consumer is assumed to be boundedly rational in the sense that he or she has 
narrow framing and loss aversion. In CASE III, we will consider that there are N1 number of fully 
rational consumers and N2 number of loss-averse narrow framers. 
c(s1) c(s2) Utility c(s1) c(s2) Utility c(s1) c(s2) Utility
Initial Status (no insuance) 1.0 5.0 0.8047 1.0 5.0 0.8047 1.0 5.0 0.8047
partial insurance (Benefit=1) 1.5 4.5 0.9548 1.5 4.5 0.9048 1.5 4.5 0.2048
partial insurance (Benefit=2) 2.0 4.0 1.0397 2.0 4.0 0.8397 2.0 4.0 -1.9603
partial insurance (Benefit=3) 2.5 3.5 1.0845 2.5 3.5 0.6345 2.5 3.5 -5.6655
Full insurance (Benefit=4) 3.0 3.0 1.0986 3.0 3.0 0.2986 3.0 3.0 -10.9014
(CASE 1) b·λ =0 (CASE 2) b·λ =0.2 (CASE 3) b·λ =3
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Table 3.2 Three Simple Economies and Pareto Efficient Levels of Insurance 
 CASE I (Economy 1) CASE II (Economy 2) CASE III (Economy 3) 
Consumers 
 
[Total number 
of consumers] 
1 Fully rational & risk-neutral 
consumer 
 + 
1 Fully rational & 
risk-averse consumer 
[2] 
1 Fully rational & risk-neutral 
consumer 
 + 
1 consumer with narrow framing 
& loss aversion 
[2] 
N1 fully rational & risk-averse 
consumers  
+ 
N2 consumers with narrow 
framing & loss aversion 
 [N1+N2] 
Pareto Efficient 
levels of 
insurance 
when premiums 
are fair 
Only full insurance level is Pareto 
Efficient 
 
 
A partial insurance level or no 
insurance could be Pareto 
efficient 
(The optimal level depends on 
the degree of narrow framing 
and loss aversion) 
A partial insurance level or no 
insurance could be Pareto 
efficient 
 (The optimal level depends on 
the degree of narrow framing 
and loss aversion, and the 
relative size of N1 and N2) 
 
(CASE I) 
The Edgeworth boxes in Figure 3.2 illustrate the economies in CASE I and II. The X-axis and Y-axis of 
the Edgeworth box represent the quantities of state-contingent commodities. The figure on the left 
illustrates the optimal insurance level when both consumers are fully rational and one consumer is risk-
neutral and the other consumer is risk-averse. It shows that the full insurance level is Pareto efficient. (i.e., 
the contract curve is the same as the certainty line).  One can interpret the fully rational and risk-neutral 
consumer as a government. The result implies that when individuals are risk-averse, then the 
government’s providing the full level of insurance is socially optimal. 
 
(CASE II)  
The figure on the right of Figure 3.2 illustrates the Pareto efficient insurance level when one consumer 
(j) is fully rational and risk-neutral and the other consumer (i) is boundedly rational. The kinked 
indifference curve of consumer i reflects narrow framing and loss aversion. Due to the distortion of the 
indifference curve of consumer i, the contractive curve, which shows the Pareto efficient level of 
insurance, is off the certainty line. That is, the insurance level lower than the full insurance becomes the 
socially efficient level in this case. Similar to CASE I, one can interpret the fully rational and risk-neutral 
consumer as a government. The result implies that if all individuals have narrow framing and loss 
aversion, then providing only a partial insurance level or not providing any insurance could be Pareto 
efficient.  
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Figure 3.2 Pareto Efficient Level of Insurance: Analysis using Edgeworth Box 
 
(CASE III) 
We consider a more realistic situation, where some individuals (N1 consumers) are fully rational and 
risk-averse and others (N2 consumers) are boundedly rational. First, in the simplest case, one may assume 
N1=N2=1. The Edgeworth box in Figure3.3 shows that, similar to CASE II, the Pareto efficient level of 
insurance could be a partial insurance or no insurance level. In particular, the second Edgeworth box of 
Figure 3.3 illustrates the case where not providing any insurance is Pareto efficient. Consumer i exhibits 
an extremely kinked indifference curve due to a high degree of narrow framing and loss aversion. As a 
result, the initial endowment point (e) becomes a Pareto efficient allocation. The initial endowment point 
(e) is Pareto dominant to allocation A (full insurance level): while fully rational consumer j gets the same 
utility either in A or e, narrow framer i becomes worse off in A. Hence, if a social planner moves an 
allocation from A to e, one agent (i) becomes strictly better off without making the other agent (j) worse 
off. 
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Figure 3.3 Pareto Efficient Level of Insurance: Analysis using Edgeworth Box 
 
  A more generalized case where N1 and N2 can take any natural number can also be discussed. For 
simplicity, we assume that Pareto weights (  𝜇𝑖,  𝜇𝑗 . . ) are equal, which means that we look at a particular 
point of Pareto efficient allocation, not all Pareto efficient allocations. By focusing on this purely 
Utilitarian social welfare function, we can view the Pareto efficient allocation as the welfare optimum in 
a single consumer economy. 
  In this economy, we will assume that there are N1 number of ‘type i’ fully rational consumers and N2 
number of ‘type j’ narrow framers. We will use the utility function in (3.9) reflecting narrow framing and 
loss aversion. Then the planner’s problem under the purely Utilitarian SWF can be written as follows. 
max
𝑐𝑡
𝑖(𝑠𝑡),𝑐𝑡
𝑗
(𝑠𝑡) 
N1 ∗ ∑ ∑  𝑠𝑡∈𝑆𝑡 𝛿
𝑡𝜋(𝑠𝑡)∞𝑡=0 {𝑢
𝑖(𝑐𝑡
𝑖 (𝑠𝑡))}                 
                  +N2 ∗ ∑ ∑  𝑠𝑡∈𝑆𝑡 𝛿
𝑡𝜋(𝑠𝑡)∞𝑡=0 {𝑢
𝑗(𝑐𝑡
𝑗 (𝑠𝑡)) − 𝑏𝑗 · ?̃?(𝑐𝑡
𝑗(𝑠𝑡) − 𝑒𝑡
𝑗(𝑠𝑡))} 
                   , where 𝑣 ̃(·) ∝ 𝜆,  𝑏𝑗  ≥ 0 
      subject to    N1 ∗ 𝑐𝑡
𝑖(𝑠𝑡) + N2 ∗ 𝑐𝑡
𝑗(𝑠𝑡) ≤ N1 ∗ 𝑒𝑡
𝑖(𝑠𝑡) + N2 ∗ 𝑒𝑡
𝑗(𝑠𝑡)    ∀𝑠𝑡 ….…………..….(3.10) 
   This type of SWF allows us to analyze the effect of the proportion of fully rational vs. boundedly 
rational consumers on the optimal level of insurance. If an economy is composed of fully rational 
consumers only, N2=0 and thus the economy is the same as CASE I. Hence, a full level of insurance is 
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socially optimal. In contrast, if an economy is composed of boundedly rational consumers only, N1=0 and 
thus the economy is the same as CASE II. Hence, a partial or no insurance level could be socially optimal. 
These kinds of analyses lead to the intuition that an increase in the proportion of boundedly rational 
consumers results in a decrease in the socially optimal level of insurance. 
  
3.4 Do We Have To Include The Behavioral Term in A Social Planner’s Problem?  
(i.e., De researchers have to include individuals’ aversion to insurance due to narrow framing and loss 
aversion in a normative analysis?) 
 
   This section introduces two opposing schools of thought regarding the issue of whether or not the 
behavioral components of preferences should be considered in a normative analysis. We then introduce a 
generalized social planer’s problem, a problem set up incorporating the views of both schools of thought. 
We show that the socially optimal level of insurance depends on the degree that a social planner respects 
the behavioral components, k (or the degree that the behavioral components reflect authentic preferences) 
 
3.4.1 Two opposing schools of thought  
 
   There are two schools of thought regarding this question (Bernheim & Rangel, 2005). The first school 
of thought argues that a social planner should respect behavioral components because they reflect 
individuals’ choices, which reveal their true preferences. The second school of thought claims that a 
social planner should not consider them since they are anomalies that are often self-destructive. That is, if 
a consumer’s problem is maximizing “u(ci) + bi*v(ai)” where “bi*v(ai)” is the behavioral term, the first 
school of thought argues that a social planner should solve (3.11) while the second school of thought 
claims that the planner should solve (3.12). 
 
max𝑐𝑖∈𝐼  ∑  
 
𝑖∈𝐼  𝜇𝑖 ( u (c
i) + bi*v(ai) )     s.t. resource constraint,  𝜇𝑖  is the Pareto weight ……….…..(3.11) 
max𝑐𝑖∈𝐼  ∑  
 
𝑖∈𝐼  𝜇𝑖 u (c
i)    s.t. resource constraint, 𝜇𝑖 is the Pareto weight ………………………......(3.12) 
 
   More specifically, the first school of thought points out that including anomalies in a planner’s problem 
does not make sense. For example, many studies report that exposure to an arbitrary number affects 
choices. This school argues that treating this arbitrary condition of choices as a welfare relevant object 
does not make sense (Bernheim 2009). Another ground of this school of thought is that a social planner 
should consider experiencing utility, the utility that consumers actually experience throughout their lives, 
not decision utility, which can be temporary. This school points out that what consumers really experience 
after decisions are made (experiencing utility) might not be affected by the behavioral biases. For 
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example, feelings of loss due to narrow framing (bi*v(ai))  might occur only at the time of decision 
making. After the decision is made, consumers might not have such feelings of loss.  
   The second school of thought argues that researchers should include the behavioral term as well because 
the behavioral term affects actual choices which reveal true preferences. Proponents of this school point 
out that what consumers actually choose reflects their true preferences and happiness. Thus, to conduct a 
welfare analysis, once should consider the behavioral term as well, since it plays a role when people make 
decisions. This school of thought also argues that, even though feelings of loss due to narrow framing and 
loss aversion (bi*v(ai)) occur only at the time of decision making, that period’s feelings or happiness 
should be taken into account.  
 
3.4.2 A Generalized Social Planner’s Problem 
  A generalized social planner’s problem which can incorporate the views of both schools of thought can 
be written as follows: 
 max𝑐𝑖∈𝐼  ∑ 𝜇𝑖
 
𝑖∈𝐼 {u(c
i) + k*bi*v(ai) } s.t. resource constraint where 0≤k ≤1, 𝜇𝑖  is the Pareto weight..(3.13) 
 
   The scalar k determines how much the social planner takes into account the behavioral component. If 
k=1, this equation is the same as (3.11), which means the planner fully takes into account the behavioral 
component. If k=0, this equation is the same as (3.12), which means the planner does not consider the 
behavioral component. 
   A formal representation of the generalized social planner’s problem when there are two consumers who 
are potentially subject to narrow framing and loss aversion can be written as follows: 
 
max
𝑐𝑡
𝑖(𝑠𝑡),𝑐𝑡
𝑗
(𝑠𝑡) 
  𝜇𝑖 ∑ ∑  𝑠𝑡∈𝑆𝑡 𝛿
𝑡𝜋(𝑠𝑡)∞𝑡=0 {𝑢
𝑖(𝑐𝑡
𝑖 (𝑠𝑡)) − 𝑘 · 𝑏𝑖 · ?̃?(𝑐𝑡
𝑖(𝑠𝑡) − 𝑒𝑡
𝑖(𝑠𝑡))}                 
                  +  𝜇𝑗  ∑ ∑  𝑠𝑡∈𝑆𝑡 𝛿
𝑡𝜋(𝑠𝑡)∞𝑡=0 {𝑢
𝑗(𝑐𝑡
𝑗 (𝑠𝑡)) − 𝑘 · 𝑏𝑗 · ?̃?(𝑐𝑡
𝑗(𝑠𝑡) − 𝑒𝑡
𝑗(𝑠𝑡))} 
                   , where 𝑣 ̃(·) ∝ 𝜆, 0 ≤ k ≤ 1, 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜇𝑗 = 1, 𝑏
𝑖 ≥ 0, 𝑏𝑗  ≥ 0 
                 subject to    𝑐𝑡
𝑖(𝑠𝑡) + 𝑐𝑡
𝑗(𝑠𝑡) ≤ 𝑒𝑡
𝑖(𝑠𝑡) + 𝑒𝑡
𝑗(𝑠𝑡)      ∀𝑠𝑡 ………………………………..(3.14) 
  
  The term  𝜇𝑖 represents the Pareto weights, and 𝜋(𝑠
𝑡) is the probability of the history (𝑠𝑡) of the state of 
the world. The scaling factor k determines how much the social planner takes into account the behavioral 
component. If k=1, the equation (3.14) means that the planner fully takes into account the behavioral 
component. If k=0, this means that the planner does not consider the behavioral component. The term bi 
denotes the degree of narrow framing. The term 𝑣 ̃(·)  is an augmented value function defined over 
consumptions that exceed initial endowments (𝑐𝑡
𝑖(𝑠𝑡)− 𝑒𝑡
𝑖(𝑠𝑡)).  
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   Note that the problem in (3.14) can incorporate a case where both agents are perfectly rational. By 
setting bi = bj = 0, one can find the efficient level of insurance when all agents are perfectly rational. 
Similarly, by setting bi  > 0 and bj = 0, one can consider a case where one agent has narrow framing while 
the other agent does not (the graph of CASE II in Figure 3.2 illustrates this case). 
 
3.4.3 Optimal insurance level under the generalized social planner’s problem 
  Not surprisingly, the optimal insurance level depends on the degree that the social planner takes the 
behavioral components into account (k). It can be formally stated as follows: in the two agent economy 
mentioned above, if k increases, then the Pareto optimal level of insurance (weakly) decreases. 
Proposition 3.1 states this. 
 
[Proposition 3.1] Consider the planner’s problem in (3.14). Further assume that bi∈ℝ+ and bj = 0;  k∈(ℝ+ 
∪ {0}) ; 𝑢𝑖(∙) and 𝑢𝑗(∙) are strictly monotonic and continuous; 𝑣 ̃(·) ≥ 0 for any value of (𝑐𝑡
𝑖(𝑠𝑡) − 𝑒𝑡
𝑖(𝑠𝑡)) 
and 𝑣 ̃(·) is continuous.  
 
 If k1 >  k0, then,  ∑ [ 𝑠𝑡 |𝑐𝑡
∗𝑖(𝑠𝑡) − 𝑒𝑡
𝑖(𝑠𝑡)| 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑘1  ] ≤  ∑ [𝑠𝑡  | 𝑐𝑡
∗𝑖(𝑠𝑡) − 𝑒𝑡
𝑖(𝑠𝑡)| 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑘0] ],  
 where 𝑐𝑡
∗𝑖(𝑠𝑡) is a Pareto efficient allocation.  
     
(proof) Suppose not. Suppose that there is a Pareto efficient allocation E1 such that k1>k0 and 
∑ [ 𝑠𝑡 |𝑐𝑡
∗𝑖(𝑠𝑡) − 𝑒𝑡
𝑖(𝑠𝑡)| 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑘1  ] >  ∑ [𝑠𝑡  | 𝑐𝑡
∗𝑖(𝑠𝑡) − 𝑒𝑡
𝑖(𝑠𝑡)| 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑘0] ]. Since k is a real number, one 
can find k* such that k0<k*<k1. The inequality, k*<k1, means that consumer i gets less disutility from the 
term 𝑏𝑖 · ?̃? (𝑐𝑡
𝑖(𝑠𝑡) − 𝑒𝑡
𝑖(𝑠𝑡)) under k*. Hence, with k*<k1, we have some spare utility compared with the 
allocation E1. A social planner can construct an allocation that gives the same level of utility to consumer i 
as E1, by removing a small amount of consumption from the consumption level of E1 (  continuity of 
𝑢𝑖(⋅) and  ?̃?(∙)). Let’s denote the consumption level by ‘𝑐1
𝑖(𝑠𝑡) − 𝜀’. The planner can distribute 𝜀  to 
consumer j. Since 𝑢𝑗(∙) is strictly monotonic, if such redistribution is made, then consumer j becomes 
strictly better off, without making consumer i worse-off. Hence, the allocation E1 is Pareto dominated by 
the newly constructed allocation. Hence, the allocation E1 cannot be Pareto efficient. This leads to a 
contradiction. Thus, given k1>k0, the Pareto efficient allocation should satisfy ∑ [ 𝑠𝑡 |𝑐𝑡
∗𝑖(𝑠𝑡) −
𝑒𝑡
𝑖(𝑠𝑡)| 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑘1  ] ≤ ∑ [𝑠𝑡  | 𝑐𝑡
∗𝑖(𝑠𝑡) − 𝑒𝑡
𝑖(𝑠𝑡)| 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑘0] if it exists. Note that this result holds as long as 
𝑏𝑖 · 𝑣(∙̃ )>0. Since we already assumed 𝑏𝑖>0, as long as 𝑣 ̃(·) ≠0, (i.e., as long as the initial allocation of 
consumption is different from the initial endowment), this holds.  
 
    Proposition 3.2 states that the degree of narrow framing and loss aversion affects the Pareto efficient 
levels of insurance: A high degree of narrow framing and loss aversion (weakly) lowers the Pareto 
efficient level of insurance. 
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[Proposition 3.2] Consider the planner’s problem in (3.14). Further assume that bi∈ℝ+ and bj = 0; k ∈ 
(ℝ+ ∪ {0}); 𝜆𝑖 ∈ ℝ+; 𝑢𝑖(∙) and 𝑢𝑗(∙) are strictly monotonic and continuous; 𝑣 ̃(·) ≥ 0 for any value of 
(𝑐𝑡
𝑖(𝑠𝑡) − 𝑒𝑡
𝑖(𝑠𝑡)) and 𝑣 ̃(·) is continuous.  
 
If 𝑏1
𝑖  > 𝑏0
𝑖 , then ∑ [ 𝑠𝑡 |𝑐𝑡
∗𝑖(𝑠𝑡) − 𝑒𝑡
𝑖(𝑠𝑡)| 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑏1
𝑖   ] ≤   ∑ [𝑠𝑡  | 𝑐𝑡
∗𝑖(𝑠𝑡) − 𝑒𝑡
𝑖(𝑠𝑡)| 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑏0
𝑖 ] ], 
where 𝑐𝑡
∗𝑖(𝑠𝑡) is a Pareto efficient allocation.  
 
Similarly, if 𝜆1
𝑖  > 𝜆0
𝑖 , then ∑ [ 𝑠𝑡 |𝑐𝑡
∗𝑖(𝑠𝑡) − 𝑒𝑡
𝑖(𝑠𝑡)| 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝜆1
𝑖   ] ≤   ∑ [𝑠𝑡  | 𝑐𝑡
∗𝑖(𝑠𝑡) − 𝑒𝑡
𝑖(𝑠𝑡)| 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝜆0
𝑖 ] ], 
where 𝑐𝑡
∗𝑖(𝑠𝑡) is a Pareto efficient allocation. 
 
(Proof) This can be proved by applying the same method in Proposition 1. Using the spare utility coming 
from 𝑏1
𝑖  > 𝑏0
𝑖  or 𝜆1
𝑖  > 𝜆0
𝑖 , a social planner can redistribute a small amount of consumption (𝜀) to the other 
consumer. Then, the newly constructed allocation Pareto dominates the economy corresponding to E1. 
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3.4.4 Pinning down the scaling factor k  
   This section explores the admissible range of k. Although the conclusion remains tentative, this section 
provides evidence indicating that k is greater than zero but less than one. This implies that some, if not all, 
of decisions affected by narrow framing and loss aversion reflect authentic preferences.  
3.4.4.1 Do researchers have to remove behavioral tendency in welfare analysis? Debates 
surrounding quasi-hyperbolic discounting 
   The quasi-hyperbolic discounting model illustrates the issues in conducting welfare analysis when 
individuals are subject to behavioral biases (Laibson 1997, also called “present-biased” preference). 
Quasi-hyperbolic discounting means that, when facing inter-temporal choice problems, individuals tend 
to discount heavily the short-run but discount moderately the long-run. This discounting pattern is 
represented by two parameters, β and δ, where β, δ ∈ (0, 1] represent short-run and long-run discount 
factors. Specifically, discount rates for periods t, t+1 and t+2 are as follows: 1, βδ, β𝛿2. If the short-term 
discount factor is β=1, then this discounting pattern is the same as in standard exponential discounting. If 
β<1, then the discounting behavior is called “quasi-hyperbolic,” and this behavior causes a dynamic 
inconsistency problem. To overview the problem, we look at an example similar to that presented in 
Beshears et al. (2008, p 1,790). Suppose β is 0.5 and δ is 0.9. Assume that there is an investment offer 
whose cost is 4 and the return that is realized in the next period is 6. When assessed at t+1, the value of 
the investment is positive ( −βδ ∗ 4 + β𝛿2 ∗ 6 =0.63). When assessed at t, however, the value of the 
investment is negative (−1 ∗ 4 +  βδ ∗ 6 = −1.3). 
   Carroll et al. (2009) study socially optimal 401(k) enrollment regimes when workers suffer from 
present-biased preferences. When exploring socially optimal regimes, these authors take individuals’ 
utility without present bias as the normative welfare measure (p. 1,642; p. 1,660). Specifically, they 
calculate individuals’ welfare gain-loss holding β = 1, while they assume that workers’ actual choices are 
governed by the quasi-hyperbolic discounting of β < 1.  
 Bernheim, Fradkin, and Popov (2015) warn that Carroll et al.’s (2009, henceforth CCLMM) normative 
welfare measure is debatable. They point out that CCLMM presume that only the long-run discount 
factor (𝛿) is the true preference while the short-run discount factor (β) is a bias. They write that the 
opposite of CCLMM’s presumption could be true: 
 CCLMM adopt a single welfare perspective, the “long-run criterion.” That choice is 
controversial (see Bernheim 2009). Those who favor it argue that it reflects the decision-
maker’s true preference purged of “present bias.” Yet people may overintellectualize temporally 
distant choices and properly appreciate experiences only “in the moment.” (Bernheim, Fradkin, 
and Popov,  2015, p. 2,801, italics added) 
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Bernheim, Fradkin, and Popov (2015) further explain:  
Some studies advocate evaluating welfare based solely on forward-looking choices, on the 
grounds that people suffer from “present bias” and “self-control problems” when making 
decisions contemporaneously (see, e.g., O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999). However, this language 
may reflect normative preconceptions rather than objective inferences. If people fully 
appreciate experiences only in the moment and overintellectualize at arms length, the forward-
looking frame is the problematic one. Absent an objective basis for adjudicating between these 
perspectives, there is an argument for remaining agnostic and respecting both. 
 There is also a case for evaluating welfare based solely on sophisticated choices (those with   
K(f=0), on the grounds that naïve choices involve characterization failure.5 However, caution is 
warranted. Models are simply lenses through which we interpret and rationalize choice 
patterns, and a variety of models can usually account for the same patterns. If we treat our 
model of naïveté as an as-if representation that may happen to fit the choice data rather than as 
a literal depiction of cognitive processes, the argument for ignoring supposedly naïve choices is 
no longer compelling. One may then wish to remain agnostic and respect all perspectives, 
regardless of how our model labels them. (pp. 2,809-2,810) 
 
   Debates surrounding present-biased behavior suggest that careful approaches are needed in determining 
k. A special issue of the Journal of Public Economics (Volume 92, Issues 8–9, Pages 1773-1862, August 
2008), titled “Happiness and Public Economics,” addressed this topic. The special issue introduced two 
studies exploring how to identify true preferences from agents’ mistake-prone choices. The first study is 
by Beshears et al. (2008), who introduce six approaches that help discern true preferences from mistakes. 
The second study is by Kőszegi and Rabin (2008), which stresses that measuring “happiness” or 
“experienced utility” is needed to find an appropriate normative model (instead of entirely relying on 
revealed choices). We apply Beshears et al.’s (2008) approaches in 3.4.4.2 and then apply Kőszegi and 
Rabin’s (2008) approach in 3.4.4.3. Table 3.3 summarizes the results. 
  
                                                                
5 Bernheim, Fradkin, and Popov (2015) explain the characterization failure as follows:  
“Welfare-Relevant Choices.—In the BR framework, one starts by “pruning” the domain of the choice mapping, eliminating 
choices that are not deemed welfare-relevant. (The welfare criterion can then be applied to all choice situations, including ones 
that were pruned, and hence played no rule in the criterion’s construction.) To avoid paternalistic judgments, BR advocate 
limiting such pruning to choices that are demonstrable mistakes, in the sense that the decision-maker misunderstands the 
available options, an occurrence (Bernheim 2009, 2015) called “characterization failure.” To understand the logic of pruning, 
suppose someone must choose between   x   and   y  . In frame   A   , he correctly recognizes   x   and   y   , and chooses y  . In 
frame   B   , he mistakes   y   for   z   , and chooses   x  . Only the first of these choices is a suitable guide for a policymaker 
choosing between   x   and   y   on his behalf.” (pp. 2,806-2,807) 
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Table 3.3 Summary of Analysis of the appropriate level of k 
 Approaches Methods and Implications on k 
* k→0: NF and LA are mistakes (NF=narrow framing, LA=loss aversion) 
   k→1: NF and LA are true preferences 
 
 
Beshears 
et al. 
(2008) 
(1) structural 
estimation 
Method: Estimate all decision parameters and then remove normatively illegitimate 
parameters. 
Implication: This approach does not clarify per se which parameters are 
“normatively illegitimate.”  Kőszegi and Rabin (2008), Rabin and Weizsäcker 
(2009), and Kőszegi & Rabin (2009) show that narrow framing can be interpreted 
as both mistakes and true preferences. 
(2) active 
decisions 
Logic: True preferences are revealed when individuals make active decisions under 
“default-free mechanisms.” 
Implication: k→0. The NF and LA’s effect on “authentic” preferences can be 
smaller than their effects on “choices” because the default option means ‘not taking 
out an insurance plan’ to most people, especially in the case of unpopular insurance. 
(3) asymptotic 
choice 
Logic: Long-run choices or experienced individuals’ choices reveal true 
preferences (i.e. learning mechanisms).  
Implication: The elderly and even professional traders have NF and LA. (k→1) 
The take-up rate of disaster insurance increases right after the disaster occurred 
(k→0), but the rate goes back to normal after several years (k→1). 
(4) aggregated 
revealed 
preferences 
Logic: Individual behavior = optimal behavior ± noises, Since noises cancel each 
other, aggregate behavior converges to optimal behavior. 
Implication: k→1. Rabin and Weizsäcker (2009) report that about 89 percent of 
decisions are made with NF in a representative sample of U.S. individuals. 
(5) Self-
reported 
preferences 
Logic: Self-report = true preferences. For example approximately 70 percent of 
smokers in the U.S. express that they want to quit Smokers’ true preferences are 
not smoking 
Implication: Depending on frames, individuals choose difference options in the 
lottery choice experimenthard to identify which choice reflects true preferences. 
(6) informed 
preferences 
Logic: Choices guided by expert advice or formal education/training reveal true 
preferences. 
Implication: Related literature reports that while education does not significantly 
reduce NF and LA (k→1), cognitive ability may affect loss-aversion (k→0). 
Loss-aversion’s effect on insurance take-up is canceled out by the effect of financial 
advice (Hwang, 2016) (k→0) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kőszegi and Rabin 
(2008)’s approach stresses 
the need of a happiness 
measure 
Method: Researchers need to measure “happiness” or “experienced utility” to 
distinguish mistakes from true preferences. The choices that enhance ex-post 
happiness are true preferences. 
Implication: Regression results in Table 3.4 show that loss-averse individuals 
report that their families and themselves are worse off after U.S. healthcare reform, 
which mandates the purchase of health insurance. The negative association between 
loss aversion and subjective wellbeing under healthcare reform is found significant 
even among those who have benefited from health insurance and those who have 
basic knowledge of health insurance. (k→1) 
   Hwang (2016) shows that loss-aversion is negatively associated with willingness 
to pay (WTP) for health insurance.  This provides one rationale why loss-aversion 
may consistently affect the assessment of insurance. (k→1) 
  Guiso (2015) reports that regret aversion is positively associated with NF and LA. 
The literature on regret aversion also claims that decision utility that considers 
regret is “rational” because regret affects actual sensations or happiness in the 
future (Loomes and Sugden, 1982) (k→1). In contrast, Guiso’s (2015) report that 
those who rely on intuition are more likely to exhibit narrow framing suggests that 
some part of narrow framing is mistakes (k→0). 
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3.4.4.2 Estimating k based on Beshears et al.’s (2008) Six Approaches 
   Beshears et al. (2008) have discussed six approaches for identifying normative preferences from 
consumers’ mistake-prone choice behaviors. These are (1) structural estimation, (2) active decisions, (3) 
asymptotic choice, (4) aggregated revealed preferences, (5) reported preferences, and (6) informed 
preferences (p. 1,787). In this section we will apply these six approaches to the case of narrow framing 
and loss aversion and discuss each criterion’s implication.  
(1) Structural estimation 
   This approach identifies normative preferences by first estimating all decision parameters that explain 
behaviors and then removing the parameters that are normatively illegitimate.  Beshears et al. (2008) 
explained that CCLMM took this approach. CCLMM assumed that choices were governed by present-
bias (β < 1), but they removed the present bias (i.e., they applied β = 1) when conducting welfare 
analysis. 
   Although this structural estimation approach looks clear, this approach per se does not clarify which 
parameters are “normatively illegitimate.” For example, as noted in the previous section, Bernheim, 
Fradkin, and Popov (2015) point out that even the “present-biased” preferences can be a reflection of 
authentic preferences. Similarly, in the case of narrow framing and loss aversion, the structural estimation 
method does not provide clear-cut guidelines for whether the behavioral tendencies are “mistakes” or 
“true preferences.” Kőszegi and Rabin (2008) give an account of why narrow framing and loss aversion 
can be interpreted in both ways. They explain as follows: 
 [After presenting an example of narrow framing] “Framing and focusing effects can be 
interpreted in two ways. Under one interpretation, the frame or focus of an individual affects 
her preferences, and these preferences are translated into frame-sensitive choices. In the 
alternative view, preferences do not depend on the momentary frame or focus, but some 
decision situations lead people to make mistakes in implementing their stable preferences. 
Yet it may be difﬁcult to tell which of these interpretations is right. In order to tell whether a 
choice in a particular frame is a mistake, we would have to induce the person to make other 
choices. But the decision frame that induces changed behavior may be changing preferences 
rather than inducing or stopping mistakes. So, for instance, if making salient some particular 
costs associated with an outcome always makes a person avoid that outcome, it may be hard to 
separate out whether this is because the negative frame makes that outcome a worse experience 
— or just mistakenly seem that way to the decision maker. (Kőszegi & Rabin 2008, p. 1,829) 
 
   In subsequent studies, Rabin et al. show theoretical grounds for why narrow framing and loss aversion 
can be interpreted as both “mistakes” and “true preference.” Rabin and Weizsäcker (2009) show that 
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narrow framing leads to “mistakes” in choices. Specifically, they show that narrowly framed decisions 
make individuals choose first-order stochastically dominated lotteries, which the individuals would never 
choose if broadly framed.6 Ironically, in another paper published in the same year, Kőszegi and Rabin 
(2009) provide a theoretical foundation for why narrow framing may in fact not be an error. Kőszegi and 
Rabin (2009) summarize their findings as follows: “This insight also provides a new perspective on 
discussions of narrow bracketing in the literature: while treating a risk to wealth in isolation from future 
decisions and risks is typically considered a mistake, our model says that in some situations it is instead a 
manifestation of a preference over changes in beliefs” (p. 910). Regarding the situations in which narrow 
framing reflects true preferences, Kőszegi & Rabin (2009) point out that the timing of the realization of 
the two lotteries is key. They point out that narrow framing on the lotteries that are realized at different 
times may not be a mistake. If we apply Kőszegi and Rabin’s argument to insurance take-up, therefore, 
narrowly framed decisions in insurance take-up may not necessarily be a mistake. The two lotteries 
associated with insurance take-up are an insurance policy and bad events associated with the insurance 
contract. While the insured can observe the realization of one lottery (an insurance policy), by the end of 
the insurance term (and partly but regularly when paying premiums), the insured cannot observe the 
realization of another lottery (background risk associated with insurance) if the bad event occurs after the 
insurance term. This mismatch may rationalize narrow framing and loss aversion in insurance take-up. 
Specifically, Kőszegi & Rabin explain: “Whatever the background risk, losing $10 conveys the bad news 
that one will have less to consume in one’s lifetime, and in our theory this fully and rationally generates a 
sense of loss” (p. 922). 
(2) Active decisions: k→0  
According to this approach, true preferences are revealed when individuals make active decisions under 
default-free mechanisms rather than when they are exposed to a particular default option.  
This approach tells us that narrow framing’s and loss aversion’s effects on “authentic” preferences can 
be smaller than their effects on “choices” as identified in Gottlieb and Mitchell (2015) and Hwang (2016) 
because the default option, or status-quo, means not taking out an insurance plan for most people, 
especially in the case of unpopular insurance such as long-term care insurance. In other words, when a 
person is asked to make an insurance purchasing decision under default-free or status-quo-free situations, 
(i.e. when both buying and not buying decisions require the same amount of efforts), then the person’s 
                                                                
6 However, attention is needed in applying this experimental result directly to insurance buying decisions. This is because, 
although a majority of people choose the right answers when lottery options are presented within a broad frame in the 
experiments by Rabin and Weizsäcker (2009), it is not certain that, in a real-world, the right choice (=purchasing insurance) will 
be made if insurance products are presented within a broad frame. Note that virtually all insurance sellers present or advertise 
their insurance products already within a broad frame.  
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decision can be less affected by loss aversion. The exact k that this active decision approach suggests will 
depend on the degree to which loss aversion reflects the person’s disutility when the outcome is worse 
than the status quo. 
(3) Asymptotic choice  
 This approach assumes that long-run choices or experienced individuals’ choices are more likely to 
reveal true preferences. Beshears et al. (2008) note the role of “learning” mechanisms through personal or 
peer experiences. The authors explain the learning effect using an example from credit card users: the fact 
that new credit card holders typically pay significantly higher fees than existing users should be 
interpreted as evidence that new account holders have not optimized their choices yet rather than 
interpreted as evidence that new account holders have a higher willingness to pay fees (p. 1,791). 
The fact that the elderly (those who are more likely to have experienced the realization of background 
risks) and even professional traders are subject to narrow framing and loss aversion suggests that these 
behavioral biases could be a part of authentic preferences. Hwang (2015) reports that older individuals 
exhibit a high degree of loss aversion, and this difference in loss aversion explains a substantial part of 
life insurance holdings among the U.S. elderly. Haigh and List (2005) show that even professional traders 
are subject to myopic loss aversion. (k→1) 
In terms of learning effects, disaster insurance provides an interesting example. The fact that the take-up 
rate of disaster insurance increases right after the disaster occurred, but that the rate goes back to normal 
after several years (for recent evidence, see Atreya, Ferreira, & Michel-Kerjan, 2015), provides mixed 
evidence on true asymptotic choices: it is not clear whether the true preference is the insurance demand 
right after a disaster (k→0) or demand in normal times (k→1). 
 (4) Aggregated revealed preference: (k→1) 
   This approach views individual behavior as a combination of optimal behavior and some noise. Since 
noises tend to cancel one another out, the aggregate behavior may reveal the optimal behavior adequate 
for a normative analysis. 
   If applied to narrow framing and loss aversion, this approach tells us that these behavioral biases may 
be part of true preferences. The fact that narrow framing and loss aversion are prevalent in virtually all 
individuals supports this: Rabin and Weizsäcker (2009) conclude that “about 89 percent of decisions are 
made with narrow brackets,” based on a survey of a nationally representative sample of U.S. individuals 
(p. 1,511). Similarly, Hwang (2016) reports that at least 60.1 percent of U.S. adults show evidence of 
narrow framing using the American Life Panel data, a representative sample of U.S. individuals aged 18 
96 
 
and older.  
(5) Self Reported Preference 
     Beshears et al. (2008) claim that self-reports provide valuable information regarding true preferences.  
The authors argue that decision-makers know what they should choose although they often fail to do so 
(p. 1,792). The authors point out the example of smokers: approximately 70 percent of smokers in the 
U.S. express that they want to quit. This indicates that smokers’ true preference is not smoking. 
  Rabin and Weizsäcker’s (2009) report that the fact that most people choose a first-order stochastically 
dominant lottery when lotteries are presented within a broad frame (although they choose first order 
dominated lotteries when lotteries are presented separately) suggests that true preferences may be choices 
under a broad frame. However, most people reply that they want to turn down an actuarially favorable 
gamble when asked small amount gamble questions. This rejection is evidence of narrow framing as well 
as loss-aversion (Rabin, 2000). Ironically, then, the self-report approach also indicates that loss aversion 
and narrow framing can be true preferences. In other words, just as we believe that the responses on the 
lifetime income gamble questions reveal true risk attitude under a broad frame, responses on small 
gambles may reveal true risk attitudes under a narrow frame. 
(6) Informed preference   
     This approach understands that informed decisions are more likely to reveal true preferences.  
Beshears et al. (2008) note that information may come from two sources: expert advice or formal 
education/training. Ketcham, Kuminoff, and Powers (2015) follow this approach: they label a choice as 
welfare-irrelevant if the choice is made by a decision maker who misunderstands the important features of 
insurance.  
   Related literature reports that while education does not significantly reduce narrow framing and loss 
aversion (k→1), high cognitive ability may lower loss-aversion (k→0). Rabin and Weizsäcker (2009) 
report that there is no statistically significant difference in narrow framing and loss aversion between 
more educated and less educated groups and more math-skilled and less math-skilled groups in the 
representative sample of the general U.S. population. Hwang (2016) also reports that there is no 
statistically significant difference in loss-aversion between more and less educated groups. In contrast, the 
literature on cognitive ability reports that those with high cognitive ability (as measured by IQ, CRT, or a 
standardized math score) are more likely to make decisions based on the expected values of risky 
opportunities (Benjamin, Brown, & Shapiro (2013), among others). Although this literature did not use 
the loss-aversion measure as in Kahneman and Tversky (1979; 1992), Rabin and Weizsäcker (2009), and 
Hwang (2016), the results of the literature indicate the possibility that those who process information 
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efficiently and correctly may be less likely to be subject to loss-aversion. 
   Additionally, loss-aversion’s effect on insurance take-up is canceled out by the effect of financial 
advice (Hwang, 2016). The fact that expertly-advised choices are less likely to be affected by narrow 
framing and loss aversion suggests that narrowly framed insurance buying decisions may not be true 
preferences. (k→0) 
3.4.4.3 Subjective Wellbeing and Loss Aversion 
   In contrast to the previous approaches of Beshears et al. (2008), which take choices or decision utility as 
a starting point, another viewpoint within the literature stresses “happiness” or “experienced utility” to 
identify true preferences from mistakes. Kőszegi and Rabin (2008) argue that happiness measures can 
significantly help identify true preferences. Kahneman and Sugden (2005) explain three possible methods 
for measuring experienced happiness: (1) measuring anticipated utility (ex-ante forecasts on future 
happiness), (2) measuring overall life-satisfaction for the past, and (3) moment-by-moment or episodes-
based reconstruction of happiness. Of these three methods, they claim that episodes-based reconstruction 
of happiness (in which respondents are asked about their previous day and rate happiness during the day 
by episode) can be an effective way of measuring happiness.  
   Motivated by these two studies (Kahneman and Sugden (2005) and Kőszegi & Rabin (2008)), this 
section explores how loss aversion is associated with ex-post happiness. Specifically, we empirically 
investigate the association between loss-aversion and subjective wellbeing after U.S. health care reform, 
which mandates the purchase of health insurance (effective date, January 2014). The assumption of the 
empirical analysis is as follows: if loss aversion is not a welfare-relevant preference, experienced 
wellbeing should not be affected by loss aversion. If loss aversion and experienced wellbeing are 
associated in some way, this may be because loss-aversion indeed affects experienced happiness. When 
dealing with subjective happiness, Kahneman and Sugden (2005) stress that it is important to measure 
experienced or ex-post wellbeing rather than ex-ante forecasts because ex-ante forecasts can be 
contaminated by behavioral biases. Hence, we use subjective wellbeing after U.S. health care reform from 
2015 March-May, one year after the reform took effect. 
   We use the RAND American Life Panel (ALP) survey, a nationally representative panel of about 5,000 
active panel members aged 18 and older who were regularly interviewed over the internet for research 
purposes.  The dependent variable in Table 3.4 is a self-report on family welfare loss after U.S. health 
care reform. It is based on the question, “Do you think you and your family are [better off/worse off//] or 
[better/worse off] under the health reform law, or do you think it didn’t make much difference?”  “1 
Better off; 2 Worse off; 3 Not much difference” (fielded in March-May 2015, N=2,997). The dependent 
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variable, Family_WorseOff_by_ACA, has a value of 2 if the response is “Worse off,” 1 if the response is “Not 
much difference,” and 0 if the response is “Better off.” Loss aversion is measured by respondents’ attitude 
(Accept/Reject) toward small gambles, which may result in losses. A related ALP question is: “In what 
follows we will ask you to make choices of whether to play or not a risky game. (Yes / No) If you play the 
game, you receive one amount if a tossed coin comes up heads and a different amount if it comes up tails. 
If you do not play the game, you do not win nor lose any money. For example, let’s look at choice (1). If 
you play the game, you lose $2 if the coin comes up heads and you win $6 if it comes up tails.” “(1) lose 
$2 win $6; (2) lose $3 win $6; (3) lose $4 win $6; (4) lose $5 win $6; (5) lose $6 win $6; (6) lose $7 win 
$6” (fielded in December 2012-March 2013, N=1,039). For details of this loss aversion measure, see 
Hwang (2016) and Carvalho, Meier, and Wang (forthcoming). The number of samples in which both 
Family_WorseOff_by_ACA and LossAversion were available was 436. 
   Ordered Logit regression results in Table 3.4 show that loss-averse individuals are more likely to report 
that their families and themselves are worse off after health care reform, which mandates the purchase of 
health insurance (Column (1)). Column (2) of the table shows that a similar result holds even if we 
control for the political orientation of respondents (Democrat or Republican), current ownership of health 
insurance (own or not), and other demographic variables. In columns (3)-(5), we consider whether the 
negative assessment of wellbeing is due to the limited experience related to health insurance. For 
example, those who rarely use health insurance may have a negative view on the policy mandating the 
purchase of health insurance. The result in column (3) shows that whether the respondent owes medical 
bills or not (i_OweMedicalBill) does not affect the assessment. In column (4), we control for the number of 
hospital visits for the past four months. In column (5), we restrict the sample to those who visited 
hospitals at least once for the past four months. The results of column (4) and (5) show that even those 
who benefited from health insurance still have a negative assessment.  In column (6), we consider the 
possibility that the negative assessment of wellbeing after healthcare reform is due to limited knowledge 
of insurance. The result in column (6) shows that loss aversion is still significantly negatively associated 
with the assessment even when we restrict the sample to those who know the meaning of deductibles 
(approximately 64.64 percent of respondents were correctly aware of the meaning). Overall, the results in 
Table 3.4 provide suggestive evidence that loss aversion may be a part of welfare-relevant preferences. 
The limitations of the empirical study in Table 3.4 are as follows. First, although the most important 
feature of U.S. health care reform is mandating the purchase of health insurance, other features of the 
reform may have affected respondents’ assessment of the wellbeing. Second, although wellbeing is 
measured after the reform, evaluating wellbeing only one year later may not be enough. Further follow-up 
studies may help confirm a long-term assessment of wellbeing under the reform. Third, measuring true 
preferences based on happiness or experienced utility has several drawbacks. For example, experienced 
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utility is easily confounded by hedonic adaptation, as Loewenstein and Ubel (2008) have pointed out. 
Table 3.4 Subjective Well-being One Year after the ACA and Loss Aversion- Ordered Logit Regression 
Results 
 
  Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All data is from the American Life Panel and fielded in March-May 2015 except 
for the loss aversion measure, which was filed in March-May 2015. The dependent variable, Family_WorseOff_by_ACA, is based on 
the question, “Do you think you and your family are [better off/worse off//] or [better/worse off] under the health reform law, or 
do you think it didn’t make much difference?”  “1 Better off; 2 Worse off; 3 Not much difference.” It takes a value of 2 if the 
response is “Worse off”, 1 if the response is “Not  much difference”, 0 if the response is “Better off.”  LossAversion takes the 
values of 0.86, 1.0, 1.2, 1.5, 2.0, 3.0, or 4.0.  It is based on a set of six risky game questions (See Hwang (2016) for details). “i_” 
means that the variable is an indicator variable. i_Republican (i_Democrat) is an indicator variable for Republican (Democrat). 
i_Own_Heanth_Insu is an indicator variable for whether or not a respondent owns any public or private health insurance. 
DoctorVisits is the number of hospital visits for the last four months. It is based on the question, “Between November 1st 2014 and 
February 28th, 2015, how many times have you seen a doctor or other health care professional about your own health at a 
doctor's office, a clinic, or some other place? Do not include times you were hospitalized overnight, visits to hospital emergency 
rooms, home visits, dental visits, or telephone calls.” [0=None; 1= one time; 2=2-3 times; 3=4-5 times; 4= 6-7times, 5= 8-9 
times; 6=10-12 times; 7= 13-15 times]. i_OweMedicalBill is an indicator variable for owing any medical bill. It is based on the 
question, “Do you currently owe anything in medical bills? [Yes/No].” Whether or not a respondent knows the meaning of 
deductibles is based on the question, “Which of the following best describes a deductible? 1 A small amount that patients must 
pay each time they visit a doctor; 2 The amount patients must pay during a year before their insurance will pay for care; 3 The 
price policy holders must pay for insurance; 4 Do not know.” 
  
   Hwang’s (2016) study provides one rationale for why loss-aversion may consistently affect the 
assessment of insurance. Hwang shows that loss-aversion is negatively associated with willingness to pay 
(WTP) for health insurance.  If loss-aversion is a stable part of the preference that determines the 
DoctorVisits≥1
 only
Those who know 
the meaning of 
deductibles
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LossAversion 0.175* 0.211** 0.204* 0.210** 0.262* 0.485***
(0.0930) (0.106) (0.123) (0.106) (0.134) (0.158)
DoctorVisits -0.0285
(0.0787)
i_OweMedicalBill x LossAversion 0.0269
(0.239)
i_OweMedicalBill -0.0947
(0.517)
i_Republican 1.228*** 1.230*** 1.231*** 1.492*** 2.001***
(0.315) (0.316) (0.316) (0.394) (0.440)
i_Democrat -0.742*** -0.739*** -0.734*** -0.739** -0.886**
(0.259) (0.259) (0.257) (0.306) (0.373)
Age -0.00902 -0.00909 -0.00877 -0.0192 -0.00345
(0.00845) (0.00847) (0.00845) (0.0120) (0.0125)
Income (1-14) 0.0664* 0.0667* 0.0650 0.0644 0.0564
(0.0389) (0.0391) (0.0395) (0.0495) (0.0552)
Education (1-15) -0.121** -0.121** -0.120** -0.0922 -0.172**
(0.0543) (0.0542) (0.0543) (0.0659) (0.0846)
i_Female -0.0490 -0.0433 -0.0498 -0.0120 0.134
(0.243) (0.244) (0.244) (0.302) (0.345)
i_Own_Health_Insu -0.178 -0.180 -0.154 -0.546 0.303
(0.344) (0.346) (0.347) (0.519) (0.560)
i_HispanicLatino -0.101 -0.0974 -0.109 0.340 1.130**
(0.314) (0.315) (0.314) (0.437) (0.499)
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 436 391 391 391 265 220
Dependent Variable: Family_WorseOff_by_ACA (0-1-2)
Regressions using  all available samples
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valuation of insurance products, then it is not surprising that we observe the negative relationship between 
loss aversion and the assessment of wellbeing under the health insurance reform.    
Given this, exactly how (through which type of sensation) does loss-aversion affect wellbeing or 
happiness? Guiso’s (2015) study on the origin of narrow framing provides important information on this 
point. Guiso finds that individuals who are regret-averse 7 8 (i.e. self-report measures of regret for losses 
or forgone gains) and who rely on intuition in decision-making exhibit narrow framing. The fact that 
those who rely on intuition are more likely to exhibit narrow framing suggests that some part of narrow 
framing is mistaken. In contrast, the positive association between regret aversion and narrow framing 
found in Guiso’s study suggests that loss-aversion affect individuals’ happiness or experienced utility 
through the sensation of “regret.” Specifically, the literature on regret aversion points out that regret 
theory is closely associated with prospect theory’s loss aversion (Bell, 1982; Loomes and Sugden, 1982). 
The literature on regret aversion also claims that the decision utility that considers regret is “rational” 
because regret affects actual sensations or happiness in the future (Loomes and Sugden, 1982). In a 
similar vein, Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) note that narrowly framed gain-loss utility can be related 
to a sense of regret. They write:  
   The utility that comes from  fluctuations in financial wealth can be interpreted in a number of 
different ways. We prefer to think of it as capturing feelings unrelated to consumption. After a 
big loss in the stock market, an investor may experience a sense of regret over his decision to 
invest in stocks; he may interpret his loss as a sign that he is a second-rate investor, thus dealing 
his ego a painful blow; and he may feel humiliation in front of friends and family when word 
leaks out. … 
   While our preferences are nonstandard, this does not mean that they are irrational in any 
sense: it is not irrational for people to get utility from sources other than consumption, nor is it 
irrational for them to anticipate these feelings when making decisions (Barberis, Huang, and 
Santos, 2001, pp 6-7, italics added). 
 
  
                                                                
7 Guiso (2015) measures attitudes toward regret using the following question. “Could you please tell me how you would react 
if you found yourself in the following situation? Two years ago a friend who is knowledgeable about ﬁnance recommended that 
you undertake an investment, which, on the basis of the information available to him then, had good chances of success. 
(A) You chose not to make the investment. Meanwhile, the value of the investment has more than doubled and had you made 
it you could have made a big gain. In such circumstances, today you would:   
 Deeply regret for not having made the investment / Regret but not be too upset / Feel no regret. 
(B) Now think of another situation. You invested a signiﬁcant amount in the investment that was recommended. Meanwhile 
market conditions have deteriorated and your investment has lost half of its value. In such a circumstances, today you would: 
 Deeply regret for not having made the investment / Regret but not be too upset / Feel no regret.” 
8 Guiso (2015) explains the relationship between regret aversion and narrow framing in the following way: “Since regret 
comes from comparing the consequences of a speciﬁc action with those of a veriﬁable alternative it leads people to focus on the 
outcomes of the action itself and ignore their contribution to overall wealth. Hence, regret-prone individuals should be more 
likely to frame the small lottery narrowly and turn it down” (p. 63). 
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3.4.4.4 Example: How to use the estimated k? (assuming that we know true k) 
   If k is narrowed down (i.e. true preferences are identified), the next steps for finding the socially 
desirable levels of insurance are straightforward. To illustrate this, we explore an example economy 
where there are two types of consumers: broad framers (number of consumers: N1) and narrow framers 
(N2+N3 consumers). Consumers are classified as broad framers if their biz is zero and narrow framers if 
biz is positive. It would be reasonable to assume that some narrow framers may update their reference 
points while other narrow framers do not. As a result, there are two types of narrow framers in the 
economy: narrow framers with an updated ‘positive reference point level of insurance coverage’ (N2 
consumers) and those who have a reference point of ‘no insurance coverage’ (N3 consumers). 
 Suppose a government plans to set up a mandatory insurance program that has fixed coverage. We will 
use the examples in Section 3.3.2.4, CASE 1 and CASE 2 of Table 3.1 in particular. (To summarize, 
consumers’ endowments can be either 1 or 5 with 50-50 chances; consumers have a natural log 
consumption utility function; broad framers have the b·λ of zero, narrow framers have the b·λ of 0.2). We 
will assume that narrow framers’ authentic preferences are identified by k of 0.3. For simplicity we further 
assume that narrow framers who update their reference point adopt the government-mandated level of 
insurance as their reference level. Then, technically, these individuals’ utilities are not affected by loss-
aversion because the reference point is the same as the government-mandated insurance level. 
   What would be the appropriate insurance level for this economy if N1=3, N2=2, and N3=5, assuming 
that the cross-section of the economy does not change? The last column in Table 3.5 shows aggregate 
consumer utility under a purely utilitarian social welfare function. The column shows that the partial 
insurance level with benefits of 3 units of consumption is optimal for the society. This optimal level is 
lower than the full insurance level, which is optimal only to broad framers, and is higher than the partial 
insurance level with benefits of 2, which is optimal only to narrow framers.  
Table 3.5 Optimal level of insurance for an example economy 
 
Aggregate Consumers' Utilty 
under purely Utilitarian 
social welfare function 
c(s1) c(s2) Utility (A) c(s1) c(s2) Utility (B) ( N1+N2)*A + N3*B
Initial Status (no insuance) 1.0 5.0 0.8047 1.0 5.0 0.8047 8.0472
partial insurance (Benefit=1) 1.5 4.5 0.9548 1.5 4.5 0.9398 9.4727
partial insurance (Benefit=2) 2.0 4.0 1.0397 2.0 4.0 0.9797 10.0972
partial insurance (Benefit=3) 2.5 3.5 1.0845 2.5 3.5 0.9495 10.1703
Full insurance (Benefit=4) 3.0 3.0 1.0986 3.0 3.0 0.8586 9.7861
   Notes:  N1=3, N2=3, and N3=5 are assumed
Broad framers [N1];
Narrow framers with 
an updated reference point 
[N2]
Narrow framners
with a reference point of zero 
insurance coverage
 b·λ =0.2, k=0.3 [N3]
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3.5 Application Example: Behavioral Welfare Analysis of The US Health Insurance Market 
This section discusses welfare implications of behavioral biases using a realistic example. We calibrate 
the behavioral insurance demand model. We will estimate the degree of narrow framing and loss aversion 
using the data of US individuals who do not hold health insurance. We will find the combination of 
narrow framing and loss aversion that is large enough to explain the behavior of those who do not buy 
any health insurance even if they are risk-averse with respect to lifetime consumption (i.e., even if their 
rational term of utility function is concave). Then, we will discuss the socially optimal level of health 
insurance under such degrees of narrow framing and loss aversion. We will see how narrow framers will 
respond to the recent US health care reform, which mandates the purchase of health insurance. Lastly, this 
section highlights that “changing individuals’ perceptions of insurance” is key to removing welfare losses 
caused by behavioral tendencies, by quantifying possible welfare losses when individuals have narrow 
framing and loss aversion. 
Although this section uses the US data, it is not the purpose of this section to quantify the precise 
amount of welfare losses or benefits of the Affordable Care Act. We will simplify the economy as much 
as possible. We will use a partial equilibrium model that only focuses on the consumer side. Using this 
simple set-up, this paper will exemplify how welfare analysis can be conducted when behavioral biases 
are introduced. Hence, the numbers and results in this section should NOT be interpreted as estimates of 
real-world welfare gain/loss of the US health care reform. 
 
3.5.1 Calibration Exercise: Health Insurance Take-up, Narrow Framing, & Loss Aversion 
To calibrate the insurance demand model in (3.3), we need to specify the degree of narrow framing and 
loss aversion. In the case of loss aversion, Kahneman and Tversky (1992) estimated that the median of 
loss aversion is about two. Hwang (2016) reports that US individuals’ loss aversion ranges from 0.87 to 
4.0 with a median value of two, using the ALP data, which was fielded by Carvalho, Meier, and Wang 
(forthcoming). Hence it is reasonable to assume that the baseline loss aversion is two. However, there has 
been no research that attempts to measure the degree of narrow framing. This paper estimates the degree 
of narrow framing using individuals’ behaviors. This paper notes that about 15 percent of US individuals 
do not own any public or private health insurance. We will find the lower bound of the degree of narrow 
framing (b), by looking at what size of b can justify the 15 percent of individuals who did not buy health 
insurance.  
   This section uses a representative agent model. Related parameter values are summarized in Table 3.6. 
The assumptions on a representative agent who does not hold any private or public health insurance plan 
is as follows: the representative agent is 42-year-old US citizen, earns $27,500 a year, has $6,000 of asset, 
and lives alone. This illustration is based on the demographic characteristics of the uninsured US citizens 
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in the ALP data set. Of the 3,457 individuals who completed the ALP survey regarding health insurance 
ownership, which was fielded in 2013, 501 individuals (14.49%) responded that they did not own any 
private or public health insurance. Demographic features of the uninsured (N=501) are as follows: median 
family income is $27,500; median age is 42. Median number of family members is one. Median of asset 
is $6,000. 
Table 3.6 Description of a representative agent and parameters of the model (3.3) 
 
Notes: Health Expenditures are based on the Hansen, Hsu, and Lee (2014), which is in turn based on the 2007 Medical 
Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS). The descriptions (coverage, deductibles, annual o-o-p maximum) of the health insurance plan 
are based on the typical Silver Plan of the Obamacare. It is assumed that these features of the health insurance plan would have 
been available at a market price (9.2 percent expensive than the fair premium) before Obamacare. 
 
   Regarding the health expenditure risk, this paper follows Hansen, Hsu, and Lee (2014), which is in turn 
based on the 2007 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS). The assumption on the risk that the 
representative agent faces is as follows: if he/she is “healthy,” then the medical expenditure is $1,294 a 
year. The likelihood of this status is 60 percent. If he/she is “unhealthy,” then the medical expenditure is 
$8,933 a year. The likelihood of this status is 35 percent. If he/she is “very unhealthy,” then the medical 
expenditure is $48,292 a year. The likelihood of this status is 5 percent. Note that these assumptions 
capture the long-tail in the distribution of health expenditures. We assume that the 42-year-old 
representative agent enters one state out of three possible health states at the age of 43 and remains at the 
same health status until the age of 64. If the annual medical expenditures exceed annual income plus 
asset, it is assumed that annual consumption level becomes $1 (not the negative consumption level). 
42-year-old US citizen (unisex) who does not own any private or public health insurance
Yearly income (consumption) $27,500
Asset $6,000
Coef. of RRA (γ) 3.0
Discount rate (δ) 0.97
Loss aversion (λ) 2.0
Coef. of diminishing sensitivity α 0.88
Coef. of diminishing sensitivity β 0.88
Health Expenditures
Health state (age 43-64) Healthy Unhealthy Very Unhealthy
Subjective & objective probability 0.60 0.35 0.05
Annual expenditures $1,294 $8,933 $48,292
Available health insurance plan
coverage 70% of medical expenditures
annual deductibles $3,177
annual out-of-pocket maximum $6,110
premium mark-up 1.092
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When he/she becomes 65, all uncertainties surrounding medical expenditures are removed as he/she is 
eligible for the public health insurance program. 
   Parameter values of the model (3.3) are specified as follows. A coefficient of relative risk aversion (γ) is 
assumed to be three. The discount rate (δ) is set to 0.97. Loss aversion (λ) is assumed to be two. 
Parameters for diminishing sensitivity (α, β) are assumed to be 0.88 following the study by Kahneman 
and Tversky (1992).  
   Given these parameters and descriptions, we will search for the magnitude of narrow framing (b) that 
makes the representative agent reject a reasonably priced private health insurance plan. 
   We assume that only one private insurance plan is available. The private health insurance plan covers 
70% of medical expenditures, with annual deductibles of $3,177 and an annual out-of-pocket-maximum 
of $6,110. The premium mark-up of the plan is assumed to be 1.092, following Hansen, Hsu, and Lee 
(2014). To simplify the choice problem, we further assume that a consumer either accepts or rejects the 
health insurance offer (partial insurance is not available). The descriptions (coverage, deductibles, annual 
o-o-p maximum) of the health insurance plan are based on the typical Silver Plan of the Obamacare. We 
assume that these features of the health insurance plan would have been available at a market price before 
Obamacare. 
 
3.5.1.1 When does the representative agent not buy insurance?  
   Under the above scenario, the representative agent is predicted to not buy the private health insurance 
plan if the degree of narrow framing is greater than 1.351*10-5. Note that this is a lower bound of narrow 
framing making the representative agent reject the health insurance plan. The estimated level of narrow 
framing (making people reject the health insurance offer) critically depends on the degree of loss aversion 
and CRRA (we assumed loss aversion of 2.0 and CRRA of 3.0). 
 
3.5.1.2 What is the optimal level of health insurance? 
   As we discussed in section 3.3 and 3.4, the socially optimal level of insurance depends on the level of k 
(the degree that a social planner respects the behavioral tendencies or the relative duration during which 
the behavioral component affects individuals’ happiness). 
   If a social planner fully respects the behavioral term (k=1), then not providing health insurance could be 
Pareto efficient. For example, if a consumer has a narrow framing of 1.351*10-5 and loss aversion of 
three, then he becomes worse off if he purchases the health insurance plan described above. Thus, forcing 
the narrow framer to purchase the health insurance plan at a market price reduces the narrow framer’s 
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utility.  To understand this more precisely,  one can imagine an economy composed of two consumers 
who are facing the health expenditure risk described above: (1) a fully rational risk-averse consumer 
(b=0), (2) a boundedly rational consumer with narrow framing (b) of 1.351*10-5 and loss aversion of 
three. One can conclude that both agents’ purchase of insurance is not Pareto efficient. This is because 
one can find a Pareto dominant allocation that is off the certainty line that makes the risk-averse consumer 
indifferent but makes the narrow framer strictly better off by remaining uninsured. (See Figure 3.3) 
   If a social planner does not fully respect the behavioral term (k<1), then both agents’ purchase of health 
insurance could be optimal. The exact optimal allocation of state-contingent commodities depends on the 
magnitude of k, narrow framing (b), loss aversion (λ), and the shape of the CRRA utility function. 
 
3.5.1.3 Will a boundedly rational consumer purchase health insurance under the Affordable Care 
Act? 
   If we assume that other parameters are fixed at the level in Table 3.6, whether or not a narrow framer 
will purchase a subsidized Obamacare plan depends on the magnitude of narrow framing. For example, if 
the degree of narrow framing is 1.351*10-5 and loss aversion is two, then the representative agent is 
indifferent to buying the market-price health insurance plan. Hence, if the insurance is provided at a 
subsidized price, then the consumer will accept the subsidized insurance plan. (Also note that the 
Affordable Care Act is imposing a fee for not having health insurance. In 2016, the uninsured must pay 
2.5% of household income or $695 per adult, whichever is higher). This prediction, however, critically 
depends on the degree of narrow framing and loss aversion. If the loss aversion and narrow framing is 
higher than those mentioned above, then a consumer can still be better off by not buying the subsidized 
insurance. 
 
3.5.1.4 Welfare implications of narrow framing and loss aversion 
   In the previous part (3.5.1.3), it has shown that a consumer can be better off by purchasing a subsidized 
health insurance plan if he has a moderate degree of narrow framing and loss aversion. (As long as the 
effect of subsidy dominates the negative effects of narrow framing and loss aversion, a consumer buys 
insurance). Even in this case, one can imagine that the consumer may enjoy a higher level of utility if 
he/she were not subject to narrow framing and loss aversion. In this part, we will find the lost utility due 
to narrow framing and loss aversion. If we assume narrow framing of 1.351*10-5 and loss aversion of two, 
it is estimated that the lost utility level is equivalent to 3.7 percent of consumption of the representative 
agent. If the degree of narrow framing or loss aversion is higher than the magnitude mentioned above, 
then the lost utility is greater than the 3.7 percent of consumption.  
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    This example highlights the importance of perception. If a narrow framer’s perception of insurance 
changes to a fully rational view, then he can fully assess the welfare benefit of health insurance. If a 
narrow framer’s perception of insurance does not change, then he can still experience some feelings of 
loss that he would not feel if he had a fully rational view. This shows that changing narrow framers’ 
perception is important in improving social welfare when a social planner mandates the purchase of 
insurance.   
 
3.6 Conclusion  
 This paper looked at the socially optimal level of insurance when consumers are subject to narrow 
framing and loss aversion. The key issue in addressing this normative question was whether or not the 
effects of these two behavioral tendencies on insurance buying decisions are true preferences or just 
mistakes. We first applied six approaches summarized by Beshears et al. (2008) — (1) structural 
estimation, (2) active decisions, (3) asymptotic choice, (4) aggregated revealed preferences, (5) reported 
preferences, and (6) informed preferences (p. 1,787) — and then applied the happiness-based approach 
suggested by Kőszegi and Rabin (2008). The results of this analysis were summarized in Table 3.3. 
   Some criteria indicate that insurance buying decisions affected by narrow framing and loss aversion can 
be just mistakes. For instance, Rabin and Weizsäcker (2009) report that the fact that most people choose 
correct options (first order dominant lotteries) under the broad frame but failed to choose them under a 
narrow frame suggests that narrowly framed choices can be mistakes. Guiso’s (2015) report that those 
who rely on intuition are more likely to exhibit narrow framing also supports this view. In addition, the 
possibility that the effect of narrow framing and loss aversion on insurance take-up can be small under 
“default free mechanisms” also indicates that narrowly-framed insurance choices may be mistakes. 
   In contrast, many other criteria indicate that narrowly-framed insurance buying decisions could be a 
reflection of true preferences. Kőszegi & Rabin (2009) provides theoretical evidence suggesting that, in 
some cases, narrow framing is not an error but a reflection of true preferences. The fact that the elderly 
who have a lot of experience with accidental events and even professional traders exhibit narrow framing 
and loss aversion also suggests that the behavioral tendencies can be true preferences. In addition, facts 
that most individuals (89 percent of U.S. individuals) have these tendencies and that formal education 
does not remove the tendencies are in line with the view as well. The regression results on loss aversion 
and experienced wellbeing also support this point: loss-averse individuals report that their families and 
themselves are worse-off after U.S. healthcare reform, which mandates the purchase of health insurance. 
The negative association between loss-aversion and subjective wellbeing after the reform is found 
significant even among those who have benefited from health insurance and those who have basic 
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knowledge of health insurance.  These results, together with Hwang’s (2016) report that loss-aversion is 
negatively associated with willingness to pay (WTP) for health insurance, suggests that loss-aversion 
consistently affects the subjective valuation of insurance. Guiso’s (2015) empirical finding that loss-
aversion is related to the strength of “regret” indicates that loss aversion can be in fact a reflection of 
future regret and hence is true preference.  
   The above analysis suggests that, if people have another type of risk attitude (loss aversion) that 
consistently affects the valuation of insurance, then that risk attitude should be considered in a normative 
analysis. This consideration is particularly important since the optimal level of insurance calculated from 
normative analysis has implications for a wide range of social insurance programs.  
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APPENDIX A 
Supplemental Materials and Tables for CHAPTER 1 
 
A.1 The Importance of Reference Points  
 
   One should note the critical role of the reference point in deriving Proposition 1.1. (See Schmidt et al. 
(2008) for this reference point). If different reference points are adopted, then the relationship between 
loss aversion and insurance demand can be reversed. For example, if ‘owning an insurance policy’ is the 
reference point (ref = ‘existing wealth – premium’ in every state), then loss aversion increases the demand 
for insurance (Schmidt (2012) considers this case) as the Proposition 1.2 states. This is because ‘not 
purchasing insurance’ is regarded as gambling. Let the probability of an accident is p. The outcome of the 
prospect (the option of not buying insurance) is either loss (losing the chance of getting benefits from 
insurance companies) with a probability of p, or gain (saved premiums when an accident doesn’t occur) 
with a probability of 1-p. Hence the value of the prospect is ‘-w(p)*λ*Lossβ + w(1-p)*Premiumα.’ For 
simplicity, consider a consumer with perfect narrow framing and the parameter values of w(p) = p and 
α=β=1. Further assume that an actuarially fair insurance is offered, which implies Premium=p*Loss. 
Under these conditions, the value of the prospect (the option of not buying an actuarially fair insurance 
policy) is ‘- p*λ*Loss+(1-p)*(p*Loss) = p*Loss*(1-p-λ). Hence, the value of the prospect (the option of 
not buying insurance) is negatively correlated with loss aversion. Thus, in this example, loss aversion is 
positively correlated with the demand for insurance. 
   The other possibility is that ‘existing wealth when accidents don’t occur’ is the reference point and the 
decision to purchase insurance is reviewed “only within the losses domain.” Many studies that applied 
prospect theory to insurance markets assumed this (Sydnor 2010, p 195): for example, Nyman (2003) 
illustrates this case. In this case, the loss aversion measure in this paper (λ) plays little role in the 
insurance decision. Instead, β, the convexity measure in the losses domain plays a critical role. Figure A.1 
shows that those who have a convex value function in the losses domain become worse off by purchasing 
insurance. It shows that if the shape of v(∙) is convex in the losses domain (for example if 0<β<1), then 
individuals decide not to buy insurance. Note that loss aversion (λ) plays little role in this case. This is 
because λ measures only a “relative value” of losses compared with the value of the same amount of gains. 
That is, λ measures the “overall concavity” of the value function “around the reference point,” which 
covers both the gains and losses domains. (See Figure A.2). 
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Figure A.1           
 
Note: This figure illustrates that if the existing wealth level (W0) is the reference point and the decision to buy insurance is 
reviewed entirely within the “losses domain,” then loss aversion (λ) does not affect insurance buying decisions. In this case, β 
affects insurance buying decisions. Specifically, if 0<β<1, then the person do not buy insurance. To illustrate this, let the 
probability of an accident be p = w(p). A consumer with initial wealth of W0 gets the value of v (W0-p*Loss) if he purchases a fair 
insurance policy. If he does not buy insurance, he gets p*v(W0-Loss)+(1-p) *v(W0). Since p*v(W0-Loss)+(1-p) *v(W0) > v (W0-
p*Loss), the person decides not to buy insurance. 
 
Figure A.2     
 
Note: This figure illustrates that if the decision to buy insurance is reviewed within the “gain-loss domain,” then loss aversion (λ) 
affects the decision. 
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A.2 Survey Results on Loss Aversion 
   The survey on loss aversion was fielded from December 2012 to March 2013 by Carvalho, Meier, and 
Wang (forthcoming) to examine if risk attitudes are affected by the liquidity constraint. Among the 
selected sample of 1,152 individuals (a representative of low-to-moderate income individuals in the US), 
1,080 individuals (93.75%) answered at least one question about the risky games. Among them, 1,039 
individuals (90.19%) completed all six questions (41 individuals did not respond to at least one question). 
Among those who completed six questions, 201 individuals showed inconsistent responses. For example, 
one respondent rejected a ‘lose $2 win $6 game’ but accepted a ‘lose $3 win $6 game.’ In this case, this 
paper dropped it from the sample for analysis. Finally, this paper used remaining 838 individuals’ answers, 
which contained complete and consistent information about loss aversion. The median and average of loss 
aversion were found to be 2.0, similar to the result of Kahneman and Tversky (1992). 
 
Table A.1 Survey Results of the ‘Risky Game Question’ 
 
Table A.2 Estimated Coefficients of Loss Aversion 
 
 
 
  
Accept Reject No response
 lose $2, win $6
2) 3.0 79.5 18.8 1.7
lose $3, win $6 2.0 63.8 32.9 3.3
lose $4, win $6 1.5 44.3 52.4 3.3
lose $5, win $6 1.2 36.6 60.1 3.3
lose $6, win $6 1.0 35.8 60.6 3.6
lose $7, win $6 0.86 27.1 69.4 3.5
Risky games
Results, percentages (N=1,080)
1)
Notes: 1) Those who answered at least one risky game question.
           2) For those who reject all six games including the ' lose $2, win $6 game,' λ of four was assigned.
Source: ALP
Implied λ for those who accept the 
game but reject other less 
favorable games
Loss aversion (λ) 0.86 1.0 1.2 1.5 2.0 3.0 4.0 Total
Observations1) 195 59 49 83 204 155 93 838
(percent) (23.3) (7.0) (5.8) (9.9) (24.3) (18.5) (11.1) (100.0)
Notes: excluding those who made incomplete or inconsistent answers
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A.3 Supplemental Tables  
Table A.3 Sources and Descriptions of Major Variables  
Variable 
* "(0 1)" or "i_" = 
dummy variable 
['Yes' or 'Own'=1] 
Original Survey question 
ALP survey 
number / 
Fielded Date 
(start month) 
LTCI (0 1) 
"[Not including government programs, do]  you now have any long-term care 
insurance which specifically covers nursing home care for a year or more or any part 
of personal or medical care in your home?": Yes / No. Coded as 1 =Yes; 0=No 
#334 
2013-6 
SDI (0 1) 
"Below is a list of common financial products. Please check the appropriate box below 
to indicate below whether or not you currently own such a product." - Supplemental 
disability insurance :  Currently Own / Do Not Currently Own. Coded as 1 = Currently 
Own; 0 = Do Not Currently Own. 
#192 
2012-3 
Number of 
Private Health 
Insurance 
Now, we'd like to ask about all the other types of health insurance plans you might 
have, such as insurance through an employer or a business, coverage for retirees, or 
health insurance you buy for yourself, including any [Medigap or] other supplemental 
coverage. Do NOT include long-term care insurance. [Other than your Medicare HMO 
or Medicare Advantage Plan you've just told me about, how/How] many other plans 
do you have? Please enter zero for none. 
#334 
2013-6 
LossAversion (λ) 
* Survey question is included in the main text. This variable takes 0.857, 1, 1.2, 1.5, 2, 
3, 4. ( The value of four was assigned if λ > 3 (those who reject all risky games)). 
#263 
2012-12 
RiskTaking 
(self report, 1-10)  
 Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid 
taking risks?  Rate yourself from 0 to 10, where 0 means "unwilling to take any risks" 
and 10 means "fully prepared to take risks." 0 Unwilling to take any risks , 1, 2,..., 10 
Fully prepared to take risks. 
#197 
2011-7 
RiskAversion 
(Income gamble)
 
 
 Suppose that you are the only income earner in the family. Your doctor recommends 
that you move because of allergies, and you have to choose between two possible 
jobs. The first would guarantee your current total family income for life. The second is 
possibly better paying, but the income is also less certain. There is a 50-50 chance the 
second job would double your total lifetime income and a 50-50 chance that it would 
cut it by a third. Which job would you take the first job or the second job? First job /  
Second job. (questions with different numbers are omitted) Coded by 1(not risk-
averse), 2, ...,10(highly risk-averse) 
#197 
2011-7 
CRRA (ɤ) 
CRRA (coefficient of relative risk aversion) is based on RiskAversion(Income gamble).  
The coefficient is computed by Hanna & Lindamood’s (2004) method. It takes the 
values of 0.008, 0.092, 0.306, 1.0, 2.0, 3.76, 7.53, 14.51, 70, 150. (The value of 150 was 
assigned if ɤ > 70). 
Author's 
calculation 
Cognitive Ability 
Now let's try some subtraction of numbers. One hundred minus 7 equals what? 
Integer / This is the second subtraction. ...(questions with different numbers are 
omitted). Coded by the number of correct answers out of 5 questions 
#300 
2012-12 
i_Heuristics (0 1) 
“When playing slot machines, people win something about 1 in every 10 times. Julie, 
however, has just won on her first three plays. What are her chances of winning the 
next time she plays?” [ ] out of [ ], Coded as 1 if the answer is less than 1 percent; 
coded as 0 if the answer is equal to or greater than 1 percent. 
#263 
2012-12 
i_Accessibility 
(0 1) 
“In the last 5 years, have you asked for any advice from a financial professional about 
any of the following? Debt counseling / savings or investments / taking out a mortgage 
or a loan / insurance of any type / tax planning.”  Coded as 1 if there is a "Yes" 
among any of them; 0 if all of them are No. 
#284 
2012-11 
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Table A.3 (Cont.)  
Variable 
* "(0 1)" or "i_" = 
dummy variable 
['Yes' or 'Own'=1] 
Original Survey question 
ALP 
survey 
number
// 
Fielded 
Date 
WTP_for_More_I
nsu 
Now imagine that you currently have the LESS GENEROUS health insurance plan, which has 
HIGH SPECIALTY DRUG COSTS ($167 per month out of pocket for a typical user). The 
premium for this health insurance plan is $333 PER MONTH. In addition, please imagine that 
today you can switch to the other health insurance plan, which has the same benefits except 
that it has MORE GENEROUS coverage of specialty drugs (LOW SPECIALTY DRUG COSTS of $0 
per month). In order to switch to the more generous health insurance plan that has low 
specialty drug costs, you would have to pay an additional premium each month. This 
amount would be in addition to the $333 monthly premium that you are already paying for 
the less generous health insurance plan that has high out-of-pocket costs for specialty drug 
users. If you do not switch today to the generous health insurance plan that has lower 
specialty drug costs, | you will not be able to get it in the future, if you end up needing 
specialty drugs. Remember that, in this scenario, you are not currently using specialty drugs. 
What is the HIGHEST amount of ADDITIONAL MONTHLY PREMIUM that you would be both 
WILLING and ABLE to pay for the health insurance plan that has LOW SPECIALTY DRUG 
COSTS, instead of the high-cost plan? Please indicate the HIGHEST amount per month that 
you would be both willing and able to pay for the health insurance plan that has low 
specialty drug costs, instead of the high-cost plan: $0 / $1/ $2/ $5/ $10/ $15/$20/ $25 / 
$30/ $40/$50 /$60 / "I would pay more than an additional $60 per month". Coded by 
amounts. ($80 was assigned if a respondent choose the last option, " I would pay more...") 
#224 
2011-11 
i_Not_buy_Insu 
 (0-1) 
We are now going to show you some health insurance plans and we are interested in what 
you would choose if these were your only options. [Please consider a situation in which you 
have to choose between the four health insurance plans shown in the table (or you can 
decide not to buy insurance and pay a penalty [yearly of $95 or 1% of your annual income, 
whichever is greater]). Assume that all these plans cover the same services. But as you can 
see they may charge different monthly premiums, or have different annual deductibles or 
out-of-pocket maximums of the co-pays may differ. You can click on any of the terms in blue 
in the table below to see its definition.] [You can click on any of the terms in blue in the 
table below to see its definition./] Think about coverage only for yourself. Please check the 
option that you would pick:  1 Plan 1  / 2 Plan 2 / 3 Plan 3 / 4 Plan 4 / 5 I would rather 
pay[ a penalty of $95 per year or 1% of your annual income, whichever is greater/ a penalty] 
and not purchase insurance. Coded as 1 if one choose "5 I would rather pay a penalty..". 
#349 
2013-9 
Auto Insurance 
Ownership (0 1) 
Please indicate if you are currently covered by any of the types of insurance below, whether 
through your employer, self-purchase, or provided by the government. Choose all that 
apply.   1 Health insurance 2 Life insurance 3 Vehicle insurance 4 Long-term care insurance  
5 Homeowners/renters insurance. Coded as 1 if Vehicle insurance is chosen. 
#189 
2011-6 
Vehicle 
Ownership (0 1) 
Do you own any vehicles for transportation, like cars, trucks, a trailer, a motor home, a boat, 
or an airplane?  Yes / No. Coded as 1=Yes; 0=No 
#189 
2011-6 
Age, Income, 
i_Female, 
i_HispanicLatino, 
Education(1-15), 
FamilySize, 
i_Married 
Age, Income, i_Married: the values as of the dependent variable is fielded are used 
Pre-
loaded 
data 
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Table A.4 Take-up ratio of LTCI, SDI, Private Health Insurance in the ALP data 
 
Notes: The take-up ratio is as of 2012 (SDI) and 2013 (LTCI and private health insurance) 
Source: American Life Panel 
  
LTCI
(N=3,421)
SDI
(N=3,671)
Numper of Private
Health Insurance
(N=3,449)
AGE
   18-34 4.7% 14.6% 0.62
   35-49 6.7% 24.8% 0.68
   50-64 9.7% 22.9% 0.78
   65- 19.1% 7.2% 0.64
Total 9.9% 19.2% 0.70
GENDER
   0 Male 9.4% 21.7% 0.71
   1 Female 10.3% 17.5% 0.70
Total 9.9% 19.2% 0.70
EDUCATION
   1 High school dropout 10.9% 13.2% 0.37
   2 High school graduate 6.6% 16.2% 0.53
   3 Some college, Associate Degree 7.4% 18.1% 0.63
   4 Bachelors degree 10.5% 21.2% 0.82
   5 Masters degree or higher 17.9% 24.2% 0.95
Total 9.9% 19.2% 0.70
MARRIED
   0 Not married 9.4% 16.8% 0.58
   1 Married or living with a partner 10.2% 20.8% 0.77
Total 9.9% 19.2% 0.70
FAMILY INCOME
   0 - 19,999 5.8% 11.1% 0.22
   20,000-39,999 5.7% 12.1% 0.55
   40,000-59,999 11.1% 21.4% 0.81
   60,000- 13.6% 26.5% 0.93
Total 9.9% 19.2% 0.70
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Table A.5 Characteristics of the Merged ALP sample  
 
Notes: Both ALP and CPS data are unweighted. The CPS sample was collected in July 2013. Most of the ALP sample (563 out of 
606) was collected between July and August, 2013. 
  
<PANEL A> Merged ALP sample (both loss aversion & LTCI information are available)
AGE obs percent FAMILY INCOME obs percent
   18-34 132 (21.8)    1 Less than 5,000 41 (6.8)
   35-49 120 (19.8)    2 5,000 to 7,499 22 (3.6)
   50-64 215 (35.5)    3 7,500 to 9,999 38 (6.3)
   65- 139 (22.9)    4 10,000 to 12,499 40 (6.6)
Total 606 (100.0)    5 12,500 to 14,999 44 (7.3)
   6 15,000 to 19,999 50 (8.3)
GENDER obs percent    7 20,000 to 24,999 90 (14.9)
   0 Male 203 (33.5)    8 25,000 to 29,999 90 (14.9)
   1 Female 403 (66.5)    9 30,000 to 34,999 72 (11.9)
Total 606 (100.0)    10 35,000 to 39,999 79 (13.0)
   11 40,000 to 49,999 21 (3.5)
EDUCATION obs percent    12 50,000 to 59,999 9 (1.5)
   1 High school dropout 63 (10.4)    13 60,000 to 74,999 7 (1.2)
   2 High school graduate 132 (21.8)    14 75,000 or more 3 (0.5)
   3 Some college, Associate Degree 272 (44.9) Total 606 (100.0)
   4 Bachelors degree 103 (17.0)
   5 Masters degree or higher 36 (5.9) MARRIED obs percent
Total 606 (100.0)    0 Not married 361 (59.6)
   1 Married or living with a partner 245 (40.4)
Total 606 (100.0)
ETHNICITY obs percent
  White/Caucasian 448 (73.9) REGIONS RESIDE obs percent
  Black/African American 79 (13.0)    North East 69 (11.4)
  American Indian or Alaskan Native 16 (2.6)    Midwest 139 (22.9)
  Asian or Pacific Islander 8 (1.3)    South 199 (32.8)
  Other or missing 55 (9.1)    West 199 (32.8)
Total 606 (100.0) Total 606 (100.0)
<PANEL B>  Comprasion with CPS data
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
         AGE 50.83 16.30 47.81 17.78
         GENDER 0.67 0.47 0.52 0.50
         MARRIED 0.40 0.49 0.53 0.50
         EDUCATION(1-5) 2.86 1.01 2.89 1.16
         ln(FAMILYINCOME) 9.86 0.76 10.66 0.83
ALP sample that both loss aversion &
 LTCI information are available (N=606)
Current Population Survey (AGE>=18)
(N=100,412)
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Table A.6 Loss Aversion and Insurance Holdings – Restricted Samples 
 
Notes: This table compares the average take-up rate of LTCI, SDI, and private health insurance between two groups (low loss 
aversion vs. high loss aversion group). In Panel A, the samples are restricted to those who show signs of narrow framing (i.e., loss 
aversion is greater than 1.0). 
  
<Panel A> Restricted samples: those with signs of narrow framing (λ>1)
N Mean (Std Err) N Mean (Std Err) P-value
Own LTCI (0-1) 244 0.074 (0.017) 184 0.027 (0.012)    0.0344**
Own SDI (0-1) 223 0.112 (0.021) 175 0.069 (0.019) 0.1383
Number of Private Health Insurance 245 0.437 (0.034) 186 0.376 (0.039) 0.2486
<Panel B> All samples (the same as Table 1)
N Mean (Std Err) N Mean (Std Err) P-value
Own LTCI (0-1) 422 0.069 (0.012) 184 0.027 (0.012)     0.0411**
Own SDI (0-1) 393 0.127 (0.017) 175 0.069 (0.019)     0.0385**
Number of Private Health Insurance 423 0.418 (0.029) 186 0.376 (0.039) 0.4056
Individuals with a low 
degree of  loss aversion 
(λ<3)  (A)
Individuals with a high 
degree of loss aversion 
(λ≥3)  (B)
Two tailed test
for equal mean
(H0: μA = μB)
Individuals with a low 
degree of  loss aversion with 
signs of Narrow 
Framing(1<λ<3)  (E)
Individuals with a high 
degree of loss aversion 
(λ≥3)  (F)
Two tailed test
for equal mean
(H0: μE = μF)
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Table A.7 Results of Table 2 when the Linear Probability Model is employed 
  
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. This table displays replication results of Table 
1.2 when the linear probability model is employed. Descriptions of variables are presented in Table 1.2. The dependent 
variables, LTCI and SDI, are indicator variables if an individual owns long-term care insurance or supplemental disability 
insurance. Overall, the results are similar to those of probit model: loss aversion measures are negatively correlated with 
insurance holdings. In all columns, loss aversion (λ) maintains its negative sign and many of them are statistically 
significant. In columns (3) and (5), although loss aversion measure loses its significance, the interaction terms 
(i_Heuristics*LossAversion, i_ProbHealthy*i_LossAver2) are significant at 1% and 5% level, indicating that the effect of loss 
aversion is significant to those who are subject to heuristics and those who believe that they will live independently at the 
age of 80, 85, or 90. The results in columns (6) and (11) seem to be associated with the small sample size (N=177, 
N=161).  
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
LossAversion (λ) -0.0159** -0.0152** -0.0108 -0.0326** -0.0105 -0.0267 -0.0286** -0.0280** -0.0300** -0.0253** -0.0254
(0.00760) (0.00752) (0.00790) (0.0151) (0.00853) (0.0212) (0.0122) (0.0123) (0.0130) (0.0127) (0.0233)
Age 0.00202*** 0.00210*** 0.00320*** 0.00208*** 0.00485*** -0.000868 -0.000933 -0.000718 -0.00185
(0.000703) (0.000716) (0.000889) (0.000737) (0.00148) (0.000837) (0.000866) (0.000927) (0.00180)
ln (Income) 0.0150 0.0158 0.0454*** 0.0165 0.0450 -0.0240 -0.0259 -0.00669 -0.0488
(0.0136) (0.0139) (0.0154) (0.0148) (0.0356) (0.0211) (0.0212) (0.0248) (0.0413)
Education(1-15) -0.00386 -0.00403 -0.00403 0.000406 0.00660 -0.00480 -0.00404 -0.00759 -0.00939
(0.00519) (0.00522) (0.00709) (0.00527) (0.0110) (0.00660) (0.00666) (0.00752) (0.0130)
i_HispanicLatino 0.0635** 0.0642** 0.118** 0.0440 0.221* 0.0191 0.0165 -0.0163 -0.0397
(0.0303) (0.0306) (0.0519) (0.0305) (0.122) (0.0372) (0.0383) (0.0436) (0.116)
i_Married -0.0405** -0.0398** -0.0513** -0.0372* -0.0686** 0.0300 0.0340 0.0225 0.0580
(0.0181) (0.0182) (0.0259) (0.0195) (0.0335) (0.0286) (0.0290) (0.0310) (0.0531)
i_Female 0.00862 0.00945 0.0593** 0.00501 0.0620 -0.0210 -0.0174 -0.0286 -0.00178
(0.0196) (0.0199) (0.0263) (0.0217) (0.0383) (0.0290) (0.0291) (0.0324) (0.0525)
i_Heuristics*LossAversion -0.0188*** -0.000148
(0.00602) (0.0132)
i_Accessibility*LossAversion 0.0993*
(0.0591)
Accessibility -0.00965
(0.0443)
i_ProbHealthy*i_LossAver2 -0.0219** 0.00188
(0.0109) (0.0241)
ProbHealthy 0.000197 0.000116
(0.000449) (0.000615)
CRRA (ɤ ) 0.000119 0.000480
(0.000376) (0.000482)
Constant 0.0878*** -0.125 -0.138 -0.507*** -0.198 -0.695** 0.166*** 0.463** 0.482** 0.367 0.815*
(0.0203) (0.146) (0.149) (0.149) (0.164) (0.335) (0.0303) (0.206) (0.208) (0.236) (0.431)
Observations 606 606 598 266 490 177 568 568 557 445 161
R-squared 0.005 0.040 0.044 0.132 0.040 0.135 0.009 0.018 0.020 0.017 0.057
Dependent Variable: LTCI Dependent Variable: SDI
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Table A.8 Probit regression results when indicator variables of loss aversion and risk aversion are 
used as explanatory variables (Non-parametric method) 
  
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. This table displays probit regression results 
when indicator variables (rather than continuous measures) of loss aversion and risk aversion measures are used as 
explanatory variables. The results indicate that only loss aversion has a significant effect on insurance holdings even if 
non-parametric method is applied. In the case of LTCI, three interaction terms (i_Heuristics*LossAversion, 
i_Accessibility*i_LossAver2, i_ProbHealthy*i_LossAver2) are significant and has right signs. Descriptions of explanatory 
variables are presented in Table 1.2. The dependent variables, LTCI and SDI, are indicator variables if an individual owns 
long-term care insurance or supplemental disability insurance. Continuous measures of loss aversion and risk aversion are 
converted into indicator variables if the values are equal to or more than the third quartile (Q3). The third quartiles of 
LossAversion, CRRA are 3.0 and 14.51 respectively. 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
i_LossAver_Q3 (λ ≥3.0) -0.439** -0.497** -0.434* -1.364*** -0.614*** -0.689 -0.313* -0.383** -0.422** -0.329* -0.669**
(0.213) (0.224) (0.228) (0.437) (0.238) (0.445) (0.161) (0.163) (0.172) (0.176) (0.287)
Age (50-64) 0.194 0.188 0.754* 0.379 6.136*** -0.125 -0.143 -0.199 -0.508
(0.246) (0.249) (0.400) (0.289) (0.971) (0.161) (0.163) (0.196) (0.322)
Age (65 - ) 0.802*** 0.846*** 1.506*** 0.977*** 7.300*** -0.482** -0.473** -0.330 -0.605*
(0.251) (0.253) (0.389) (0.295) (1.042) (0.227) (0.228) (0.242) (0.353)
Income (0-25000) -0.739* -0.706* -1.633*** -0.926** -3.177*** 0.203 0.223 -0.0243 0.186
(0.429) (0.429) (0.579) (0.461) (1.130) (0.532) (0.531) (0.547) (0.582)
Income (25000-50000) -0.444 -0.406 -0.672 -0.578 -2.405** 0.319 0.305 0.170 0.204
(0.421) (0.423) (0.497) (0.453) (1.036) (0.533) (0.532) (0.542) (0.578)
Education(1-15) -0.0339 -0.0341 -0.0370 -0.00363 -0.0256 -0.0439 -0.0390 -0.0608 -0.0136
(0.0402) (0.0409) (0.0615) (0.0486) (0.0881) (0.0352) (0.0351) (0.0424) (0.0680)
i_HispanicLatino 0.535** 0.542** 1.192*** 0.502* 2.936*** 0.108 0.0935 -0.0740 0.239
(0.233) (0.235) (0.325) (0.269) (0.959) (0.199) (0.201) (0.220) (0.633)
i_Married -0.382** -0.391** -0.623 -0.403* -1.205** 0.0683 0.0899 0.0692 0.431*
(0.193) (0.197) (0.390) (0.223) (0.474) (0.143) (0.144) (0.164) (0.261)
i_Female 0.0165 0.0229 0.898*** -0.0845 0.668* -0.133 -0.112 -0.180 -0.102
(0.197) (0.200) (0.324) (0.229) (0.403) (0.151) (0.152) (0.176) (0.267)
i_Heuristics*LossAversion -0.434* -0.0105
(0.261) (0.0883)
i_Accessibility*i_LossAver2 0.838**
(0.379)
Accessibility 0.281
(0.411)
i_ProbHealthy*i_LossAver2 -0.645** -5.97e-05
(0.324) (0.168)
ProbHealthy 0.00399 0.00140
(0.00437) (0.00364)
i_CRRA Q3 (ɤ≥14.51) -0.561 -0.00731
(0.396) (0.239)
Constant -1.485*** -0.878 -0.865 -2.035** -1.219 -5.177*** -1.167*** -0.943 -0.976 -0.344 -1.250
(0.0931) (0.657) (0.673) (0.857) (0.801) (1.833) (0.0799) (0.755) (0.754) (0.858) (1.565)
Observations 606 606 598 266 490 177 598 568 557 445 177
Dependent Variable: LTCI Dependent Variable: SDI
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Table A.9 Can conventional risk aversion measures explain insurance take-up decision?-Probit 
regression results (Non-parametric method) 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. This table shows that conventional risk 
aversion measures cannot explain insurance take-up decisions even if a non-parametric estimation method is applied. 
Samples are restricted to those individuals whose household wealth level is below the median so that one can compare 
this result with the result of ‘loss aversion-LTCI’ or ‘loss-aversion-SDI’. The dependent variables, LTCI and SDI, are 
indicator variables if an individual owns long-term care insurance or supplemental disability insurance. Continuous 
measures of risk aversion are converted into indicator variables (equal to or higher than the first/second/third quartile of 
CRRA) and the indicator variables are used as explanatory variables. The p-values of F-test in columns (4) and (8) 
indicate that three dummy variables of risk aversion (i_CRRA_Q1, i_CRRA_Q2, i_CRRA_Q3) are not jointly significant 
in explaining the ownership of LTCI and SDI. 
 
 
  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
i_CRRA_Q1 (ɤ ≥ 3.76) 0.0124 0.112 -0.148 0.0665
(0.166) (0.211) (0.151) (0.191)
i_CRRA_Q2 (ɤ ≥ 7.53) -0.0712 -0.0196 -0.237** -0.332*
(0.128) (0.177) (0.119) (0.172)
i_CRRA_Q3 (ɤ ≥ 14.51) -0.181 -0.197 -0.0511 0.112
(0.131) (0.150) (0.115) (0.141)
Age (50-64) 0.00332 0.00648 0.00996 0.00783 -0.0364 -0.0445 -0.0399 -0.0460
(0.176) (0.176) (0.177) (0.178) (0.134) (0.134) (0.134) (0.134)
Age (65 - ) 0.815*** 0.813*** 0.820*** 0.824*** -0.534*** -0.534*** -0.536*** -0.536***
(0.173) (0.173) (0.175) (0.175) (0.162) (0.163) (0.163) (0.163)
Income (0-25000) -1.003*** -0.997*** -0.985*** -0.987*** -0.388** -0.381** -0.383** -0.392**
(0.206) (0.206) (0.206) (0.207) (0.165) (0.165) (0.166) (0.166)
Income (25000-50000) -0.378*** -0.377*** -0.372*** -0.372*** -0.103 -0.102 -0.0983 -0.106
(0.134) (0.134) (0.134) (0.134) (0.127) (0.127) (0.127) (0.127)
Education(1-15) 0.0496 0.0494 0.0448 0.0449 -0.0246 -0.0260 -0.0248 -0.0232
(0.0317) (0.0317) (0.0320) (0.0321) (0.0305) (0.0304) (0.0304) (0.0304)
HispanicLatino 0.270 0.266 0.291 0.296 0.173 0.171 0.166 0.183
(0.257) (0.258) (0.260) (0.260) (0.277) (0.279) (0.276) (0.278)
Married -0.268** -0.270** -0.277** -0.279** -0.00913 -0.0134 -0.00983 -0.0187
(0.127) (0.127) (0.128) (0.128) (0.117) (0.118) (0.117) (0.117)
Gender 0.256** 0.261** 0.274** 0.272** -0.140 -0.137 -0.146 -0.147
(0.126) (0.127) (0.128) (0.128) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116)
Constant -1.840*** -1.782*** -1.723*** -1.799*** -0.577 -0.520 -0.664 -0.598
(0.502) (0.482) (0.481) (0.506) (0.675) (0.664) (0.661) (0.676)
Observations 875 875 875 875 763 763 763 763
P-value of F-test
for joint significance of 
i_CRRA_Q1, i_CRRA_Q2, & 
i_CRRA_Q3
- - - 0.5288 - - - 0.2032
Dependent Variable: LTCI Dependent Variable: SDI
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Table A.10 The samples are restricted to baby-boomers (those who were born in 1946~1964) 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variables are indicator variables 
for owning LTCI (column 1), SDI (column2), and the number of private health insurance (column 3).   
(1) Probit (2) Probit (3) OLS
VARIABLES LTCI SDI Number of Private Health Insurance
LossAversion -0.445*** -0.0706
(0.144) (0.0938)
i_Lossaver(λ≥4) -0.149**
(0.0751)
lnincome 0.210 -0.266** 0.167***
(0.266) (0.131) (0.0417)
Education(1-15) 0.0196 -0.0279 0.0278*
(0.0712) (0.0512) (0.0144)
i_Hispanic 0.577* 0.0982 -0.0682
(0.343) (0.301) (0.0840)
I_Married -0.461 -0.181 -0.0214
(0.297) (0.220) (0.0724)
I_Female 0.664 0.0403 0.182***
(0.437) (0.214) (0.0597)
Number of Public Insurance
 one owns -0.195***
(0.0369)
Constant -3.689 1.700 -1.479***
(2.411) (1.388) (0.389)
Observations 265 269 268
R-squared - - 0.202
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Table A.11 The Correlation of Coefficient between Loss Aversion and Risk Aversion 
 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.This table displays the correlation of coefficient between the loss aversion measure and 
risk aversion measures. See notes in Table 1.1 for the descriptions of the variables. The correlation of coefficient indicates that the 
loss-aversion measure is positively correlated with risk aversion measures. Since these measures evaluate respondents’ attitude 
toward risk, the  positive correlation is not surprising. Guiso (2015) also reports a similar positive correlation. 
  
LossAversion
RiskAversion
(Income gamble, 1-10)
CRRA RiskTaking(self-report, 0-10)
LossAversion 1
 (p-value)
 [obs] 840
RiskAversion(Income gamble, 1-10) 0.1822** 1
 (p-value) (0.0102)
 [obs] [198] [1718]
CRRA 0.0778 0.7878*** 1
 (p-value) (0.2758) (0.000)
 [obs] [198] [1718] [1718]
RiskTaking(self-report, 0-10) -0.1808** -0.297*** -0.2108*** 1
 (p-value) (0.0106) (0.000) (0.000)
 [obs] [199] [1718] [1718] [1721]
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Table A12. Robustness Check: Are loss aversion measures associated with religious orientation? 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. This table displays that the importance of 
religion, e.g., being a Protestant or Catholic is not associated with any of the loss aversion measure (continuous loss aversion 
measure, two dummy variables for loss high loss aversion). Imp_Religion is the self-reported importance of religion in one’s life 
(5-Very important; 3 - Somewhat important; 1-Not too important). i_Protestant (i_Catholic) is an indicator variable if a respondent 
is a Protestant (Catholic). 
 
  
(1) OLS (2) Probit (3) Probit (4) OLS (5) Probit (6) Probit
Dep. Var: LossAversion i_LossAver_Q3 (λ ≥3.0) i_LossAver_4 (λ ≥4.0) LossAversion i_LossAver_Q3 (λ ≥3.0) i_LossAver_4 (λ ≥4.0)
Age 0.00164 0.00292 0.00374 0.00300 0.00442 0.00665
(0.00268) (0.00347) (0.00448) (0.00296) (0.00391) (0.00488)
i_Female -0.0772 -0.0445 -0.0591 -0.0614 -0.0396 -0.0494
(0.0900) (0.114) (0.145) (0.0919) (0.117) (0.149)
Imp_Religion 0.0429 0.0367 0.00840 0.0426 0.0385 0.0129
(0.0272) (0.0349) (0.0440) (0.0275) (0.0358) (0.0443)
i_Prostestant 0.0906 0.199 -0.00429 0.0620 0.192 0.00440
(0.117) (0.144) (0.177) (0.120) (0.147) (0.183)
i_Catholic -0.104 -0.0434 -0.190 -0.125 -0.0329 -0.213
(0.109) (0.144) (0.190) (0.113) (0.149) (0.200)
ln (Income) -0.0483 -0.0994 -0.165*
(0.0614) (0.0762) (0.0929)
Education(1-15) 0.0469** 0.0341 0.0455
(0.0201) (0.0265) (0.0315)
i_HispanicLatino -0.00881 -0.105 -0.00121
(0.112) (0.152) (0.186)
i_Married 0.0623 0.0529 0.0192
(0.0882) (0.115) (0.146)
FamilySize 0.0152 0.0316 0.0389
(0.0310) (0.0388) (0.0462)
Constant 1.863*** -0.756*** -1.367*** 1.742*** -0.255 -0.436
(0.175) (0.226) (0.292) (0.620) (0.753) (0.934)
Observations 610 610 610 610 610 610
R-squared 0.010 - - 0.019 - -
P-value (F test) 0.290 0.402 0.861 0.276 0.541 0.653
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Table A.13: Loss Aversion and Auto Insurance Coverage 
 
Notes: This table compares the average take-up rate of auto insurance between two groups (low loss aversion vs. high loss 
aversion group). Samples are restricted to those who own vehicles for transportation. It shows that individuals in a high loss-
aversion group are more likely to be covered by auto insurance. But the difference between the two groups is not statistically 
significant. 
 
 
  
N Mean (Std Err) N Mean (Std Err) P-value
Covered by
 Auto Insurance (0-1)
139 0.878 (0.028) 176 0.886 (0.024) 0.8132
N Mean (Std Err) N Mean (Std Err) P-value
Covered by
 Auto Insurance (0-1)
86 0.837 (0.040) 229 0.900 (0.020)   0.1265
Individuals with a low degree of  
loss aversion (λ<2)  (G)
Individuals with a high degree of 
loss aversion (λ≥2)  (H)
Two tailed t test
for equal mean
(H0: μG = μH)
Individuals with a low degree of  
loss aversion (λ<1.2)  ( I )
Individuals with a high degree of 
loss aversion (λ≥1.2)  ( J )
Two tailed t test
for equal mean
(H0: μI = μJ)
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A.4 Propositions related to Section 1.4 
[Proposition 1.4] For any given γ>0, there exist bi z and λi such that at+1= 0 is optimal. 
(corollary) If bi z and λi are large enough, consumers do not buy insurance (at+1). 
This implies that, if the degree of narrow framing and loss aversion is high, then consumers do not buy 
insurance even though they are risk averse with respect to final consumption. 
 
[Proposition 1.5] An “insurance premium”, qt (s
t
,st+1), is not only an increasing function of 𝛾, but also a 
decreasing function of λi.. If 𝛼 = 𝛽 = 1, w(p)=p, and λi >1, then qt (s
t
,st+1) is a decreasing function of bi,z as 
well. 
This implies that consumers’ willingness to pay for insurance depends not only on the concavity (𝛾) of 
their utility function, which is defined over their final-consumption, but also on the degree of narrow 
framing (bi z) and loss aversion (λi). 
(Proof -part1) An insurance premium, qt (s
t
,st+1), is a decreasing function of λi.. 
The first order condition (FOC) in equation (1.3) in Section 1.2.3 is as follows: 
𝑞𝑡 ∙ V′(ct) – bi,z 𝐸[𝑣
′(at+1 )] = E [δ 𝑉′(ct+1)] 
Hence,  
𝑞𝑡 = E 
δ 𝑉′(𝑐𝑡+1)
𝑉′(𝑐𝑡)
+ 𝑏𝑖,𝑧𝑥  𝐸 
[𝑣′(𝑎𝑡+1 )] 
𝑉′(𝑐𝑡)
 
The equation (1.5) in Section 1.2.3 shows that 𝐸[𝑣′(at+1 )] is a decreasing function of λi. 
Since 𝑏𝑖,𝑧𝑥 ≥ 0, 𝑞𝑡  is a decreasing function of λi. 
 
(Proof-part2) An insurance premium, qt (s
t
,st+1), is a decreasing function of bi z. if 𝛼 = 𝛽 = 1, w(p)=p,  
and λi >1. 
One needs to show that 𝐸 
[𝑣′(𝑎𝑡+1 )] 
𝑉′(𝑐𝑡)
 is negative. The term 𝑉′(𝑐𝑡) is greater than zero because strictly 
monotonic V(⋅) function is assumed. Hence, we need to show 𝐸[𝑣′(at+1 )] is negative. The paragraph right 
below the equation (1.5) in Section 1.2.3 shows that 𝐸[𝑣′(at+1 )] is negative if 𝛼 = 𝛽 = 1, w(p)=p, and λi 
>1. Hence, we can get the result.  
 
[Proposition 1.6] Suppose bi z >0 and λi >1. If bi z is a decreasing function of z, then the decrease in z 
results in an increase in at+1
*
 . 
This implies that, if the prominence of risky framing (z) of an insurance policy is decreased, demand 
for the insurance policy will increase. 
 
[Proposition 1.7] Define p as an objective probability of an accident, and ?̃? as a consumer’s subjective 
probability of the accident. Let Ua=1 as the consumer’s utility when buying one unit of state-contingent 
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claim, and Ua=0 as the consumer’s utility when not buying it. Then, 
∂
∂?̃?
(Ua=1 −Ua=0) when b>0, is greater 
than 
∂
∂?̃?
(Ua=1 −Ua=0) when b=0. 
 
  This implies that the effect of subjective probability on changes in utility (by purchasing an insurance 
policy) is greater for a boundedly rational consumer than for a perfectly rational consumer. 
 
(Proof) Define p as an objective probability of an accident, and ?̃? as a consumer’s subjective probability 
of the accident. Let Ua=1 as the consumer’s utility when buying one unit of state-contingent claim, and 
Ua=0 as the consumer’s utility when not buying the state-contingent claim. Then, 
∂
∂?̃?
𝐸(Ua=1 −Ua=0) when 
b>0, is greater than 
∂
∂?̃?
𝐸(Ua=1 −Ua=0) when b=0.  
 
1) When b=0 (i.e., perfectly rational consumer under EU theory): Let L potential losses from an accident. 
A premium of an insurance product that pays out L when the accident occurs is 𝑝 ∙ L. Let the perfectly 
rational consumer’s (i) utility function be Ui = V(W), where V is a concave utility function defined over 
final wealth (W). Then the consumer’s (i) expected gains from purchasing the insurance policy are as 
follows: 
E [Ui a=1 −Ui a=0 ] = V(W- 𝑝 ∙ L) – [ ?̃? ∙ V(W − L) + (1 − ?̃?) ∙ V(𝑊)]  ……………………….……………..(a) 
(Note that if ?̃?= 𝑝, the gains are always positive as long as V(∙) is a concave function. Thus, consumers 
will buy the insurance policy) 
 
2) When b>0 (i.e., boundedly rational consumer): Let a boundedly rational consumer’s (j) utility function 
be as follows:  
Uj = V(W)+b∙ 𝑣(𝑎), where V is a concave utility function defined over final wealth, b is the degree of 
narrow framing, and 𝑣(𝑎) = {
(𝐿 − 𝑝𝐿)𝛼    𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑛 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑠  
  −𝜆 ∙ (𝑝 ∙ 𝐿)𝛽    𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                    
, where λ is the 
degree of loss aversion. 
Then the consumer’s ( j ) expected gains from purchasing the insurance policy are as follows: 
E [Uj a=1 −Uj a=0 ] = V(W-p ∙ L)–[𝑝 ∙ V(𝑊 − L) + (1 − 𝑝) ∙ V(W)]+ b[𝑝 ∙ (𝐿 − 𝑝𝐿)
𝛼 − (1 − 𝑝) ∙ 𝜆 ∙ (𝑝 ∙ 𝐿)𝛽 ]..(b) 
 
If we subtract (a) from (b), then 
𝐸[(Uj a=1 −Uj a=0) - (Ui a=1 –Ui a=0)] = b ∙ [𝑝 ∙ (𝐿 − 𝑝𝐿)𝛼 − (1 − 𝑝) ∙ 𝜆 ∙ (𝑝 ∙ 𝐿)𝛽 ] 
 
Thus, 
∂
∂?̃?
 𝐸[(Uj a=1 −Uj a=0) - (Ui a=1 –Ui a=0)]  
  = b ∙  [(𝐿 − 𝑝𝐿)𝛼 +  𝜆 ∙ (𝑝 ∙ 𝐿)𝛽 ] >> 0. 
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APPENDIX B 
Supplemental Materials and Tables for CHAPTER 2 
Appendix B.1 Supplemental Tables 
Table B.1 Definitions and Sources of Variables 
Variable Related question / Coding HRS Code 
lossavers 
See Section 2.4.1. This variable takes 1.03, 1.07, 1.10, 1.15, 1.20, 1.30, 
3.0, or 5.0. 
NV014, 
NV015, 
 NV016, 
NV017 
i_lossaver  (0 1) An indicator variable for high loss aversion (λ = 5.0)      " 
i_lossaver2  (0 1) An indicator variable for loss aversion (λ ≥ 3.0)      " 
own_life  (0 1) 
Do you have any life insurance, including individual or group policies? 
IWER: Do not include burial insurance. ); Coded as 1=Yes; 0=No 
NT011 
num_life 
How many different life insurance policies do you have?    IWER: 
Include individual policies, group policies, or paid-up policies if R asks.  
NT012  
log_amt_life 
[What/Altogether, what] is the total face value of [this policy/these 
policies], that is, the amount of money the beneficiary would get if you 
were to die? ; Coded as ln(1+facevalue) 
NT013 
own_whole (0 1) 
 [Is this a life insurance policy that builds/Are any of these life insurance 
policies ones that build] up a cash value that you can borrow against, or 
that you would receive if the policy were to be cancelled? Def: (These 
are sometimes called 'Whole Life' or 'Straight Life Policies.'); Coded as 
1=Yes; 0=No 
NT018 
num_whole How many such policies do you have? NT019 
log_amt_whole 
What is the current face value of [these policies/this policy]? ; Coded as 
ln(1+facevalue) 
NT020 
own_term  (0 1) Author's imputation (See Section 2.3.2)   
num_term                 "   
log_amt_term                 "   
own2term (0 1) 
An indicator variable for owning two or more policies of term-life 
insurance 
  
log_amt_term50k ln(face value of term - 50,000).  
§
   
will (0 1) 
Do you currently have a will that is written and witnessed?; Coded as 1 
if response is '1. Yes, will,' '2.  [vol] Yes, will and trust,' or '3.  [vol] No 
will, but have trust'. Coded as 0 otherwise.  
NT001 
log_income
 #
 ln(familyincome+1) H11ITOT* 
log_Stock  
#
 ln(net value of stocks, mutual funds, and investment trusts+1). H11WSTCK* 
log_House
 #
 ln(net value of primary residence+1). 
§
 H11WTOTH* 
log_Nonrisky 
#
 
ln(1+ 'value of checking, savings, or money market accounts’+‘value of 
CD, government savings bonds, and T-bills’ +‘net value of bonds and 
bond funds.’)) 
H11WCHCK* 
+H11WCD* 
+H11WBOND* 
log_NetFinWorth
 #
 
the net value of non-housing financial wealth (Stock + Nonrisky + net 
value of all other saving value of other debt (other than mortgage, land 
loan, or home loan)).
§
 
H11WTOTN* 
log_NetWorth
 #
  ln(total net wealth including secondary residence+1).
§
 H11WTOTB* 
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Table B.1 (Cont.) 
Variable Related question / Coding HRS Code 
own_house (0 1) An indicator variable for house ownership H11WOHOUS* 
edu Years of education NZ216  
kids Number of Resident and non-resident children 
NA099 + 
NA100 
employed (0 1) 
An indicator variable for currently working. Coded as 1 if NJ005M1==1 
(Working now), 0 otherwise. 
 NJ005M1 
selfemp (0 1) An indicator variable for self employers. R11SLFEMP* 
cognitive 
Calculated Number Series Score (A high score indicates a high cognitive 
ability). 
ex) I would like you to write down the numbers from left to right and 
then tell me what number goes in the blank based on the pattern of 
numbers. 2 . . . 4 . . . 6 . . . BLANK 
NNSSCORE 
prob_live80100 
a percent chance that a respondent will live 11~15 more years. It is 
based on the question “What is the percent chance that you will live to 
be [85/80/90/95/100] or more? (00---10---20---30---40---50---60---70---
80---90---100). [assigned ages are as follows: 80 (IF AGE IS 65-69) 85 (IF 
AGE IS 70-74) 90 (IF AGE IS 75-79) 95 (IF AGE IS 80-84) 100 (IF AGE IS 85-
89)]. 
NP029 
livesure (0 1) An indicator variable for 'prob_live80100 ≥ 90 percent'      " 
advice (0 1) 
An indicator variable for getting advice from financial experts. This is 
based on the 2014 HRS Module questions “Do you [and 
your[partner/husband/wife]] have someone such as a friend or relative, 
or bank officer, lawyer or financial consultant who regularly helps you 
with handling your money or property or other financial matters such 
as signing checks, paying bills, dealing with banks and making 
investments?  [Yes /No]” and “[IF YES] Who helps you [and your 
[partner/husband/wife]] with your finances?  1.CHILD OR CHILD-IN-
LAW 2.OTHER RELATIVE  3.FRIEND  4.LAWYER 5.BANK OFFICER 
6.FINANCIAL CONSULTANT, ACCOUNTANT OR OTHER PROFESSIONAL 
INVESTMENT COUNSELOR  7.OTHER, SPECIFY.” The value of zero is 
assigned if a respondent chooses “No” to the first question or “1~4, or 
7” to the second question. The value of one is assigned if a respondent 
choose Yes in the first question and (5 or 6) in the second question 
(getting help from financial experts). 
OV501 
riskavers 
This variable takes 1,2,3,4,5, or 6. It is based on the question, 
"Suppose that you are the only income earner in the family. Your doctor 
recommends that you move because of allergies, and you have to 
choose between two possible jobs. The ﬁrst would guarantee your 
current total family income for life. The second is possibly better 
paying, but the income is also less certain. There is a 50-50 chance the 
second job would double your total lifetime income and a 50-50 chance 
that it would cut it by a third [by seventy-five percent; in half; by twenty 
percent; by 10 percent]. Which job would you take – the ﬁrst job or the 
second job?" See Barsky et al. (1997) 
r8risk6* 
Notes: # indicates household-level data; individual-level data otherwise. § indicates that the value in the log is replaced with one if the original 
value is less than one. * indicates that the source of the data is “RAND HRS Income and Wealth Imputations-v.O (March 2016).” 
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Table B.2 Descriptive Statistics of Variables (2012 HRS sample aged 60 or more and loss-aversion 
data is available) 
Variable Mean 
     
S.D. 
Quantiles 
   obs 
Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
lossavers 4.24 (1.32) 1.03 3 5 5 5 1,100 
i_lossaver 0.72 (0.45) 0 0 1 1 1 1,100 
i_lossaver2 0.89 (0.31) 0 1 1 1 1 1,100 
own_life 0.57 (0.50) 0 0 1 1 1 1,095 
num_life 0.85 (0.95) 0 0 1 1 5 1,087 
log_amt_life 5.4 (5.18) 0 0 8.52 10.13 15.42 1,001 
own_term 0.36 (0.48) 0 0 0 1 1 1,051 
num_term 0.48 (0.75) 0 0 0 1 5 1,050 
log_amt_term 3.26 (4.85) 0 0 0 9.21 15.42 987 
own2term 0.09 (0.29) 0 0 0 0 1 1,050 
log_amt_term50k 1.17 (3.47) 0 0 0 0 15.41 987 
own_whole 0.27 (0.44) 0 0 0 1 1 1,051 
num_whole 0.35 (0.66) 0 0 0 1 4 1,048 
log_amt_whole 1.06 (3.12) 0 0 0 0 12.71 862 
will 0.58 (0.49) 0 0 1 1 1 1,095 
log_income 10.31 (1.27) 0 9.74 10.37 10.99 14.22 1,100 
log_Stock 2.59 (4.85) 0 0 0 0 15.42 1,100 
log_House 8.6 (5.16) 0 0 11.29 12.09 14.91 1,100 
log_Nonrisky 7.41 (4.27) 0 5.53 8.66 10.71 14.65 1,100 
log_NetFinWorth 7.31 (5.10) 0 0 9.21 11.46 15.52 1,100 
log_NetWorth 10.86 (3.93) 0 10.48 12.07 13.17 16.37 1,100 
age 72.26 (8.43) 60 65 72 78 99 1,100 
edu 12.63 (3.03) 0 12 12 14 17 1,093 
kids 3.25 (2.08) 0 2 3 4 20 1,100 
employed 0.21 (0.41) 0 0 0 0 1 1,100 
selfemp 0.08 (0.27) 0 0 0 0 1 1,100 
cognitive 516.67 (34.36) 409 501 519 537 584 943 
prob_live80100 46.04 (31.62) 0 20 50 75 100 1,021 
livesure 0.12 (0.32) 0 0 0 0 1 1,021 
advice 0.12 (0.33) 0 0 0 0 1 97 
married 0.57 (0.50) 0 0 1 1 1 1,100 
female 0.59 (0.49) 0 0 1 1 1 1,100 
i_hispanic 0.09 (0.29) 0 0 0 0 1 1,100 
own_house 0.78 (0.41) 0 1 1 1 1 1,100 
riskavers 4.75 (1.43) 1 4 5 6 6 373 
Notes: See Table B.1 for definitions of variables 
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Table B.3 Characteristics of the Analyzed 2012 HRS Sample: Comparison with 2012 CPS 
  
Notes: The analyzed HRS samples are those who are aged 60 or more and loss aversion data is available. 
Current Population Survey (CPS) samples are based on July 2012 survey. All figures are based on unweighted data. 
 
 
N (Percent) N (Percent)
Total observations 1,100 (100.00) 23,085 (100.00)
BY AGE
  60-64 263 (23.91) 6,341 (27.47)
  65-69 173 (15.73) 5,360 (23.22)
  70-74 251 (22.82) 3,941 (17.07)
  75-79 186 (16.91) 3,022 (13.09)
  80-84 131 (11.91) 2,301 (9.97)
  85- 96 (8.73) 2,120 (9.18)
GENDER
   0 Male 452 (41.09) 10,421 (45.14)
   1 Female 648 (58.91) 12,664 (54.86)
MARRIED
  0 Currently not married 472 (42.91) 9,305 (40.31)
  1 Currently married 628 (57.09) 13,780 (59.69)
EDUCATION
  1 High school dropout 225 (20.59) 3,355 (14.53)
  2 High school graduate 389 (35.59) 7,835 (33.94)
  3 Some college 252 (23.06) 5,712 (24.74)
  4 Bachelors degree 101 (9.24) 3,525 (15.27)
  5 Masters degree or higher 126 (11.53) 2,658 (11.51)
HISPANIC
  0 No 999 (90.82) 21,813 (94.49)
  1 Yes 101 (9.18) 1,272 (5.51)
FAMILY INCOME ($)
  Less than 14,999 216 (19.64) 3,277 (14.20)
  15,000-24,999 214 (19.45) 3,393 (14.70)
  25,000-34,999 168 (15.27) 3,475 (15.05)
  35,000-49,999 157 (14.27) 3,500 (15.16)
  50,000-74,999 168 (15.27) 4,161 (18.02)
  75,000 or more 177 (16.09) 5,279 (22.87)
REGIONS RESIDE
   North East 166 (15.12) 4,762 (20.63)
   Midwest 257 (23.41) 5,712 (24.74)
   South 461 (41.99) 7,000 (30.32)
   West 214 (19.49) 5,611 (24.31)
HRS sample aged 60 or more &
loss-aversion data is available 
CPS sample aged 60 or 
more
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  Table B.4 Demography of Loss aversion and Risk Aversion (Age≥60) 
 
Notes: See Table B.1 for definitions of lossavers and riskavers. This table shows that female, old, and undereducated individuals 
are more likely to be loss-averse. Risk aversion also exhibits a similar pattern. The correlation of coefficient (ρ) between loss 
aversion and risk aversion is estimated to be 0.1080 (N=373, p-value=0.0371) 
Source: 2012 HRS. RAND HRS Data File (v.O) (Feb 2016).  
 
  
Male Female Age 60-70 70-80
Not 
currently
married
Currently
Married
edu<=12 edu>12 kids<=2 kids>3
N 452 648 436 437 472 628 614 486 464 636
lossavers
(1.03,1.07,...,3.0,5.0)
4.14 4.31 4.11 4.32 4.24 4.24 4.28 4.19 4.30 4.20
(s.d) (1.38) (1.27) (1.36) (1.28) (1.30) (1.33) (1.28) (1.36) (1.28) (1.34)
Male Female Age 60-70 70-80
Not 
currently
married
Currently
Married
edu<=12 edu>12 kids<=2 kids>3
N 1,671 2,550 3,701 520 1,494 2,727 1,954 3,178 2,046 3,086
riskavers
 (1,2,3,4,5,6)
4.58 4.84 4.73 4.80 4.69 4.76 4.92 4.59 4.70 4.73
(s.d) (0.53) (1.41) (1.46) (1.48) (1.53) (1.43) (1.44) (1.50) (1.43) (1.53)
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Table B.5 Life Insurance Ownership Ratio of the U.S. Elderly in 2012 (Age≥ 𝟓𝟏, individual-level, 
unweighted) 
 
Notes: This table displays the ownership ratio of life insurance of the U.S. elderly. It shows that 56.0 percent of those aged 50 or 
older have life insurance. By demographic characteristics, wealthy, highly educated, male and married individuals and those with 
kids are more likely to hold life insurance. 
Data Source: 2012 HRS 
  
BY AGE 51-59 60-69 70-79 80-89 90 or older Total
 ( N ) (5,620) (5,018) (5,042) (2,361) (534) (18,575)
Any life insurance (a+b-c) 0.582 0.583 0.550 0.512 0.403 0.560
   term-life(a) 0.453 0.407 0.326 0.296 0.242 0.380
   whole-life(b) 0.211 0.255 0.294 0.280 0.197 0.254
   both types (c ) 0.082 0.079 0.070 0.064 0.036 0.074
BY GENDER Male Female Total
 ( N ) (7,947) (10,627) (18,574)
Any life insurance (a+b-c) 0.602 0.528 0.560
   term-life(a) 0.416 0.353 0.380
   whole-life(b) 0.276 0.237 0.254
   both types (c ) 0.091 0.062 0.074
BY CURRENT MARITAL STATUS
Not married
or coupled
Married or
 coupled
Total
 ( N ) (7,968) (10,606) (18,574)
Any life insurance (a+b-c) 0.485 0.616 0.560
   term-life(a) 0.322 0.423 0.380
   whole-life(b) 0.214 0.283 0.254
   both types (c ) 0.052 0.091 0.074
BY THE NUMER OF KIDS 0 1 2 3 4 or more Total
 ( N ) (1,467) (1,940) (5,018) (3,908) (6,242) (18,575)
Any life insurance (a+b-c) 0.487 0.567 0.605 0.594 0.516 0.560
   term-life(a) 0.344 0.387 0.413 0.408 0.343 0.380
   whole-life(b) 0.202 0.254 0.276 0.273 0.236 0.254
   both types (c ) 0.059 0.074 0.083 0.086 0.062 0.074
BY HOUSEHOLD NET WORTH Bottom 25% 25-50% 50-75% Top 25% Total
 ( N ) (4,557) (4,583) (4,679) (4,756) (18,575)
Any life insurance (a+b-c) 0.407 0.582 0.638 0.607 0.560
   term-life(a) 0.280 0.403 0.442 0.393 0.380
   whole-life(b) 0.161 0.240 0.295 0.315 0.254
   both types (c ) 0.034 0.062 0.099 0.100 0.074
BY EDUCATION
Highschool
Dropout
Highschool
Graduate
Some
College
Bachelor's
Degree
Gradiate
Degree
Total
 ( N ) (3,889) (5,743) (4,327) (2,225) (2,047) (18,231)
Any life insurance (a+b-c) 0.392 0.576 0.605 0.644 0.649 0.560
   term-life(a) 0.247 0.374 0.415 0.476 0.471 0.380
   whole-life(b) 0.174 0.270 0.268 0.288 0.297 0.254
   both types (c ) 0.030 0.068 0.078 0.120 0.119 0.074
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Table B.6 Loss Aversion and Term-Life & Whole-Life Insurance: All HRS samples 
 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Sources: 2012 HRS. 
 
 
  
Two tailed t-test for
equal mean
p-value
own_term 0.431 (0.021) 0.373 (0.015) 0.023**
num_term 0.589 (0.034) 0.504 (0.024) 0.040**
log_amt_term 4.442 (0.241) 3.520 (0.159)  0.001***
own_whole 0.243 (0.018) 0.254 (0.013) 0.628
num_whole 0.291 (0.024) 0.327 (0.020) 0.267
log_amt_whole 1.094 (0.151) 1.078 (0.104) 0.927
Those with low
loss aversion (λ≤3)
Those with high 
loss aversion (λ>3)
N=543 N=1,087
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Table B.7 Robustness Check 1: Further control of employer-provided term-life plans (Age≥60) 
 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.The dependent variable of columns (1)-(2) in 
Panel A is an indicator variable for owning two or more policies of term-life insurance. The dependent variable of columns (3)-(4) 
is log of the “coverage amount of term-life insurance−$50,000.” By using these dependent variables, we consider the possibility 
that one term-life insurance plan with the coverage amount of $50,000 or less can be provided by employers. In Panel B, we 
report regression results when 13 occupation dummy variables (based on industry codes with longest reported tenure) are added.  
Panel A
(1) Probit (2) Probit (3) Tobit (4) Tobit
own_2term own_2term log_amt_term50k log_amt_term50k
lossavers -0.0806** -0.0793** -1.777** -0.945
(0.0379) (0.0390) (0.718) (0.621)
will 0.119 5.643***
(0.137) (2.144)
log_income 0.0595 0.860
(0.0801) (0.982)
log_networth 0.0103 0.487
(0.0189) (0.360)
female -0.223* -7.620***
(0.114) (1.857)
married 0.00178 2.791
(0.136) (2.444)
age 0.0400 -0.0519
(0.0977) (2.740)
age_sq -0.000276 -0.00629
(0.000659) (0.0194)
edu 0.000736 1.150***
(0.0183) (0.324)
kids -0.0403 0.599
(0.0284) (0.445)
employed 0.405*** 8.166***
(0.137) (1.921)
Constant -0.981*** -3.096 -17.76*** -17.10
(0.164) (3.659) (3.472) (98.01)
Observations 1,050 1,041 987 978
Panel B
Term-Life Insurance Whole-Life Insurance
(1) Probit (2) OLS (3) Tobit (4) Probit (5) OLS (6) Tobit
VARIABLES own_term num_term log_amt_term own_whole num_whole log_amt_whole
lossavers -0.0543* -0.0359** -0.670** 0.0535 0.0240 0.447
(0.0309) (0.0176) (0.317) (0.0327) (0.0147) (0.738)
will 0.00126 0.00215 -0.0153 0.225** 0.0948** 5.527**
(0.0989) (0.0581) (1.063) (0.0999) (0.0452) (2.227)
log_income 0.0324 0.0312 0.252 0.0196 0.0157 0.715
(0.0369) (0.0206) (0.389) (0.0338) (0.0131) (0.830)
log_networth 0.0317** 0.0109* 0.314** 0.00736 0.00431 0.251
(0.0136) (0.00604) (0.155) (0.0132) (0.00479) (0.312)
female -0.0354 -0.0538 0.0172 -0.231** -0.145*** -7.492***
(0.0946) (0.0518) (1.027) (0.0953) (0.0506) (2.007)
married -0.0400 -0.00437 0.0175 0.000787 0.00984 -0.314
(0.0980) (0.0549) (1.075) (0.101) (0.0478) (2.233)
age -0.101 -0.0533 -0.921 0.136 0.0593 3.538
(0.0837) (0.0437) (0.923) (0.0921) (0.0417) (2.227)
age_sq 0.000616 0.000331 0.00485 -0.000950 -0.000399 -0.0244
(0.000563) (0.000290) (0.00625) (0.000622) (0.000281) (0.0151)
edu 0.0436*** 0.00848 0.565*** 0.00843 0.00426 0.0650
(0.0156) (0.00742) (0.175) (0.0159) (0.00723) (0.370)
kids 0.00859 -0.00655 0.113 0.0275 0.00495 0.0319
(0.0202) (0.00974) (0.216) (0.0206) (0.00925) (0.430)
employed 0.276** 0.169*** 3.350*** 0.0925 0.0200 4.285*
(0.112) (0.0651) (1.158) (0.116) (0.0529) (2.466)
Constant 2.427 2.074 23.15 -6.177* -2.181 -162.6**
(3.080) (1.608) (33.93) (3.376) (1.503) (80.02)
occupation_dummies O O O O O O
Observations 1,042 1,041 978 1,042 1,039 854
R-squared 0.098 0.038
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Table B.8 Robustness Check 2: Low wealth level (bottom half) individuals only (Age≥60) 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. This table displays the results when the sample 
is restricted to the bottom half of the original sample in terms of wealth levels. The results show that loss aversion is still 
significant at 5 percent level in the regression for num_term and is significant at 10 percent in the regression for log_amt_term. 
 
  
Term-Life Insurance Whole-Life Insurance
(1) Probit (2) OLS (3) Tobit (4) Probit (5) OLS (6) Tobit
VARIABLES own_term num_term log_amt_term own_whole num_whole log_amt_whole
lossavers -0.0700 -0.0548** -0.839* 0.0486 0.0197 0.796
(0.0441) (0.0272) (0.475) (0.0459) (0.0217) (1.138)
will 0.183 0.166** 1.607 0.185 0.0604 4.131
(0.132) (0.0818) (1.455) (0.134) (0.0655) (3.000)
log_income 0.0624 0.0445 0.466 0.0666 0.0299* 1.775
(0.0724) (0.0422) (0.811) (0.0591) (0.0170) (2.102)
log_networth 0.0483*** 0.0224*** 0.492*** 0.0264 0.0127** 0.839**
(0.0163) (0.00740) (0.190) (0.0161) (0.00564) (0.406)
female 0.0220 -0.0189 1.081 -0.00223 -0.0394 -3.436
(0.128) (0.0772) (1.442) (0.129) (0.0576) (2.892)
married -0.00188 0.0265 1.656 0.0116 0.0436 0.447
(0.140) (0.0936) (1.567) (0.144) (0.0639) (3.202)
age 0.0446 0.0566 0.691 0.158 0.0716* 6.379**
(0.104) (0.0521) (1.193) (0.111) (0.0432) (2.594)
age_sq -0.000363 -0.000419 -0.00588 -0.00106 -0.000475* -0.0420**
(0.000695) (0.000346) (0.00806) (0.000742) (0.000286) (0.0173)
edu 0.0577*** 0.0168* 0.812*** 0.00840 0.00296 -0.154
(0.0206) (0.00923) (0.244) (0.0207) (0.00898) (0.505)
kids -0.00671 -0.0192 0.0161 0.0438 0.0107 -0.405
(0.0282) (0.0147) (0.316) (0.0283) (0.0116) (0.685)
employed 0.187 0.118 2.218 0.214 0.0566 5.797
(0.160) (0.0941) (1.719) (0.168) (0.0788) (3.774)
Constant -3.267 -2.021 -41.88 -7.914* -2.900* -286.9***
(3.873) (1.954) (44.78) (4.131) (1.585) (95.84)
Observations 518 517 491 520 520 425
R-squared 0.077 0.036
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Table B.9 Robustness Check 3: A risk aversion measure is added (Age≥60)  
  
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.This table displays the regression results when a 
risk aversion measure (riskavers) is controlled for. The variable riskavers is measured by the status-quo-bias-free lifetime income 
gamble questions by Barsky et al. (1997) in the HRS. The variable takes the values of 1, 2, …,or 6. See Table B.1 for details. 
Panel A
Term-Life Insurance Whole-Life Insurance
(1) Probit (2) OLS (3) Tobit (4) Probit (5) OLS (6) Tobit
VARIABLES own_term num_term log_amt_term own_whole num_whole log_amt_whole
lossavers -0.0901* -0.0729** -1.104** 0.124** 0.0471** 1.592
(0.0513) (0.0337) (0.467) (0.0595) (0.0188) (1.206)
riskaver 0.0160 0.0147 -0.0448 -0.0941* -0.0298 -1.955*
(0.0502) (0.0284) (0.507) (0.0516) (0.0205) (1.081)
will 0.0344 -0.0325 0.407 0.195 0.0711 7.968**
(0.158) (0.110) (1.554) (0.172) (0.0680) (3.758)
log_income 0.0289 0.0823 -0.0293 0.0154 0.00183 0.265
(0.0985) (0.0574) (0.965) (0.0952) (0.0375) (2.447)
log_networth -0.00544 -0.00123 -0.0681 0.0707*** 0.0201*** 1.194***
(0.0211) (0.0123) (0.208) (0.0218) (0.00522) (0.443)
female -0.0832 -0.104 -0.476 -0.145 -0.0627 -6.685**
(0.144) (0.0864) (1.440) (0.158) (0.0621) (3.309)
married 0.188 0.0513 2.141 -0.219 -0.0724 -6.539
(0.180) (0.103) (1.822) (0.200) (0.0824) (4.425)
age 0.0334 -0.161 1.244 1.126 0.257 12.85
(0.959) (0.590) (9.470) (1.067) (0.419) (24.14)
age_sq -0.000560 0.00108 -0.0129 -0.00886 -0.00209 -0.102
(0.00736) (0.00450) (0.0728) (0.00818) (0.00320) (0.185)
edu 0.0632** 0.0187 0.757*** -0.00683 -0.00568 -0.0211
(0.0266) (0.0134) (0.272) (0.0287) (0.0110) (0.782)
kids -0.0134 -0.0147 -0.211 0.00441 -0.00819 -0.0831
(0.0380) (0.0220) (0.380) (0.0409) (0.0139) (0.870)
employed 0.359** 0.204* 3.330** 0.117 0.0507 7.879**
(0.161) (0.118) (1.593) (0.176) (0.0665) (3.796)
Constant -0.958 5.574 -33.60 -37.30 -7.758 -439.5
(31.24) (19.29) (307.3) (34.63) (13.57) (778.8)
Observations 361 361 347 361 360 308
R-squared 0.091 0.055
Panel B
Term-Life Insurance Whole-Life Insurance
(1) Probit (2) OLS (3) Tobit (4) Probit (5) OLS (6) Tobit
VARIABLES own_term num_term log_amt_term own_whole num_whole log_amt_whole
riskaver 0.0276** 0.00735 0.174 -0.00326 -0.00192 -0.136
(0.0140) (0.00833) (0.146) (0.0148) (0.00745) (0.323)
will 0.0502 0.0231 0.521 0.245*** 0.100*** 4.039***
(0.0453) (0.0274) (0.466) (0.0478) (0.0236) (1.092)
log_income 0.0254 0.0225*** 0.259 0.0632*** 0.0221*** 1.333***
(0.0155) (0.00844) (0.167) (0.0191) (0.00539) (0.506)
log_networth 0.00702 0.00483 0.0950 0.00598 0.00408 0.112
(0.00594) (0.00314) (0.0633) (0.00647) (0.00255) (0.153)
female -0.163*** -0.106*** -1.930*** -0.0454 -0.0568** -2.868***
(0.0425) (0.0257) (0.437) (0.0446) (0.0222) (0.962)
married 0.0784 0.0348 0.846* 0.0720 0.0328 1.043
(0.0477) (0.0274) (0.503) (0.0504) (0.0229) (1.154)
age -0.0577 -0.147 0.219 0.357 -0.00914 -4.278
(0.254) (0.136) (2.710) (0.254) (0.124) (5.363)
age_sq 0.000249 0.00103 -0.00386 -0.00256 0.000136 0.0337
(0.00194) (0.00104) (0.0208) (0.00194) (0.000950) (0.0410)
edu 0.0586*** 0.0266*** 0.651*** 0.0116 0.00609 0.519**
(0.00825) (0.00441) (0.0870) (0.00866) (0.00380) (0.216)
kids 0.0278** 0.0160** 0.270** -0.0181 -0.00809 0.0621
(0.0113) (0.00640) (0.116) (0.0119) (0.00509) (0.264)
employed 0.343*** 0.203*** 3.864*** 0.130*** 0.0664*** 4.559***
(0.0455) (0.0280) (0.465) (0.0483) (0.0233) (1.045)
Constant 1.043 4.998 -15.02 -13.97* -0.0160 90.67
(8.260) (4.417) (87.98) (8.267) (4.017) (174.6)
Observations 4,005 3,999 3,806 3,992 3,985 3,290
R-squared 0.056 0.029
 140  
 
Table B.10 Robustness Check 4: Samples are restricted to those aged 60-69 
 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Panel A of this table reports regression results 
when the sample is restricted to those in the same life-cycle stage, those aged 60-69 in particular. In Panel B, a risk aversion 
measure is added as a explanatory variable to this age cohort samples. Results show that even if a risk aversion measure is added 
to this age cohort sample, loss aversion’s effects remain robust while risk-aversion is not significant. 
Panel A
Term-Life Insurance Whole-Life Insurance
(1) Probit (2) OLS (3) Tobit (4) Probit (5) OLS (6) Tobit
VARIABLES own_term num_term log_amt_term own_whole num_whole log_amt_whole
lossavers -0.0769 -0.0650** -1.032** 0.0900* 0.0401** 1.269
(0.0476) (0.0291) (0.442) (0.0506) (0.0171) (1.101)
will -0.0121 -2.79e-05 -0.289 0.172 0.0760 5.317
(0.147) (0.0941) (1.440) (0.155) (0.0677) (3.483)
log_income 0.0604 0.0513* 0.564 0.0351 0.0149 0.899
(0.0697) (0.0309) (0.728) (0.0534) (0.0176) (1.646)
log_networth 0.0269 0.00888 0.288 0.0153 0.00746 1.137**
(0.0190) (0.00934) (0.208) (0.0189) (0.00610) (0.500)
female -0.0678 -0.0914 -0.205 -0.214 -0.143** -10.51***
(0.137) (0.0802) (1.371) (0.141) (0.0633) (2.810)
married 0.101 0.0719 1.674 -0.0360 -0.0255 -3.751
(0.163) (0.0874) (1.662) (0.171) (0.0732) (3.739)
edu 0.0671*** 0.0233** 0.798*** 0.0144 0.00298 0.468
(0.0228) (0.0100) (0.238) (0.0250) (0.00956) (0.719)
kids 0.0138 -0.000456 0.126 0.0253 -0.00264 0.562
(0.0350) (0.0193) (0.354) (0.0370) (0.0141) (0.825)
employed 0.430*** 0.281*** 3.911*** 0.202 0.0919 5.948*
(0.138) (0.0848) (1.371) (0.145) (0.0589) (3.183)
Constant -1.948*** -0.214 -19.91*** -1.868*** -0.0939 -53.91***
(0.729) (0.335) (7.525) (0.600) (0.190) (16.60)
Observations 417 417 401 417 417 349
R-squared 0.111 0.048
Panel B
Term-Life Insurance Whole-Life Insurance
(1) Probit (2) OLS (3) Tobit (4) Probit (5) OLS (6) Tobit
VARIABLES own_term num_term log_amt_term own_whole num_whole log_amt_whole
lossavers -0.106* -0.0909** -1.230** 0.0931 0.0404** 1.374
(0.0547) (0.0360) (0.485) (0.0624) (0.0202) (1.226)
riskavers 0.0411 0.0317 0.236 -0.0862 -0.0240 -1.513
(0.0562) (0.0319) (0.564) (0.0546) (0.0218) (1.129)
will -0.0151 -0.0523 -0.106 0.258 0.100 8.618**
(0.169) (0.119) (1.611) (0.186) (0.0745) (3.727)
log_income 0.0920 0.102 0.480 -0.0345 -0.0253 -1.174
(0.113) (0.0639) (1.123) (0.105) (0.0418) (2.486)
log_networth -0.0101 -0.00299 -0.0983 0.0736*** 0.0194*** 1.316**
(0.0219) (0.0117) (0.210) (0.0251) (0.00567) (0.514)
female -0.111 -0.134 -0.689 -0.146 -0.0846 -9.069***
(0.155) (0.0952) (1.496) (0.168) (0.0691) (3.416)
married 0.257 0.128 2.963 -0.162 -0.0314 -4.537
(0.195) (0.107) (1.955) (0.216) (0.0862) (4.544)
edu 0.0625** 0.0212 0.749** -0.0101 -0.00369 0.0905
(0.0292) (0.0145) (0.290) (0.0312) (0.0127) (0.837)
kids -0.0129 -0.00801 -0.146 -0.0127 -0.0136 0.102
(0.0414) (0.0243) (0.407) (0.0435) (0.0144) (0.903)
employed 0.443*** 0.264** 4.145*** 0.211 0.112 9.429**
(0.165) (0.114) (1.579) (0.180) (0.0703) (3.692)
Constant -1.860 -0.576 -13.80 -1.034 0.356 -24.47
(1.195) (0.638) (12.10) (1.091) (0.424) (25.42)
Observations 311 311 299 311 311 266
R-squared 0.115 0.057
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Table B.11 Robustness Check 5: Bivariate Probit, SUR, Bivariate Tobit results (Age≥60) 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.This table reports the regression results when the 
Bivariate Probit, SUR, and Bivariate Tobit models are employed. These methods consider the possibility that decisions to buy 
term-life and whole-life are jointly determined. Since term-life and whole-life insurance are partial substitutes of each other, 
owning one type of life insurance may have a negative effect on the purchase of the other type of life insurance. For estimation, 
Stata codes, biprobit, sureg, and mvtobit are used. 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES own_term own_whole num_term num_whole log_amt_term log_amt_whole
lossavers -0.0516* 0.0489 -0.0353** 0.0226 -0.574* 0.701
(0.0305) (0.0323) (0.0176) (0.0157) (0.323) (0.799)
will 0.0530 0.240** 0.0339 0.0920* 0.590 5.462**
(0.0951) (0.100) (0.0535) (0.0477) (1.019) (2.453)
log_income 0.0155 0.0224 0.0221 0.0189 0.143 0.688
(0.0360) (0.0334) (0.0205) (0.0183) (0.370) (1.025)
log_networth 0.0382*** 0.00657 0.0153** 0.00420 0.365*** 0.320
(0.0133) (0.0133) (0.00699) (0.00623) (0.139) (0.355)
female -0.117 -0.221** -0.0873* -0.141*** -0.900 -7.149***
(0.0852) (0.0875) (0.0482) (0.0430) (0.912) (2.178)
married -0.0364 0.0304 0.000802 0.0138 0.385 -0.0698
(0.0968) (0.100) (0.0543) (0.0484) (1.042) (2.453)
age -0.0609 0.141 -0.0235 0.0567 -0.476 3.480*
(0.0771) (0.0872) (0.0428) (0.0382) (0.868) (2.102)
age_sq 0.000328 -0.000981* 0.000119 -0.000380 0.00168 -0.0240*
(0.000517) (0.000587) (0.000286) (0.000255) (0.00584) (0.0142)
edu 0.0427*** 0.00453 0.0121 0.00282 0.516*** 0.0740
(0.0143) (0.0151) (0.00828) (0.00738) (0.164) (0.359)
kids 0.00161 0.0201 -0.0101 0.00355 0.161 -0.131
(0.0199) (0.0205) (0.0113) (0.0101) (0.216) (0.528)
employed 0.214** 0.114 0.147** 0.0256 2.492** 2.907
(0.108) (0.114) (0.0637) (0.0568) (1.154) (2.668)
Constant 1.415 -6.354** 1.187 -2.104 12.82 -159.8**
(2.871) (3.225) (1.604) (1.430) (32.21) (79.45)
rho
Observations 1,039 1,039 1,036 1,036 811 811
R-squared 0.048 0.030
(0.0533) (0.0686)
Bivariate Probit SUR regressions Bivariate Tobit
-0.228*** 0.205***
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Table B.12. Robustness Check 6: an indicator variable for loss aversion is used (Age≥60) 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. This table reports the regression results when an 
indicator variable is used for high loss-aversion instead of using a continuous measure for loss aversion. The indicator variable 
(i_lossaver) takes the value of one if the person’s loss aversion is equal to five and zero otherwise. 
  
Term-Life Insurance Whole-Life Insurance
(1) Probit (2) OLS (3) Tobit (4) Probit (5) OLS (6) Tobit
VARIABLES own_term num_term log_amt_term own_whole num_whole log_amt_whole
i_lossaver -0.168* -0.111** -2.271** 0.0643 0.0348 -0.538
(0.0904) (0.0535) (0.986) (0.0953) (0.0445) (2.144)
will 0.0477 0.0310 0.364 0.216** 0.0896** 5.748**
(0.0950) (0.0578) (1.070) (0.0993) (0.0448) (2.306)
log_income 0.0173 0.0231 0.105 0.0251 0.0188 0.526
(0.0367) (0.0203) (0.414) (0.0334) (0.0132) (0.825)
log_networth 0.0376*** 0.0150** 0.387** 0.00810 0.00461 0.312
(0.0133) (0.00619) (0.158) (0.0130) (0.00484) (0.307)
female -0.113 -0.0860* -0.951 -0.212** -0.140*** -7.117***
(0.0854) (0.0508) (0.972) (0.0873) (0.0430) (1.858)
married -0.0389 -0.00168 0.190 0.0105 0.00935 0.0150
(0.0967) (0.0571) (1.108) (0.1000) (0.0473) (2.249)
age -0.0560 -0.0239 -0.708 0.144* 0.0560 3.341
(0.0764) (0.0412) (0.888) (0.0875) (0.0386) (2.174)
age_sq 0.000297 0.000123 0.00326 -0.00100* -0.000375 -0.0232
(0.000513) (0.000272) (0.00600) (0.000590) (0.000260) (0.0147)
edu 0.0440*** 0.0120* 0.553*** 0.00660 0.00297 0.138
(0.0144) (0.00703) (0.166) (0.0153) (0.00711) (0.365)
kids 0.00287 -0.00956 0.0409 0.0242 0.00403 0.0145
(0.0199) (0.0102) (0.227) (0.0204) (0.00928) (0.435)
employed 0.216** 0.144** 2.664** 0.115 0.0282 3.585
(0.108) (0.0664) (1.171) (0.115) (0.0516) (2.449)
Constant 1.093 1.121 17.93 -6.358** -2.012 -150.7*
(2.844) (1.539) (33.01) (3.239) (1.414) (79.03)
Observations 1,042 1,041 978 1,042 1,039 854
R-squared 0.048 0.028
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Table B.13 Robustness Check (Wealth) 2: Samples are restricted to those aged 65-70 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. This table reports the regression results when 
the sample is restricted to those in the same life-cycle stage, those aged 65-70 in particular. occupation_dummies1 represents 17 
occupation dummy variables, which is based on the occupation code for job with longest reported tenure (RAND HRS code: 
R11JLOCC). 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES log_Stock log_House log_Nonrisky log_NetFinWorth log_NetWorth
lossavers -1.691** 0.0330 -0.0242 -0.0268 0.269*
(0.737) (0.236) (0.200) (0.304) (0.159)
log_income -0.180 0.181 0.437 0.819 0.0304
(1.087) (0.358) (0.295) (0.543) (0.190)
edu 1.243** 0.116 0.197 0.351 0.158
(0.622) (0.209) (0.163) (0.252) (0.113)
will 9.557*** 2.821*** 2.753*** 4.087*** 1.483***
(2.434) (0.785) (0.728) (1.040) (0.448)
female 1.303 1.381* 0.751 0.677 0.125
(2.362) (0.752) (0.667) (0.911) (0.414)
married 4.606 2.219** 0.736 1.420 0.887
(3.494) (0.981) (0.815) (1.302) (0.584)
kids -1.829*** 0.316* -0.255 -0.320 0.0918
(0.684) (0.188) (0.198) (0.272) (0.104)
employed 4.606* -0.456 0.225 0.387 0.981*
(2.676) (0.876) (0.693) (1.106) (0.547)
selfemp -7.683** 1.733 -0.133 0.502 -0.577
(3.680) (1.176) (0.968) (1.120) (0.804)
own_house 4.280 2.408** 4.742*** 6.208***
(4.983) (1.094) (1.749) (0.961)
i_hispanic -0.0631 -3.232* -2.886 0.317
(1.427) (1.670) (2.059) (0.760)
Constant -37.06** -0.662 -4.530 -14.90** 0.686
(14.63) (4.576) (3.913) (6.704) (2.494)
occupation_dummies1 O O O O O
Observations 224 224 224 224 224
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Table B.14 Robustness Check (Wealth) 3: Indicator variables for loss aversion are used (Age≥65) 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. This table reports the regression results when 
indicator variables for loss aversion (i_lossaver (λ=5.0); i_lossaver2 (λ≥3.0)) are used as explanatory variables. 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES log_Stock log_House log_Nonrisky log_NetFinWorth log_NetWorth log_Stock log_House log_Nonrisky log_NetFinWorth log_NetWorth
i_lossaver -2.638** 0.346 0.514 0.245 0.337
(1.321) (0.460) (0.354) (0.445) (0.240)
i_lossaver2 -4.040** 0.814 1.084** 0.662 0.895**
(1.847) (0.661) (0.512) (0.651) (0.385)
log_income 3.765*** 0.308 0.800*** 1.031*** 0.227** 3.806*** 0.307 0.799*** 1.030*** 0.227**
(0.826) (0.215) (0.232) (0.306) (0.106) (0.822) (0.213) (0.230) (0.305) (0.105)
edu 1.115*** 0.156* 0.282*** 0.374*** 0.158*** 1.106*** 0.156* 0.283*** 0.376*** 0.159***
(0.266) (0.0847) (0.0663) (0.0861) (0.0413) (0.265) (0.0841) (0.0662) (0.0860) (0.0407)
age 3.047 0.564 -0.312 0.510 0.0645 3.032 0.560 -0.316 0.509 0.0620
(1.852) (0.604) (0.445) (0.541) (0.273) (1.849) (0.604) (0.443) (0.540) (0.271)
age_sq -0.0195 -0.00411 0.00231 -0.00265 -0.000325 -0.0195 -0.00408 0.00233 -0.00264 -0.000307
(0.0120) (0.00393) (0.00286) (0.00347) (0.00174) (0.0119) (0.00393) (0.00285) (0.00346) (0.00172)
will 10.03*** 2.281*** 2.361*** 3.611*** 1.869*** 9.996*** 2.271*** 2.353*** 3.603*** 1.857***
(1.576) (0.477) (0.361) (0.482) (0.245) (1.588) (0.475) (0.360) (0.480) (0.244)
female 2.783** 0.440 0.446 0.635 0.191 2.805** 0.447 0.455 0.638 0.196
(1.297) (0.437) (0.333) (0.441) (0.220) (1.295) (0.435) (0.332) (0.442) (0.219)
married 4.665*** 3.156*** 0.800** 1.408*** 0.967*** 4.454*** 3.194*** 0.853** 1.438*** 1.010***
(1.509) (0.486) (0.361) (0.488) (0.228) (1.502) (0.486) (0.360) (0.487) (0.225)
kids -0.995*** 0.0374 -0.0922 -0.118 0.00377 -0.965*** 0.0390 -0.0901 -0.116 0.00584
(0.332) (0.0924) (0.0724) (0.0952) (0.0489) (0.329) (0.0922) (0.0724) (0.0952) (0.0487)
employed -2.172 -0.0461 -0.424 -0.437 0.481 -2.159 -0.0493 -0.424 -0.438 0.478
(2.017) (0.617) (0.470) (0.655) (0.313) (1.998) (0.616) (0.471) (0.657) (0.314)
i_hispanic -16.92*** -0.751 -2.630*** -2.745*** -0.453 -16.21*** -0.775 -2.668*** -2.769*** -0.474
(5.237) (0.937) (0.813) (0.979) (0.499) (5.083) (0.933) (0.812) (0.980) (0.490)
own_house 1.922 1.311*** 1.847*** 4.546*** 1.866 1.304*** 1.843*** 4.534***
(1.951) (0.446) (0.564) (0.388) (1.945) (0.445) (0.564) (0.386)
Constant -186.4*** -20.20 2.317 -36.45* -2.104 -184.1** -20.52 1.814 -36.81* -2.580
(71.27) (23.21) (17.26) (21.05) (10.58) (71.34) (23.21) (17.20) (21.03) (10.50)
occupation_dummies O O O O O O O O O O
Observations 829 829 829 829 829 829 829 829 829 829
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Table B.15 Robustness Check (Wealth) 4: Risk aversion measure is controlled for (Age≥65) 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. This table displays the regression results when a 
risk aversion measure (riskavers) is controlled for. The variable riskavers is measured by the status-quo-bias-free lifetime income 
gamble questions by Barsky et al. (1997) in the HRS. The variable takes the values of 1, 2, …,or 6. See Table B.1 for details. 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES log_Stock log_House log_Nonrisky log_NetFinWorth log_NetWorth log_Stock log_House log_Nonrisky log_NetFinWorth log_NetWorth
lossavers -2.360*** -0.223 -0.0978 -0.143 0.146
(0.795) (0.228) (0.226) (0.328) (0.179)
riskavers 0.537 -0.0139 0.205 0.303 0.0233 -0.388 -0.0365 0.0520 0.0191 -0.0316
(0.714) (0.253) (0.240) (0.304) (0.172) (0.244) (0.0777) (0.0618) (0.0893) (0.0407)
log_income 0.957 0.785* 0.593 0.609 0.222 2.303*** 0.509*** 0.561*** 0.823*** 0.347***
(1.402) (0.412) (0.438) (0.622) (0.269) (0.493) (0.125) (0.104) (0.173) (0.0843)
edu 0.601 0.226 0.263* 0.503** 0.0985 1.237*** 0.113** 0.375*** 0.497*** 0.158***
(0.481) (0.156) (0.144) (0.195) (0.0929) (0.186) (0.0515) (0.0427) (0.0619) (0.0286)
age -90.67** -4.867 0.119 6.333 -4.069 3.728 -0.519 1.223 4.347 2.144
(44.45) (14.61) (14.08) (19.39) (10.29) (8.611) (2.313) (2.198) (3.345) (1.376)
age_sq 0.680** 0.0368 0.000776 -0.0421 0.0309 -0.0267 0.00385 -0.00901 -0.0313 -0.0154
(0.328) (0.108) (0.104) (0.143) (0.0760) (0.0632) (0.0170) (0.0162) (0.0246) (0.0101)
will 10.68*** 2.267*** 2.727*** 4.321*** 1.898*** 7.623*** 2.374*** 1.433*** 2.580*** 0.994***
(2.415) (0.713) (0.710) (0.990) (0.434) (0.837) (0.244) (0.194) (0.291) (0.137)
female 0.411 0.724 0.167 0.610 0.526 0.670 0.268 -0.115 0.0332 -0.0959
(2.202) (0.713) (0.705) (1.007) (0.422) (0.823) (0.249) (0.195) (0.296) (0.142)
married 3.730 1.891* 1.048 2.024 0.638 2.092** 2.889*** 0.681*** 0.972*** 0.802***
(3.231) (0.965) (0.841) (1.280) (0.562) (0.917) (0.282) (0.218) (0.326) (0.153)
kids -1.857** 0.441** -0.177 -0.143 0.0749 -1.107*** -0.0890 -0.264*** -0.344*** -0.132***
(0.721) (0.189) (0.209) (0.289) (0.122) (0.241) (0.0637) (0.0510) (0.0742) (0.0366)
employed 2.172 0.0277 -0.0513 -0.214 0.917* -0.797 -0.265 -0.174 -0.722** -0.0932
(2.718) (0.834) (0.728) (0.995) (0.486) (0.894) (0.268) (0.207) (0.320) (0.154)
i_hispanic -64.58 2.719*** -2.104 -2.338 1.323*** -5.864** 0.619 -1.708*** -1.036 0.363
(0) (1.023) (1.687) (2.029) (0.477) (2.318) (0.513) (0.484) (0.632) (0.254)
own_house 6.559 1.273 3.298* 5.647*** 8.585*** 1.745*** 2.909*** 5.284***
(4.354) (1.349) (1.788) (1.125) (1.693) (0.301) (0.460) (0.289)
Constant 2,982** 156.3 -17.75 -250.8 133.3 -188.6 16.29 -46.86 -163.4 -74.36
(1,504) (493.7) (475.7) (655.4) (347.7) (292.9) (78.70) (74.65) (113.6) (46.72)
Occupation Dummies O O O O O O O O O O
Observations 197 197 197 197 197 2,215 2,215 2,215 2,215 2,215
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Appendix B.2 Proofs of [A4] 
Proof) An increase in 𝑑?̂? increases the demand for term-life insurance:  
The quotient rule of derivatives is applied in equation (2.25).  
𝜕𝑎𝑡+1(𝑠1)
∗
𝜕?̂?𝑡
=
𝑒𝑡+𝑞𝑡𝑒𝑡+1(𝑠1)+
1−𝑞𝑡𝑅𝑡+1
𝑅𝑡+1
 𝑒𝑡+1(𝑠2)
[1+𝑞𝑡(
𝛽𝜋1
𝑞𝑡
𝑑?̂? )
1
𝛾⁄   +  (
1−𝑞𝑡𝑅𝑡+1
𝑅𝑡+1
)1−
1
𝛾⁄ (𝛽𝜋2)
1
𝛾⁄  ∙{1+ 𝑑𝑡+1̂
1
𝛾⁄  }]2
∗ ⟨ [1 𝛾⁄ (
𝛽𝜋1
𝑞𝑡
𝑑?̂?  )
1
𝛾⁄ −1 ∗
𝛽𝜋1
𝑞𝑡
∗ [1 +
𝑞𝑡(
𝛽𝜋1
𝑞𝑡
𝑑?̂?  )
1
𝛾⁄   +   (
1−𝑞𝑡𝑅𝑡+1
𝑅𝑡+1
)1−
1
𝛾⁄ (𝛽𝜋2)
1
𝛾⁄  ∙ {1 + 𝑑𝑡+1̂
1
𝛾⁄  }]  − [(
𝛽𝜋1
𝑞𝑡
𝑑?̂?  )
1
𝛾⁄ − (
𝑅𝑡+1
1−𝑞𝑡𝑅𝑡+1
 𝛽 𝜋2 )
1
𝛾⁄ ∙
{1 + 𝑑𝑡+1̂
1
𝛾⁄ }]*1 γ⁄ ∗ 𝑞𝑡(
𝛽𝜋1
𝑞𝑡
𝑑?̂?  )
1
𝛾⁄ −1 ∗
𝛽𝜋1
𝑞𝑡
 ⟩   
The terms in ⟨  ⟩ follows:  
[1 𝛾⁄ (
𝛽𝜋1
𝑞𝑡
𝑑?̂?  )
1
𝛾⁄ −1 ∗
𝛽𝜋1
𝑞𝑡
∗ [1 + 𝑞𝑡(
𝛽𝜋1
𝑞𝑡
𝑑?̂?  )
1
𝛾⁄   +   (
1−𝑞𝑡𝑅𝑡+1
𝑅𝑡+1
)1−
1
𝛾⁄ (𝛽𝜋2)
1
𝛾⁄  ∙ {1 + 𝑑𝑡+1̂
1
𝛾⁄  }]  + [−(
𝛽𝜋1
𝑞𝑡
𝑑?̂?  )
1
𝛾⁄ +
(
𝑅𝑡+1
1−𝑞𝑡𝑅𝑡+1
 𝛽 𝜋2 )
1
𝛾⁄ ∙ {1 +  𝑑𝑡+1̂
1
𝛾⁄ }]*1 𝛾⁄ ∗ 𝑞𝑡(
𝛽𝜋1
𝑞𝑡
𝑑?̂?  )
1
𝛾⁄ −1 ∗
𝛽𝜋1
𝑞𝑡
] 
= 1 𝛾⁄ (
𝛽𝜋1
𝑞𝑡
𝑑?̂?  )
1
𝛾⁄ −1 ∗
𝛽𝜋1
𝑞𝑡
 [ 1 + (𝑞𝑡 − 1) (
𝛽𝜋1
𝑞𝑡
𝑑?̂?  )
1
𝛾⁄ + (
1−𝑞𝑡𝑅𝑡+1
𝑅𝑡+1
)1−
1
𝛾⁄ (𝛽𝜋2)
1
𝛾⁄  ∙ {1 + 𝑑𝑡+1̂
1
𝛾⁄  } +
(
𝑅𝑡+1
1−𝑞𝑡𝑅𝑡+1
 𝛽 𝜋2 )
1
𝛾⁄ ∙ {1 +  𝑑𝑡+1̂
1
𝛾⁄ } 
Note that everything is positive except for (𝑞𝑡 − 1). Since 𝑑?̂? ≤ 1, 𝑞𝑡 ≥ 𝛽𝜋1(equality holds at a fair 
premium), and γ > 0, the term (𝑞𝑡 − 1) (
𝛽𝜋1
𝑞𝑡
𝑑?̂?  )
1
𝛾⁄   is greater than negative one.  
Thus 1 + (𝑞𝑡 − 1) (
𝛽𝜋1
𝑞𝑡
𝑑?̂?  )
1
𝛾⁄  is positive. Thus 
𝜕𝑎𝑡+1(𝑠1)
∗
𝜕?̂?𝑡
 > 0. ■ 
 
Proof) An increase in 𝑑?̂? decreases the demand for saving:  
The result (2.21) says that an increase in 𝑑?̂? decreases 𝐶𝑡
∗. The result (2.26) says that this leads to a 
decrease in 𝑏𝑡+1
∗   ■ 
Proof ) An increase in 𝑑𝑡+1̂ decreases the optimal level of term-life insurance.  
The result is obvious in the equations (2.21) and (2.25): 
𝑑𝑡+1̂ ↑  𝐶𝑡
∗ ↓ and [(
𝛽𝜋1
𝑞𝑡
𝑑?̂? )
1
𝛾⁄ − (
𝑅𝑡+1
1−𝑞𝑡𝑅𝑡+1
 𝛽 𝜋2 )
1
𝛾⁄ ∙ {1 +  𝑑𝑡+1̂
1
𝛾⁄
}] ↓  ■ 
  
Proof) An increase in 𝑑𝑡+1̂ increases the optimal level of saving: 
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The quotient rule of derivatives is applied in equation (2.26).  
𝜕𝑏𝑡+1
∗
𝜕𝑑𝑡+1̂
=
𝑒𝑡+𝑞𝑡𝑒𝑡+1(𝑠1)+
1−𝑞𝑡𝑅𝑡+1
𝑅𝑡+1
 𝑒𝑡+1(𝑠2)
[1+𝑞𝑡(
𝛽𝜋1
𝑞𝑡
𝑑?̂? )
1
𝛾⁄   +  (
1−𝑞𝑡𝑅𝑡+1
𝑅𝑡+1
)1−
1
𝛾⁄ (𝛽𝜋2)
1
𝛾⁄  ∙{1+ 𝑑𝑡+1̂
1
𝛾⁄  }]2
∙
1
𝑅𝑡+1
∙ (
𝑅𝑡+1
1−𝑞𝑡𝑅𝑡+1
 𝛽 𝜋2 )
1
𝛾⁄ ∙ ⟨1 𝛾⁄ 𝑑𝑡+1̂
1
𝛾−1⁄ ∙
[1 + 𝑞𝑡(
𝛽𝜋1
𝑞𝑡
𝑑?̂?  )
1
𝛾⁄   +   (
1−𝑞𝑡𝑅𝑡+1
𝑅𝑡+1
)1−
1
𝛾⁄ (𝛽𝜋2)
1
𝛾⁄  ∙ {1 + 𝑑𝑡+1̂
1
𝛾⁄  }] − (1 + 𝑑𝑡+1̂
1
𝛾⁄ ) ∙ { (
1−𝑞𝑡𝑅𝑡+1
𝑅𝑡+1
)1−
1
𝛾⁄ ∙
(𝛽𝜋2)
1
𝛾⁄ ∙ 1 𝛾⁄ ∙ 𝑑𝑡+1̂
1
𝛾⁄ −1  
The terms in ⟨  ⟩ follows:  
[1 𝛾⁄ ∙ 𝑑𝑡+1̂
1
𝛾⁄ −1 ∙ (
1−𝑞𝑡𝑅𝑡+1
𝑅𝑡+1
)1−
1
𝛾⁄ ∙ (1 + 𝑑𝑡+1̂
1
𝛾⁄ )] ∙ {1 − (𝛽𝜋2)
1
𝛾⁄ } + 1 𝛾⁄ ∙ 𝑑𝑡+1̂
1
𝛾⁄ −1 ∙ (1 + 𝑞𝑡(
𝛽𝜋1
𝑞𝑡
𝑑?̂?  )
1
𝛾⁄ . 
Note that everything is positive except for −(𝛽𝜋2)
1
𝛾⁄ . Since 𝛽𝜋2 ≤ 1 and γ > 0, the term {1 − (𝛽𝜋2)
1
𝛾⁄ } is 
positive. Thus 
𝜕𝑏𝑡+1
∗
𝜕𝑑𝑡+1
̂ > 0. ■ 
